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Articles 
Contract-Based Post-Sale Restrictions on 
Patented Products Following Quanta 
Alfred C. Server* and William J. Casey** 
Supreme Court decisions regarding the doctrine of patent exhaustion have drawn a bright 
line for determining when patent exhaustion occurs. If a sale of a patented product is 
authorized, exhaustion occurs. If a sale is not authorized, there is no exhaustion and 
patent remedies remain available to the patent holder to enforce a breach of a contractual 
restriction placed by the patent holder on the buyer of its patented product. But a lack of 
precision in the Supreme Court’s patent exhaustion jurisprudence has resulted in 
uncertainty regarding the scope and impact of patent exhaustion. Specifically, questions 
persist as to whether a patent holder can preserve its patent infringement remedies by 
placing a contract-based restriction on a buyer’s use or disposition of its patented product 
as a condition of the sale of the product and whether breach of contract remedies remain 
available to a patent holder if an authorized first sale is made and exhaustion occurs. 
 
The Supreme Court’s failure to answer these questions in its latest decision regarding 
patent exhaustion has prompted the Authors of this Article to seek these answers through 
a review of the relevant case law, in order to provide guidance to the patent holder who 
intends to control the use or distribution of its patented product following a sale. On the 
basis of their review, which involves an analysis of the conflict between federal patent law 
and state contract law that occurs in the context of an authorized first sale of a patented 
product, the Authors contend that a patent holder is unable to preserve patent infringement 
remedies by conditioning the sale of its patented product, and that contractual remedies 
remain available in many cases even when patent exhaustion occurs. Further, the Authors 
propose a case-by-case approach to assessing whether a contract-based post-sale 
restriction on a patented product is enforceable under state contract law. This approach 
involves determining whether (i) an objective of federal patent law preempts enforcement 
of the contractual provision; (ii) the inclusion of the provision in a contract constitutes 
patent misuse; (iii) the provision violates federal antitrust law; and (iv) public policy 
considerations (that is, regarding public health and safety) militate in favor of enforcing 
the restriction. The Authors conclude by noting that the distinction between patent 
remedies and contract remedies has diminished in the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent 
ruling that the proper test for the granting of an injunction upon a finding of patent 
infringement is the traditional four-factor test used for non-patent causes of action. 
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Introduction 
In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,1 the Supreme 
Court provided its latest interpretation of the patent exhaustion doctrine. 
The Quanta Court held that the authorized first sale of a patented 
product exhausts the patent rights substantially embodied in the product, 
eliminating patent infringement remedies with respect to the product 
based on those rights.2 The Court left unanswered, however, the 
questions of whether a patent holder can preserve its patent infringement 
remedies by placing a contract-based restriction on the buyer of its 
patented product as a condition of sale and whether breach of contract 
remedies are still available to the patent holder if an authorized first sale 
exhausts patent infringement remedies. In this Article we address these 
questions, which require a balancing of the policy considerations that 
inform the federal patent laws against the dictates of state contract law. 
In Part I, we discuss the nature and scope of the patent exhaustion 
doctrine. We begin with a brief history of the doctrine, as articulated by 
the Supreme Court, including a discussion of the various rationales that 
have been offered as justifications for patent exhaustion. We next review 
the Court’s Quanta decision. Finally, we address the current status of the 
conditional sale doctrine, as articulated by the Federal Circuit in 
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.3 According to the conditional sale 
doctrine, a patent holder can preserve its patent infringement remedies 
by placing a condition, in the form of an explicit contract-based post-sale 
restriction, on the buyer of its patented product.4 If the conditional sale 
doctrine remains good law following Quanta and a patent holder can 
control the post-sale use or disposition of its product through a patent 
infringement remedy, the question of whether a breach of contract 
remedy is also available to the patent holder is relatively unimportant. If, 
on the other hand, the authorized first sale of a patented product 
exhausts patent infringement remedies, irrespective of any condition 
placed on the buyer, then a patent holder who intends to maintain 
control of its product following a sale must rely on the enforceability of a 
breach of contract claim. The Supreme Court in Quanta failed to discuss 
the Federal Circuit’s Mallinckrodt decision, leaving questions as to the 
status of the conditional sale doctrine. However, on the basis of Supreme 
Court precedent regarding patent exhaustion and the structure of the 
Court’s argument in Quanta, we conclude that the conditional sale 
doctrine is no longer good law. And even if one accepts, for the sake of 
argument, that the doctrine’s status has yet to be fully resolved, there is 
sufficient uncertainty regarding its continued viability following Quanta 
 
 1. 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 638. 
 3. 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 4. Id. at 708–09. 
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to justify a comprehensive assessment of the enforceability of post-sale 
restrictions on a patented product through a breach of contract remedy. 
In Part II of this Article, we undertake such an assessment. We 
review arguments against the enforceability of any contract-based post-
sale restriction on a patented product under state contract law. We 
consider whether such a restriction (i) is an impermissible attempt to 
contract around patent exhaustion that is preempted under federal 
patent law; (ii) is per se patent misuse, or (iii) contravenes the public 
policies against restraints on alienation and restraints of trade. We 
conclude that some contract-based post-sale restrictions are enforceable 
under state law while others are not, depending on the nature of the 
restriction, and that such restrictions should be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis under a rule of reason type analysis. Next, we provide an 
approach to assessing the enforceability of individual contract-based 
post-sale restrictions on a patented product under state law, which 
requires a determination of whether (i) an objective of federal patent law 
preempts enforcement of the contractual provision; (ii) the inclusion of 
the provision in a contract constitutes patent misuse; (iii) the provision 
violates federal antitrust law; and (iv) public policy considerations (e.g., 
regarding public health and safety) militate in favor of enforcing the 
restriction. We then apply this approach in analyzing a representative 
contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product. We end this 
Section by considering the impact of the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.5 regarding injunctive relief for 
patent infringement on the relative benefit to a patent holder of a breach 
of contract remedy as compared to a patent infringement remedy. 
I.  Patent Exhaustion Doctrine 
A. A Brief History of the Doctrine 
The Supreme Court’s 1852 decision in Bloomer v. McQuewan6 is 
generally acknowledged as the Court’s first application of the patent 
exhaustion doctrine,7 also called the first sale doctrine.8 In that case, the 
holder of a patent right for the original patent term sold the right to 
 
 5. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 6. 55 U.S. 539 (1852). 
 7. While Bloomer v. McQuewan is generally acknowledged as the Supreme Court’s first 
application of the patent exhaustion doctrine, there was no actual authorized first sale in the case. The 
so-called authorized sale took place when a party that was granted the right under the applicable 
patent to construct and use a patented machine legally obtained title to the machine by constructing 
and using it pursuant to the granted right. Id. at 548. 
 8. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine 
in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 487, 491 (2011) (“The first significant body of distribution 
restraints law in the United States was the judge-made ‘first sale’ doctrine, often referred to as patent 
‘exhaustion,’ which limited a patentee’s ability to place restrictions on a patented good after it had 
been sold.”). 
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construct and use machines covered by the patent.9 The purchaser of the 
patent right manufactured the machines during the original term and 
continued to use them during an extension of the patent term.10 The 
holder of the patent for the extended term sued the purchaser for 
infringement.11 The Court rejected the patent infringement claim, ruling 
that the purchaser gained ownership of the machines made during the 
original term and, thereby, exhausted the right of the owner of the patent 
for the extended term to control the purchaser’s use of the machines.12 
The Court reasoned that “when the machine passes to the hands of the 
purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly”13 created by 
Congress in enacting the federal patent laws. In the 160 years since the 
McQuewan decision, the Court has reconsidered the meaning and scope 
of the patent exhaustion doctrine on at least eighteen occasions. While a 
discussion of each of these cases is beyond the scope of this Article, they 
are listed for reference in Table 1.14 In this brief history of the doctrine, 
we focus only on those cases that are critical to the issues addressed in 
this Article. 
Following its McQuewan decision, the Court’s next significant 
endorsement of the exhaustion doctrine came in Adams v. Burke.15 The 
case involved an alleged territorial restriction on the use of patented 
coffin lids.16 Burke, an undertaker, purchased some of the coffin lids from 
the owner of the patent right to make, sell, and use them within a ten-
mile radius of the city of Boston.17 Burke used the lids for their intended 
purpose in the town of Natick, which is seventeen miles from Boston.18 
Adams, the assignee of the remaining patent rights, sued Burke for 
infringement based on Burke’s use of the patented lids in the territory 
 
 9. McQuewan, 55 U.S. at 548. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 549–51. 
 13. Id. at 549. 
 14. Table 1 lists the Supreme Court cases that consider whether a restriction on a patented 
product is enforceable through a patent infringement remedy following an alleged transfer of title to 
the product. The term “patent holder” refers to the holder of the right conferred by the issuance of a 
U.S. patent (whether the original patentee, an assignee, or a conveyee) to exclude others from making 
and selling a product that is covered by or substantially embodies the applicable patent, as opposed to 
a licensee under the patent, such as a “manufacturing licensee” that has been granted the right by the 
patent holder to make and sell the patented product. The Supreme Court’s decisions in E. Bement & 
Sons v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902), and United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 
476 (1926), are frequently included in discussions of the Court’s patent exhaustion jurisprudence. 
These cases, however, solely addressed the enforceability of a restriction placed by a patent holder on 
a manufacturing licensee and did not consider a restriction placed on the buyer of a patented product. 
Moreover, Bement was a breach of contract case that did not involve a patent infringement claim. 
 15. 84 U.S. 453 (1873). 
 16. Id. at 453–54. 
 17. Id. at 454–55. 
 18. Id. 
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assigned to Adams.19 The Court rejected the infringement claim on the 
grounds that the authorized first sale of the coffin lids to Burke 
exhausted any patent rights with respect to the purchased lids. 
The Court’s brief opinion in Adams is noteworthy because it provided 
language that spawned a number of justifications for patent exhaustion, 
based on arguments that are often overlapping and, occasionally, in 
conflict. The Adams Court relied on the holding in McQuewan to 
conclude that “when the patentee, or the person having his rights, sells a 
machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use, . . . he parts with the 
right to restrict that use [because] [t]he article . . . passes without the limit 
of the monopoly.”20 This is a per se rule that holds that an authorized first 
sale of a patented product, which transfers title to the product to the 
buyer, moves the product outside of the scope of the patent monopoly 
and, therefore, exhausts the patent rights with respect to that product. As 
will be demonstrated in Part I.B, this bright-line rule was emphatically 
endorsed by the Supreme Court in its recent Quanta decision. 
The Court in Adams, however, embellished the McQuewan “outside 
of the patent monopoly” rationale by focusing on the consideration 
received by an authorized seller in the sale of its patented product. As 
the Court stated, 
the patentee or his assignee having in the act of sale received all the 
royalty or consideration which he claims for the use of his invention in 
that particular machine or instrument, it is open to the use of the 
purchaser without further restriction on account of the monopoly of 
the patentees.21 
This language has been interpreted as reflecting the view that once a 
patent holder has received its reward for its invention through the sale of 
a product embodying that invention, the purpose of the federal patent 
statute to encourage innovation for the public good has been satisfied. 
As the Supreme Court noted in a subsequent decision referencing its 
Adams holding, “once that purpose is realized the patent law affords no 
basis for restraining the use and enjoyment of the thing sold.”22 
Exhaustion of the patent right following an authorized first sale for 
consideration is consistent with the view that the statutory monopoly 
conferred upon an inventor through the issuance of a patent should be 
limited and of no greater scope or duration than that required to meet 
the federal patent system’s goal “to promote invention while at the same 
time preserving free competition.”23 
The Supreme Court’s language in Adams regarding a patentee’s 
reward, however, has been interpreted differently by the courts over the 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 456. 
 21. Id. 
 22. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942). 
 23. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230–31 (1964). 
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years. According to one view, the single reward interpretation,24 a patent 
holder who sells its patented product is entitled to a single payment at 
the time of the sale and, upon receipt of that consideration, its right to 
exert downstream control over the buyer’s use or disposition of the 
product through the threat of a patent infringement claim ends as a result 
of patent exhaustion. The Supreme Court expressed this view in Hobbie 
v. Jennison,25 endorsing “the true interpretation of the decision in Adams 
v. Burke.”26 In the words of the Hobbie Court, “when the patentee, or the 
person having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole value 
is in its use, he receives the consideration for its use and parts with the 
right to restrict that use.”27  
However, an alternative interpretation has been suggested, most 
recently by the Federal Circuit in its decisions in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. 
Medipart, Inc.28 and B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories.29 
According to that view, a patent holder can request a payment from its 
buyer that is less than the full value of the patent rights embodied in the 
product sold. By so doing, the patent holder is able to retain some of the 
rights in the product, which are made known to the buyer in the form of 
a contract-based restriction on the buyer’s post-sale use or disposition of 
the product. A violation of this restriction by the buyer can be remedied 
through a patent infringement claim. As the Federal Circuit noted in its 
Braun decision, the exhaustion doctrine “does not apply to an expressly 
conditional sale . . . . In such a transaction, it is more reasonable to infer 
that the parties negotiated a price that reflects only the value of the ‘use’ 
rights conferred by the patentee.”30 In essence, the patent holder can tailor 
the consideration demanded for the sale of its product to match the value 
of the rights transferred to the buyer. The question as to which of these 
conflicting interpretations of the consideration rationale for patent 
exhaustion (single reward versus tailored consideration) is correct is still 
being debated and is specifically addressed in Part II.B.2 below. 
The Court in Adams offered yet another rationale for the patent 
exhaustion doctrine when it held “that the sale by a person [of a patented 
machine] who has the full right to make, sell, and use such a machine 
 
 24. The single reward interpretation of patent exhaustion is also discussed in Part II.B.2 infra. 
 25. 149 U.S. 355 (1893). 
 26. Id. at 361. 
 27. Id. at 361–62. In Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. 340, 350 (1863), the Supreme Court expressed a 
similar view in stating that patentees “are entitled to but one royalty for a patented machine, and 
consequently when a patentee has himself constructed the machine and sold it, or authorized another 
to construct and sell it, . . . and the consideration has been paid to him for the right, he has then to that 
extent parted with his monopoly, and ceased to have any interest whatever in the machine so 
sold . . . .”; see LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., No. C 01-00326 CW, 2002 WL 31996860, at 
*4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2002) (“The [patent exhaustion] doctrine is designed to prevent a patentee 
from receiving a double royalty on a single patented invention.”). 
 28. 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 29. 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 30. Id. at 1426; see infra note 146. 
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carries with it the right to the use of that machine to the full extent to which 
it can be used.”31 In effect, the Court articulated the implied license 
rationale for patent exhaustion, which holds that the authorized first sale 
of a patented product is accompanied by an implied license to use and 
dispose of the product free from downstream control by the patent 
holder. This rationale has been repeated in subsequent Supreme Court 
opinions regarding patent exhaustion.32 However, the validity of this 
argument has been questioned,33 and, as discussed in the following Part, 
the Supreme Court rejected the implied license rationale in Quanta.34 
The various justifications for patent exhaustion reflected in the 
Court’s opinion in Adams are echoed, albeit inconsistently, in subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions addressing the doctrine. In fact, the Court’s 
Adams opinion provides the first glimpse of the confusion as to policy 
rationale that has come to characterize the Supreme Court’s patent 
exhaustion jurisprudence. This confusion has been the source of 
significant uncertainty among commentators and the courts with respect 
to the proper application of the doctrine. 
The Supreme Court’s next important ruling on patent exhaustion 
was issued in Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co.35 In that case the Court 
held that the authorized first sale of patented beds by the owner of the 
rights to the patent in the state of Michigan exhausted all of the patent 
rights embodied in the beds.36 The effect of the exhaustion was to bar a 
patent infringement claim brought by the owner of the patent rights in 
the state of Massachusetts against a buyer who purchased the beds in 
 
 31. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 455 (1873) (emphasis added). 
 32. See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942) (observing that an authorized 
sale is “both a complete transfer of ownership … and a license to practice” the patented invention); see 
infra notes 71–79 and accompanying text discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Univis; see also 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. 
LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-937), 2007 WL 3353102 (“[A]n authorized sale of a 
patented article grants an implied-in-law license under patent law to practice the patent. As Adams 
explained, this Court’s first-sale cases rest on the principle that ‘the sale by a person who has the full 
right to make, sell, and use such a machine carries with it the right to the use of that machine to the full 
extent to which it can be used.’” (citation omitted)). 
 33. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 
89 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 31–32 (2001); John W. Osborne, A Coherent View of Patent Exhaustion: A 
Standard Based on Patentable Distinctiveness, 20 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 643, 687–
91 (2004); see also LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., C 01-00326 CW, 2002 WL 31996860 *3–4 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2002) (“The patent exhaustion doctrine . . . is derived from the statutory grant of 
exclusivity to the patentee. . . . The implied license doctrine, on the other hand, derives not from 
statute, but from principles of equity. . . . Although similar in effect, the doctrines require distinct 
analysis. To determine if a patent was exhausted, the court must assess whether the terms of the 
patentee’s sale remove the invention from the protection of the patent law. The determination of 
whether an implied license exists, however, is necessarily more fact specific. The court must determine 
whether the patentee’s acts led the accused infringer to believe it had acquired the right to practice the 
patented invention.”). 
 34. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 35. 157 U.S. 659 (1895). 
 36. Id. at 666. 
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Michigan but resold them in Massachusetts.37 The significance of the case 
for our purposes is that it provides the first clear articulation by the 
Supreme Court of the question that is the focus of this Article, namely, is 
a contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product enforceable 
through a breach of contract remedy, despite the absence of a patent 
infringement remedy as a result of exhaustion? In raising, but not 
answering, this question the Keeler Court stated the following: 
[O]ne who buys patented articles of manufacture from one authorized 
to sell them becomes possessed of an absolute property in such articles, 
unrestricted in time or place. Whether a patentee may protect himself 
and his assignees by special contracts brought home to the purchasers 
is not a question before us, and upon which we express no opinion. It 
is, however, obvious that such a question would arise as a question of 
contract, and not as one under the inherent meaning and effect of the 
patent laws.38 
We will revisit this language below in Part II.A of this Article. 
The Court’s decision in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.39 (overruled in 
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co.40) is a 
true outlier in the Supreme Court’s patent exhaustion jurisprudence. The 
case involved the sale of a patented rotary mimeograph machine by the 
patentee in which the buyer was obligated, as indicated by a notice 
attached to the machine, to only use unpatented stencil paper and ink 
made by the patentee in the operation of the machine.41 Despite the 
authorized first sale of the patented machine, the Court held that the 
relevant patents were not exhausted and that the post-sale restriction 
placed on the buyer was enforceable through a patent infringement 
remedy.42 The Court distinguished its prior decisions in which an 
authorized first sale resulted in patent exhaustion as involving 
unconditional sales in which the seller placed no post-sale restriction on 
the buyer with respect to the product sold.43 It relied on a variation of the 
implied license rationale for patent exhaustion to argue that a seller can 
retain some of its patent rights with respect to a product if the sale is 
made subject to a condition known to the buyer.44 Quoting from a 
recognized treatise on patent law, the Henry Court held that “any person 
having the right to sell may at the time of sale restrict the use of his 
vendee within specific boundaries of time or place or method, and these 
 
 37. Id. at 667. 
 38. Id. at 666. 
 39. 224 U.S. 1 (1912). 
 40. 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
 41. Henry, 224 U.S. at 11. 
 42. Id. at 24–25. 
 43. Id. at 19 (“In the cases cited above [including Mitchell, Adams, and Keeler], the statement that 
a purchaser of a patented machine has an unlimited right to use it for all the purposes of the invention, 
so long as the identity of the machine is preserved, was made of one who bought unconditionally, that 
is, subject to no specified limitation upon his right of use.”). 
 44. Id. at 23–24. 
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will then become the measure of the implied license arising from the 
sale.”45 In other words, while an unconditional authorized first sale of a 
patented product carries with it an unrestricted implied license granted 
to the buyer to use or dispose of the product and in that sense exhausts 
the patent right, an authorized first sale that is conditioned by means of 
an express restriction placed on the buyer limits the scope of the implied 
license and the extent of the exhaustion. 
The Henry Court provided a second justification for its ruling by 
adopting the tailored consideration rationale for patent exhaustion, 
discussed above. Recall that, according to this rationale, a patent holder 
that sells its product can request a payment that is less than a full value of 
the patent rights embodied in the product and, thereby, retain some of its 
rights in the product that are made known to the buyer through an express 
condition of the sale. As the Court in Henry explained, 
the patentee sold its machines at cost, or less, and depended upon the 
profit realized from the sale of other non-patented articles adapted to 
be used with the machine, and . . . it had put out many thousands of 
such machines under the same license restriction. Such a sale, while 
transferring the property right in the machine, carries with it only the 
right to use it for practicing the invention according to the terms of the 
license. To no other or greater extent does the patentee consent to the 
use of the machine. When the purchaser is sued for infringement by 
using the device, he may defend by pleading, not the general and 
unlimited license which is carried by an unconditional sale, but the 
limited license indicated by the metal tablet annexed to the machine. If 
the use is not one permitted, it is plainly an infringing use.46 
The Court in Henry bolstered its argument that a conditioned 
authorized sale limits patent exhaustion by citing its prior decisions in 
Mitchell v. Hawley47 and Bement v. National Harrow Co.,48 in which the 
Court had ruled that the product-related restriction under consideration 
was enforceable. However, the sales in those cases were not authorized 
by the patent holder. In fact, the Henry Court had to look to a prior Sixth 
Circuit decision in Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka 
Specialty Co.49 for a fact pattern similar to that in Henry in which the 
conditioning of an authorized first sale preserved a patent infringement 
 
 45. Id. at 24 (quoting 2 Robinson on Patents § 824). 
 46. Id. at 26. 
 47. 83 U.S. 544 (1872). 
 48. 186 U.S. 70 (1902). Note that Bement was a breach of contract case that did not involve a 
patent infringement claim. It solely addressed the enforceability of a restriction placed by a patent 
holder on a manufacturing licensee and did not consider a restriction placed on the buyer of a 
patented product. The Court in Henry relied on it for the proposition that ‘“with few exceptions, . . . 
any conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to this kind of [patented 
intellectual] property, imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the right to 
manufacture or use or sell the article, will be upheld by the courts. The fact that the conditions in the 
contracts keep up the [patentee’s] monopoly . . . does not render them illegal.’” Henry v. A.B. Dick 
Co., 224 U.S. 1, 30 (1912) (quoting Bement, 186 U.S. at 91). 
 49. 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896). 
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remedy, and the same judge (Lurton) delivered the opinion of the court 
in both cases. 
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Henry was overruled in 
Motion Picture Patents,50 the so-called conditional sale doctrine endorsed 
in Henry was resurrected by the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt and 
Braun.51 There is uncertainty, however, as to the continued viability of 
the doctrine in the wake of the Supreme Court’s Quanta decision. We 
discuss the status of the conditional sale doctrine and its relevance to the 
question of whether a contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented 
product can be enforced through a breach of contract remedy in Part I.C. 
Following its decision in Henry, the Supreme Court issued four 
opinions regarding patent exhaustion that undermined and ultimately 
overruled its holding in Henry: Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell,52 Straus v. 
Victor Talking Machine Co.,53 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal 
Film Manufacturing Co.,54 and Boston Store of Chicago v. American 
Graphophone Co.55 Aspects of these decisions are discussed elsewhere in 
this Article. Collectively, they are remarkable for the following shared 
features: In each of these cases the Court found that (i) the relevant 
patent was exhausted following an authorized first sale of a patented 
product, despite an express condition placed upon, and known to, the 
buyer in the form of a restriction as to the post-sale use or disposition of 
the product; (ii) as a result of the exhaustion, the post-sale restriction 
placed on the buyer was not enforceable through a patent infringement 
remedy; and (iii) the post-sale restriction under consideration, which 
placed either a tying or price-fixing obligation on the buyer, was void as 
constituting patent misuse and/or in violation of competition law. 
The Supreme Court relied primarily on McQuewan’s “outside the 
patent monopoly” rationale for patent exhaustion in deciding these four 
cases.56 However, the Court in these cases addressed another consideration 
that has been used as a justification for patent exhaustion, namely, the 
public policies against restraints of alienation and restraints of trade. As 
the Court noted in Straus,  
 
 50. 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917) (“It is obvious that the conclusions arrived at in this opinion are such 
that the decision in Henry v. Dick Co. . . . must be regarded as overruled.”). 
 51. See William LaFuze et al., The Conditional Sale Doctrine in a Post-Quanta World and Its 
Implications on Modern Licensing Agreements, 11 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 295 (2011). 
 52. 229 U.S. 1 (1913). 
 53. 243 U.S. 490 (1917). 
 54. 243 U.S. 502. 
 55. 246 U.S. 8 (1918). 
 56. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852). The Court’s position was, perhaps, best 
expressed in its Bauer decision when it stated that, following the authorized first sale of a patented 
product, the “right to vend conferred by the patent law has been exercised, and the added restriction is 
beyond the protection and purpose of the act. This being so, the case is brought within that line of 
cases in which this court from the beginning has held that a patentee who has parted with a patented 
machine by passing title to a purchaser has placed the article beyond the limits of the monopoly 
secured by the patent act.” 229 U.S. at 17. 
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[c]ourts would be perversely blind if they failed to look through such 
an attempt as this ‘License Notice’ thus plainly is to sell property for a 
full price, and yet to place restraints upon its further alienation, such as 
have been hateful to the law from Lord Coke’s day to ours, because 
obnoxious to the public interest.57 
In Motion Picture Patents, the Court stated that 
it is not competent for the owner of a patent by notice attached to its 
machine to, in effect, extend the scope of its patent monopoly by 
restricting the use of it to materials necessary in its operation but which 
are no part of the patented invention, or to send its machines forth into 
the channels of trade of the country subject to conditions as to use or 
royalty to be paid to be imposed thereafter at the discretion of such 
patent owner. The patent law furnishes no warrant for such a practice 
and the cost, inconvenience and annoyance to the public which the 
opposite conclusion would occasion forbid it.58 
We discuss this policy rationale further in Part II.A.3. 
General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co.59 was the next 
important patent exhaustion case decided by the Supreme Court. 
American Telephone and Telegraph Company (the “Telephone 
Company”) owned various patents that covered amplifiers used for home-
use radio reception and for reproducing sound for movie equipment in 
theaters.60 The Telephone Company authorized its agent to grant a 
nonexclusive license under its patents to American Transformer Company 
(the “Transformer Company”) to manufacture and sell amplifiers covered 
by the patents for radio reception only.61 The license agreement was 
explicit in limiting the scope of the grant to sales to private radio users 
and not for commercial use in theaters.62 Despite the restriction, the 
Transformer Company sold amplifiers to General Talking Pictures 
Corporation (“GTP”), knowing that GTP intended to use the amplifiers 
in theaters.63 GTP was made aware of the limitation on the Transformer 
Company’s right to sell the amplifiers through a notice affixed to the 
machines indicating that they were for private use only.64 Western 
Electric Company (“Western”), which had been granted the exclusive 
right to sell the covered amplifiers for commercial use in theaters, sued 
GTP for patent infringement.65 The Court concluded that both the 
Transformer Company and GTP had infringed the patents at issue.66 In 
manufacturing the amplifiers for, and selling them to, GTP for 
 
 57. 243 U.S. at 500–01. 
 58. 243 U.S. at 516. 
 59. 304 U.S. 175 (1938), reh’g at 305 U.S. 124 (1938). 
 60. Gen. Talking Pictures, 304 U.S. at 179. 
 61. Id. at 179–80. 
 62. Id. at 180. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 179. 
 66. Id. at 181–82. 
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commercial use, the Transformer Company was acting outside of the 
scope of its license grant.67 Accordingly, the sale made by the 
Transformer Company was an infringing (and not authorized) sale that 
did not exhaust the patent infringement remedy that Western sought 
from the Transformer Company.68 GTP, which had purchased the 
amplifiers with the knowledge that the sale by the Transformer Company 
was not authorized, infringed the patents through its commercial use of 
the amplifiers.69 
The Court’s decision in General Talking Pictures is instructive for 
several reasons. First, it was the Court’s clearest demonstration to date of 
an infringing sale of a patented product in a case addressing patent 
exhaustion. The business arrangement under consideration was carefully 
detailed by the Court so as to highlight the fact that the sale of the 
patented product was made by a manufacturing licensee acting outside of 
the scope of a validly restricted license grant.70 Second, the Court 
distinguished between a restriction placed by a patent holder on its 
manufacturing licensee and a restriction placed on the buyer of a patented 
product. And third, the Court confirmed that only a first sale that is 
authorized by the holder of the patent right (as opposed to an infringing 
sale) triggers exhaustion that renders a post-sale restriction on the buyer 
of the patented product unenforceable through a patent infringement 
remedy. 
Considering our view that General Talking Pictures is a pivotal case 
for interpreting the Supreme Court’s patent exhaustion jurisprudence, it 
is particularly noteworthy that the Federal Circuit relied on the case in 
Mallinckrodt to resurrect the conditional sale doctrine originally endorsed 
in Henry. There is a clear distinction, however, between the infringing sale 
that occurred in General Talking Pictures and an authorized first sale 
accompanied by a condition on the buyer that occurred in both Henry and 
Mallinckrodt. As we will argue in Part I.C, Supreme Court case law 
makes clear that the former does not exhaust patent infringement 
remedies while the latter does. Suffice it to say at this point that through 
application of the principles set forth in General Talking Pictures, 
seemingly contradictory Supreme Court decisions regarding patent 
exhaustion can be reconciled, with the exception of Henry which was 
overruled by Motion Picture Patents. 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 182. 
 70. 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938) (“As the restriction was legal and the amplifiers were made and sold 
outside the scope of the license the effect is precisely the same as if no license whatsoever had been 
granted to Transformer Company. And as Pictures Corporation [GTP] knew the facts, it is in no better 
position than if it had manufactured the amplifiers itself without a license. It is liable because it has 
used the invention without license to do so.”). 
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United States v. Univis Lens Co.71 was the Supreme Court’s last 
significant patent exhaustion opinion prior to its Quanta decision. The 
case involved a licensing system by means of which the holder of patents 
relating to multifocal lenses for eyeglasses controlled the prices at which 
the lenses were sold.72 Univis Lens Company (“Univis”) was licensed by 
the patent holder to manufacture and sell lens blanks to designated 
licensees of the patent holder for finishing and resale, at prices specified 
by the patent holder, for use in eyeglasses.73 The federal government 
challenged the licensing system as an unlawful restraint of trade under 
the Sherman Act that was not within the protection of the patent laws.74 
The Supreme Court found for the government on the basis of its 
conclusion that the authorized first sale of the lens blanks by Univis 
exhausted the patent monopoly with respect to the lenses—rendering the 
resale price restriction placed on a buyer of the lenses void as a violation 
of antitrust law.75 Central to the Court’s ruling was its determination that 
the authorized sale of a lens blank, which embodied the essential features 
of the patented invention and whose only use was as a multifocal lens for 
eyeglasses when finished in accordance with the patent, exhausted the 
relevant patents with respect to both the blank and the finished lens, 
despite the fact that the finishing of the lens was to be performed by the 
buyer of the blank.76 
As in Adams, the Supreme Court in Univis relied on multiple 
justifications for patent exhaustion to rule that the post-sale restriction 
under consideration in the case was not enforceable through a patent 
infringement remedy. The Univis Court adopted McQuewan’s “outside 
of the patent monopoly” rationale in stating that the “first vending of any 
article manufactured under a patent puts the article beyond the reach of 
the monopoly which that patent confers.”77 In addition, the Court 
endorsed Adams’s focus on the consideration received by a patent holder 
from a product sale by noting that 
 
 71. 316 U.S. 241 (1942). 
 72. Id. at 243–44. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 242–43. 
 75. Id. at 250 (“The patentee may surrender his monopoly in whole by the sale of his patent or in 
part by the sale of an article embodying the invention. His monopoly remains so long as he retains the 
ownership of the patented article. But sale of it exhausts the monopoly in that article and the patentee 
may not thereafter, by virtue of his patent, control the use or disposition of the article. Hence the 
patentee cannot control the resale price of patented articles which he has sold, either by resort to an 
infringement suit, or, consistently with the Sherman Act . . . by stipulating for price maintenance by his 
vendees.” (citation omitted)). 
 76. Id. at 250–51 (“[W]here one has sold an uncompleted article which, because it embodies 
essential features of his patented invention, is within the protection of his patent, and has destined the 
article to be finished by the purchaser in conformity to the patent, he has sold his invention so far as it 
is or may be embodied in that particular article.”). 
 77. Id. at 252. 
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[o]ur decisions have uniformly recognized that the purpose of the 
patent law is fulfilled with respect to any particular article when the 
patentee has received his reward for the use of his invention by the sale 
of the article, and that once that purpose is realized the patent law 
affords no basis for restraining the use and enjoyment of the thing 
sold.78 
Finally, the Univis Court looked to the implied license rationale for patent 
exhaustion to support its ruling in the case. In the words of the Court, 
[a]n incident to the purchase of any article, whether patented or 
unpatented, is the right to use and sell it, and upon familiar principles 
the authorized sale of an article which is capable of use only in 
practicing the patent is a relinquishment of the patent monopoly with 
respect to the article sold. Sale of a lens blank by the patentee or by his 
licensee is thus in itself both a complete transfer of ownership of the 
blank, which is within the protection of the patent law, and a license to 
practice the final stage of the patent procedure.79 
The Supreme Court’s reliance on multiple rationales for patent 
exhaustion in its Univis decision was consistent with the Court’s prior 
approach to justifying the doctrine and left the various rationales 
available for reconsideration by the Court in Quanta. 
B. QUANTA 
 1. The Supreme Court’s Decision 
In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics., Inc.,80 the Supreme 
Court issued its latest opinion on patent exhaustion. LG Electronics 
(“LGE”) owned a portfolio of patents related to computer systems.81 
LGE licensed its patents to Intel Corporation (“Intel”).82 The license 
agreement authorized “Intel to make, use, sell (directly or indirectly), 
offer to sell, import or otherwise dispose of its own products practicing 
the [licensed] patents” (the “Licensed Intel Products”).83 The license 
agreement also had a clause that attempted to prevent the license from 
 
 78. Id. at 251. 
 79. Id. at 249 (citation omitted). 
 80. 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
 81. See id. at 621–23. Three patents were at issue in the case. Id. at 621. U.S. Patent No. 4,939,641 
(’641) covers a system that “ensur[es] that the most current data are retrieved from main memory by 
monitoring data requests and updating main memory from the cache when stale data are requested.” 
Id. at 622 (citing LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). U.S. 
Patent No. 5,379,379 (’379) covers an efficient manner of coordinating “requests to read from, and 
write to, main memory.” Id. (citing LG Elecs., 453 F.3d at 1378). U.S. Patent No. 5,077,733 (’733) 
covers methods of rotating data traffic among multiple computer components to ensure no one 
component’s usage dominates while giving heavy users priority. Id. at 622–23 (citing Order Construing 
Disputed Terms and Phrases at 37–38, LG Elecs. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., No. C01-02187 (N.D. 
Cal., Aug. 20, 2002)). 
 82. Id. at 623. 
 83. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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extending to third party buyers.84 But, the license agreement noted that it 
was not intended to modify the principles of patent exhaustion in any 
way.85 In a separate master agreement, Intel agreed to provide written 
notice to its buyers that Intel’s license from LGE did not extend to 
products made “by combining an Intel product with any non-Intel 
product.”86 
Quanta Computer (“Quanta”) purchased microprocessors and 
chipsets, each a Licensed Intel Product, from Intel and combined them 
with non-Intel memory and buses.87 LGE’s patents covered the 
combination, but Quanta combined the Intel and non-Intel products 
despite Intel’s provision of the notice required by the master 
agreement.88 LGE then asserted its patents against Quanta while Quanta 
argued that Intel’s sale to Quanta exhausted any patent rights LGE had 
in the combined product.89 
The Court held that patent exhaustion applied and that LGE had no 
patent remedy it could use to seek redress against Quanta.90 In discussing 
the exhaustion doctrine, the Court emphasized several of its precedents91 
to reinforce the basic tenet that an authorized first sale of a patented 
product exhausts a patent holder’s rights in the patent with respect to 
that product. First, the Court noted that following such a sale, post-sale 
restrictions on the use or disposition of the product are not enforceable 
through a patent infringement remedy.92 Next, the Court referenced 
McQuewan’s “outside of the patent monopoly” rationale as the 
justification for patent exhaustion.93 Finally, citing its decision in Univis, 
the Court emphasized that patent exhaustion applies “following the sale of 
an item . . . when the item sufficiently embodies the patent—even if it does 
 
 84. Id. (“[The agreement] stipulates that no license is granted by either party hereto . . . to any 
third party for the combination by a third party of Licensed Products of either party with items, 
components, or the like acquired . . . from sources other than a party hereto, or for the use, import, 
offer for sale or sale of such combination.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 85. Id. (“[N]otwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement, the parties 
agree that nothing herein shall in any way limit or alter the effect of patent exhaustion that would 
otherwise apply when a party hereto sells any of its Licensed Products.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 86. Id. at 624. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 638. 
 91. See id. at 625–28. In reviewing the history of the patent exhaustion doctrine, the Court in 
Quanta discussed its prior decisions in McQuewan, Adams, Henry, Bauer, Motion Picture Patents, and 
Univis. 
 92. See id. at 625–26. The Court noted that after briefly permitting the enforcement of post-sale 
restrictions through a patent infringement remedy in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), it 
overruled that decision in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
 93. Id. at 625 (“[W]hen the machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within 
the limits of the monopoly.” (quoting Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1853))). 
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not completely practice the patent—such that its only and intended use is 
to be finished under the terms of the patent.”94 
Before addressing whether the sale under consideration in the case 
was an authorized first sale that exhausted the patent, the Quanta Court 
considered whether exhaustion applies to method claims and whether 
the Licensed Intel Products substantially embodied the patents. First, the 
Court held that patent exhaustion does apply to method claims.95 It based 
this holding on Court precedent,96 as well as the policy rationale that 
clever claim drafters would draft method claims to avoid exhaustion.97 
Second, the Court held that an “authorized sale of an article which is 
capable of use only in practicing the patent is a relinquishment of the 
patent monopoly with respect to the article sold.”98 Since only common 
processes or standard parts were required to practice the LGE patents 
after Intel’s sale of the Licensed Intel Products, the Court found that 
Intel’s microprocessors and chipsets substantially embodied the LGE 
patents.99 Further, the Court addressed when substantial embodiment 
occurs by noting that the inventive part of the patents in this case was in 
the design of the Licensed Intel Products and not their combination with 
memory and buses.100 
Finally, the Court addressed whether Intel’s sale was an authorized 
sale that exhausted the patent and held that the sale was authorized and 
exhaustion did apply.101 In coming to this determination, the Court rejected 
LGE’s argument that Intel was not authorized to sell Licensed Intel 
Products to buyers for “use in combination with non-Intel products.”102 
Instead, the Court noted that the license agreement did not restrict 
 
 94. Id. at 628. 
 95. Id. at 629 (“[T]his Court has repeatedly held that method patents were exhausted by the sale 
of an item that embodied the method.”). 
 96. Id. (“In Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, for example, the Court held that the sale of a 
motor fuel produced under one patent also exhausted the patent for a method of using the fuel in 
combustion motors. Similarly, . . . Univis held that the sale of optical lens blanks that partially 
practiced a patent exhausted the method patents that were not completely practiced until the blanks 
were ground into lenses.” (citation omitted)). 
 97. Id. at 629–30. (“Eliminating exhaustion for method patents would seriously undermine the 
exhaustion doctrine. Patentees seeking to avoid patent exhaustion could simply draft their patent claims 
to describe a method rather than an apparatus . . . . By characterizing their claims as method instead of 
apparatus claims, or including a method claim for the machine’s patented method of performing its task, a 
patent drafter could shield practically any patented item from exhaustion.”). 
 98. Id. at 631 (quoting United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942)). 
 99. Id. at 633 (“Like the Univis lens blanks, the Intel Products constitute a material part of the 
patented invention and all but completely practice the patent. Here, as in Univis, the incomplete 
article substantially embodies the patent because the only step necessary to practice the patent is the 
application of common processes or the addition of standard parts. Everything inventive about each 
patent is embodied in the Intel Products.”). 
 100. Id. at 635 (“In this case, the inventive part of the patent is not the fact that memory and buses 
are combined with a microprocessor or chipset; rather, it is included in the design of the Intel Products 
themselves and the way these products access the memory or bus.”). 
 101. Id. at 635–37. 
 102. Id. at 636. 
578 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:561 
Intel’s ability to sell to buyers intending to combine the Licensed Intel 
Products with non-Intel parts.103 Further, Intel provided to third party 
buyers the notice that was required by the master agreement, and even if 
they did not, the breach of the master agreement would not have 
breached the license agreement.104 Thus, the Court found the sale to be 
authorized by the license agreement.105 
It is noteworthy that the Court in Quanta rejected LGE’s argument 
that Quanta had no right to combine the Licensed Intel Products with 
non-Intel products because the license agreement between LGE and Intel 
disclaimed any license to third parties (including Quanta) to practice the 
LGE patents by combining the Intel products with non-Intel 
components.106 According to the Quanta Court, this argument was relevant 
to the reasoning that, in the absence of an explicit disclaimer such as the 
one in the license agreement, Quanta would have been granted an implied 
license under LGE’s patents to use the Licensed Intel Products with non-
Intel products, but in the presence of such an explicit disclaimer, the 
implied license to Quanta was limited to use of the Intel products only 
with other Intel products.107 From the Court’s perspective, however, the 
question at issue in the case (and Quanta’s argument in support of its 
unrestricted use of the Licensed Intel Products) was not one of implied 
license, but of patent exhaustion.108 In essence, the Supreme Court in 
Quanta rejected the implied license rationale for patent exhaustion in 
favor of the per se rule originally set forth in McQuewan that an 
authorized first sale of a patented product places the product outside of 
the scope of the statutorily created patent monopoly. 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 636–37. 
 105. See id. (“LGE overlooks important aspects of the structure of the Intel-LGE transaction. 
Nothing in the License Agreement restricts Intel’s right to sell its microprocessors and chipsets to 
purchasers who intend to combine them with non-Intel parts. It broadly permits Intel to ‘“make, use, 
[or] sell”’ products free of LGE’s patent claims. To be sure, LGE did require Intel to give notice to its 
customers, including Quanta, that LGE had not licensed those customers to practice its patents. But 
neither party contends that Intel breached the agreement in that respect. In any event, the provision 
requiring notice to Quanta appeared only in the Master Agreement, and LGE does not suggest that a 
breach of that agreement would constitute a breach of the License Agreement. Hence, Intel’s 
authority to sell its products embodying the LGE Patents was not conditioned on the notice or on 
Quanta’s decision to abide by LGE’s directions in that notice.” (alteration in original) (citations 
omitted)). 
 106. Id. at 637. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. (“LGE points out that the License Agreement specifically disclaimed any license to third 
parties to practice the patents by combining licensed products with other components. But the 
question whether third parties received implied licenses is irrelevant because Quanta asserts its right 
to practice the patents based not on implied license but on exhaustion. And exhaustion turns only on 
Intel’s own license to sell products practicing the LGE Patents.” (citation omitted)). 
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 2. A Critique of the Decision 
The Supreme Court’s Quanta decision has been the subject of 
numerous commentaries109 and scholarly reviews.110 Foremost among the 
criticisms that have been leveled at the decision are the following: (i) The 
Quanta decision endorses a per se rule for patent exhaustion, in the 
absence of a clear and compelling policy rationale; (ii) the decision rests 
upon formalistic line drawing that permits a patent holder, through an 
appropriate business arrangement and careful contract drafting, to 
circumvent patent exhaustion; and (iii) the Court’s opinion in the case 
leaves unanswered critical questions regarding the fate of Mallinckrodt’s 
conditional sale doctrine and the enforceability of a contract-based post-
sale restriction on a patented product through a breach of contract 
remedy. 
a. A Per Se Rule That Lacks a Clear and Compelling Policy 
Rationale 
The Supreme Court in Quanta concluded that “[t]he authorized sale 
of an article that substantially embodies a patent exhausts the patent 
holder’s rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking patent law to 
control post-sale use of the article.”111 This bright-line rule mandates the 
exhaustion of any patent substantially embodied in a product following the 
product’s authorized first sale by the patent holder or its licensee. While 
application of the rule may present a challenge as to which patent is 
exhausted by the sale,112 the rule has simplicity and finality to commend it. 
 
 109. See Eileen McDermott, How Quanta Will Change Licensing, Managing Intell. Prop., 
July/Aug. 2008, at 74; Chris Holman, Quanta and Its Impact on Biotechnology, Holman’s Biotech IP 
Blog (June 11, 2008), http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/2008/06/quanta-and-its-impact-on-
biotechnology.html. 
 110. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 8; Thomas G. Hungar, Observations Regarding the 
Supreme Court’s Decision in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 49 IDEA 517 (2009); 
LaFuze et al., supra note 51; Jason McCammon, The Validity of Conditional Sales: Competing Views of 
Patent Exhaustion in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008), 32 Harv. 
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 785 (2009); Jared Tong, Comment, You Pay for What You Get: The Argument for 
Allowing Parties to Contract Around Patent Exhaustion, 46 Hous. L. Rev. 1711 (2010). 
 111. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 638. 
 112. See McDermott, supra note 109, at 76 (“Jeffrey Kushan of Sidley Austin, who represented LG 
in the case, says that the Court failed to grasp the crux of the issue. ‘One thing that was not 
appreciated in the Court’s decision was the relationship between the products and the patents at issue. 
They didn’t connect the dots on independent patent embodiments,’ says Kushan. He adds that the 
Court’s assertion that, since the chips ‘substantially embodied’ the method patents, they were subject 
to exhaustion, is simply unclear. ‘We don’t know what “substantially embodied” means,’ says Kushan. 
‘We don’t know how much has to be embodied—that’s an area of confusion. It doesn’t have an 
objective footing.’”); Holman, supra note 109 (“I foresee difficulty as courts attempt to apply the 
‘substantially embodied’ standard. For example, the Court suggests that in applying the doctrine to a 
patent claiming a ‘combination invention,’ the purchased product would have to incorporate all claim 
limitations to ‘substantially embody’ the patent . . . . But for other patents, wherein the inventive 
element resides in only certain claim limitations (such as the LGE patents), the court will need to 
identify the ‘inventive’ claim limitations and determine whether a product comprising those limitations 
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The Quanta Court’s restatement of the law of patent exhaustion has 
been criticized, however, as perpetuating a draconian per se rule against 
post-sale vertical restraints113 that runs counter to the trend in 
competition law to evaluate such restraints with greater subtlety and to 
view them more favorably. As one commentator stated, 
[t]he Supreme Court missed an opportunity to make the law of post-
sale restraints more coherent in its recent Quanta Computer decision, 
where it reverted to a strict application of the first sale rule not clearly 
related to any policy of furthering competition or innovation. Until 
Quanta, the case law over the last two generations had consistently 
pursued two themes: a benign attitude toward vertical restraints and a 
belief that IP rights are not inherently monopolistic. The Quanta 
decision is a reversion to an older form of patent “exceptionalism” that 
viewed post-sale restraints on patented articles as inherently 
suspicious.114 
This concern regarding the Supreme Court’s latest statement on 
patent exhaustion in Quanta is exacerbated by the Court’s recurring 
failure to articulate a clear and compelling policy rationale in support of 
the doctrine. As noted in Part I.A, the basis for this policy-related 
objection to the Supreme Court’s patent exhaustion jurisprudence has its 
roots in the Court’s earliest decisions regarding the doctrine. And the 
Court in Quanta did little to resolve this problem. In fact, the Court’s 
opinion in Quanta is remarkable for its lack of any substantive discussion 
of the justification for patent exhaustion.115 While the Quanta Court 
rejected the implied license rational for the doctrine, it accepted without 
reexamination McQuewan’s “outside of the patent monopoly” argument 
and then cited favorably subsequent decisions in Adams, Motion Picture 
Patents, and Univis, each of which simply endorsed some variant of the 
McQuewan argument.116 The relevance, for our purposes, of the Court’s 
 
‘embodies’ the patent. The court might also need to address the question of whether the purchaser’s 
use of the product required ‘creative or inventive decisions,’ or whether any additional parts added to 
the product to arrive at the patented invention are ‘standard.’”). 
 113. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 539 (“[The Quanta opinion endorses] a draconian rule that 
prohibits every post-sale restraint without any inquiry into the nature or likely effects of the 
challenged restriction.”); id. at 541 (“The worst problem of the first sale rule is that it lacks subtlety. 
To be sure, there is a set of technical rules that determines when a qualifying ‘sale’ of a patented . . . 
good has occurred. However, once such a sale is found enforcement of the post-sale restraint is denied 
automatically, with no consideration of the restraint’s purpose or effect.”); id. at 546 (“The Supreme 
Court[’s] . . . position in Quanta seems excessively draconian, yielding a per se rule against a practice 
that was not clearly shown to be more harmful than its alternatives.”); see also McCammon, supra note 
110, at 796 (“Indeed, much of the language in the [Quanta] opinion cuts in favor of a broad reach for 
patent exhaustion (something close to a per se rule) and against a reasonableness inquiry.”). 
 114. Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 492 (footnote omitted). 
 115. See id. at 502 (“The [Quanta] opinion failed to articulate any rationale for the doctrine other 
than naked precedent and stare decisis. The Court largely ignored the historical concern with 
restraints on alienated or the later concerns with competition policy.”); id. at 540 (“Without stating 
any policy argument for its preservation, the Supreme Court nevertheless soundly reaffirmed the first 
sale doctrine in its 2008 Quanta decision.”); see also infra note 327. 
 116. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625–28, 637 (2008). 
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failure to provide a clear justification for patent exhaustion is that it adds 
to the challenge of answering a central question addressed in this 
Article—that is, does the enforcement of a post-sale restriction on a 
patented product through a breach of contract remedy constitute an 
impermissible attempt to “contract-around” the underlying purpose of 
the patent exhaustion doctrine? As will be argued in Part II, answering 
this question involves a balancing of the policy considerations that 
underlie the exhaustion doctrine against the dictates of contract law. The 
failure by the Supreme Court to offer a clear and compelling justification 
for patent exhaustion complicates this balancing effort, which is required 
when pitting the judge-made doctrine of patent exhaustion117 against 
state contract law. 
b. Formalistic Line Drawing 
A second criticism of the Supreme Court’s Quanta decision is that 
the Court endorsed formalistic line drawing that permits a patent holder, 
through an appropriate business arrangement and careful contract 
drafting, to circumvent patent exhaustion. The rule in Quanta is that the 
authorized first sale of a patented product by the patent holder or its 
licensee exhausts any patent substantially embodied in the product 
sold.118 In General Talking Pictures, the Court held that patent exhaustion 
is avoided where a manufacturing licensee sells a product outside of the 
scope of its license from the patent holder.119 Under that circumstance, the 
patent holder can pursue a patent infringement remedy against a buyer 
who ignores a post-sale restriction relating to the product. The Court’s 
holdings in these two cases allow a patent holder, whose direct sales are by 
definition authorized120 and, therefore, would trigger exhaustion, to 
preserve its patent infringement remedies by granting a restricted license 
to another party to make and sell its product. As one commentator 
explained, 
Quanta appears to permit a patent holder to impose post-sale 
restrictions on purchasers if those sales are made by a licensee, even 
though the patent holder would not be able to impose the same 
restrictions on a direct purchaser. Thus, for example, Quanta would 
seem to bar a patent holder from selling a product under the condition 
that purchasers are only permitted to use the product for personal, 
non-commercial uses, and then suing purchasers who violate this 
 
 117. In Hovenkamp, supra note 8, the author provided the following comment on the difficulty of 
developing a clear and compelling policy rational for a judge-made patent law doctrine: “[O]ne 
significant disadvantage that judges face is that they decide disputes one at a time and often in a single 
doctrinal context. This severely limits their opportunity to articulate a coherent policy about multi-
faceted issues such as competition policy and the encouragement of innovation.” Id. at 494. 
 118. Quanta Computer, 553 U.S. at 638. 
 119. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181–82 (1938). 
 120. Hungar, supra note 110, at 538 n.108 (“To be sure, the patent holder by definition cannot 
make an unauthorized sale.”). 
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condition for patent infringement. However, in Talking Pictures (1938) 
the Supreme Court held that a patent holder can accomplish essentially 
the same result when the product is sold by a licensee. In Talking 
Pictures, the patent owner authorized a licensed manufacturer to sell a 
patented product solely for private use; the licensee was barred from 
selling the product to commercial users. Nevertheless, some purchasers 
used the product commercially, and the Supreme Court held that 
because the sales were not authorized under the license patent 
exhaustion did not apply; the patent owner was permitted [to] sue the 
commercial purchasers for patent infringement. In Quanta, the 
Supreme Court cited Talking Pictures with approval, apparently 
clearing the way for a patent owner to restrict the use of a product by 
sales through a licensee in a manner that would not be permitted if the 
patent owner sold the product directly.121 
The above interpretation of the scope of the exhaustion doctrine 
and the impact of the Court’s holding in General Talking Pictures has 
been challenged, however, as reflecting “formalistic line drawing”122 that 
“make[s] little economic sense.”123 The Federal Circuit relied on this 
argument in Mallinckrodt to support its resurrection of the conditional 
sale doctrine,124 which provides an alternative and less convoluted means 
for a patent holder to preserve its patent infringement remedies through 
conditioning a direct sale of its patented product by placing an express 
restriction on a buyer with respect to the use or disposition of the 
product. We explore this line of reasoning in Part I.C as part of a broader 
assessment of the continued viability of the conditional sale doctrine 
following the Supreme Court’s Quanta decision. 
c. Critical Unanswered Questions 
A final criticism of the Supreme Court’s Quanta decision is that it left 
in its wake critical unanswered questions regarding the fate of 
Mallinckrodt’s conditional sale doctrine and the enforceability of a 
contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product through a 
breach of contract remedy. The Quanta Court failed to raise the first 
question and raised but failed to answer the second. We devote the 
remainder of this Article to providing answers to these two questions. 
 
 121. Holman, supra note 109, at *3–4. 
 122. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“That the viability of 
the restriction should depend on how the transaction is structured was denigrated as ‘formalistic line 
drawing’ . . . . [W]e discern no reason to preserve formalistic distinctions of no economic 
consequence . . . .”). 
 123. Holman, supra note 109, at *4 (“This [ability of a patent holder to circumvent patent 
exhaustion only through an intervening manufacturing licensee] is clearly an anomalous outcome, and 
seems to make little economic sense. If this sort of restriction is permissible when accomplished 
through a licensee, why not let the patent owner achieve the same result directly?”). 
 124. See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 705. 
April 2013]       CONTRACT-BASED POST-SALE RESTRICTIONS 583 
C. Status of MALLINCKRODT’s Conditional Sale Doctrine 
In Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.,125 the Federal Circuit 
resurrected the conditional sale doctrine originally endorsed by the 
Supreme Court in Henry. However, the continued viability of that doctrine 
following Quanta has been questioned.126 The relevance of Quanta’s 
impact on Mallinckrodt’s conditional sale doctrine for the purposes of this 
Article is as follows: A central question addressed in the Article is whether 
a patent holder can rely on a breach of contract remedy to enforce a post-
sale restriction on a patented product. This question takes on special 
significance if there is meaningful doubt as to whether the conditional 
sale doctrine is good law. If a patent holder has the option of pursuing a 
patent infringement remedy or a breach of contract remedy in the 
context of a violation of a post-sale restriction by the buyer of a patented 
product, it will almost certainly pursue the patent infringement remedy, 
as was the case in both Mallinckrodt and Quanta. In the absence of a 
patent infringement remedy, however, reliance on a breach of contract 
claim becomes essential if the patent holder is to exercise some ability to 
control its patented product following a sale. Accordingly, a 
comprehensive analysis of the enforceability under contract law of post-
sale contractual restrictions, as provided in this Article, is justified. 
 1. Facts in Mallinckrodt and the Federal Circuit’s Holding 
Mallinckrodt, Inc. (“Mallinckrodt”) owned a number of patents that 
covered a medical device used for the delivery of radioactive or 
therapeutic material in the form of an aerosol mist for the diagnosis or 
treatment of diseases of the lung.127 It manufactured the devices and sold 
them to hospitals with an attached notice and a package insert that 
indicated that the device was for a single use only.128 Despite the notice, 
certain hospitals shipped used devices to Medipart, Inc. (“Medipart”) for 
“reconditioning,” whereupon Medipart cleaned the devices and returned 
them to the hospitals for reuse, without testing for radioactive or 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Hungar, supra note 110, at 529–30 (“In the Quanta opinion, the Supreme Court did not 
explicitly overrule or even cite Mallinckrodt, and accordingly, questions have arisen regarding the 
continued vitality of that case and its Federal Circuit progeny, with various commentators vigorously 
asserting both sides of the question. A careful examination of the manner in which the Quanta case 
was litigated and decided, however, sheds considerable light on that question, and indicates that there 
is no longer any room for continued adherence to the Mallinckrodt line of cases.”); LaFuze, supra note 
51, at 317 (“In failing to mention the Mallinckrodt case and the conditional sale doctrine in the Quanta 
opinion, the Supreme Court left the status of the conditional sale doctrine unclear. Several ways of 
reconciling the opinion with the doctrine exist . . . . Ultimately, leaving the scope of the conditional 
sale doctrine intact is the best way for courts to ‘promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and the useful 
[a]rts.’” (alterations in original)). 
 127. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 701–02. 
 128. Id. at 702. 
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biological contamination.129 Mallinckrodt filed suit against Medipart, 
alleging patent infringement and inducement to infringe for its role in 
violating the post-sale restriction placed on the device.130 Medipart 
argued that the authorized first sale of the devices by Mallinckrodt to the 
hospitals exhausted Mallinckrodt’s patent infringement remedies, relying 
on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Motion Picture Patents and “the 
Bauer trilogy”—Bauer, Straus, and Boston Store.131 The issue for the 
Federal Circuit was whether a conditioned authorized first sale of a 
patented product triggers patent exhaustion. 
A threshold question is why the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt 
failed to find for the alleged infringer on the basis of the fact that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Motion Picture Patents had overruled its 
prior holding in Henry that a conditioned authorized first sale did not 
result in patent exhaustion. The answer to that question can be found in 
the lack of precision that has characterized the Supreme Court’s patent 
exhaustion jurisprudence. Four problems are of particular note. First, both 
before and after its decision in Henry, the Court has used the words 
“without condition” or “unconditional” to describe the type of authorized 
first sale that triggers patent exhaustion.132 This was especially confusing 
when the Court used these qualifying words in a case in which it had 
concluded that an authorized first sale of a patented product had 
rendered a restriction that the patent holder had attempted to place on a 
buyer’s use or disposition of the product as a condition of the sale 
unenforceable through a patent infringement remedy. For example, in 
Motion Picture Patents, the case that overruled Henry, the Court held 
that the sale under consideration was an authorized first sale that 
exhausted the applicable patent and rendered the restriction placed on 
the buyer with respect to the product unenforceable under patent law.133 
Nonetheless, in summarizing its prior holding in Bauer upon which it 
relied, the Court in Motion Picture Patents stated that “the right to vend 
is exhausted by a single, unconditional sale, the article sold being thereby 
carried outside the monopoly of the patent law and rendered free of 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 704. 
 132. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917) (“[T]he 
right to vend is exhausted by a single, unconditional sale, the article sold being thereby carried outside 
the monopoly of the patent law and rendered free of every restriction which the vendor may attempt 
to put upon it.”); Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 455 (1873) (“[The patented coffin lids under 
consideration were] sold . . . without condition or restriction.”); Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 
544, 547 (1872) (“[A] patentee, when he has himself constructed a machine and sold it without any 
conditions, or authorized another to construct, sell, and deliver it . . . without any conditions, and the 
consideration has been paid to him for the thing patented, the rule is well established that the patentee 
must be understood to have parted to that extent with all his exclusive right, and that he ceases to have 
any interest whatever in the patented machine so sold and delivered.”); see also Keeler v. Standard 
Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 663 (1895) (quoting the above language from Mitchell). 
 133. Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 507, 515–16. 
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every restriction which the vendor may attempt to put upon it.”134 
However, the sale under consideration in Bauer (as in Motion Picture 
Patents) was conditioned.135 The Court’s use of such qualifying language 
in Motion Picture Patents raised questions as to the meaning of the words 
“without condition” or “unconditional” and whether it was still possible 
for a patent holder to preserve its patent infringement remedies through 
some type of conditioning of the sale of its patented product to a buyer. 
Second, the Supreme Court’s reliance on multiple justifications for 
patent exhaustion, as discussed in Part I.A, permitted a court to select 
from the various rationales the one that most effectively supported the 
court’s ruling in a case. With respect to the conditional sale doctrine, 
reliance on the implied license rationale for patent exhaustion provided 
courts with useful arguments in support of the doctrine. The view that 
the sale of a patented product is accompanied by an implied license to use 
or dispose of that product conflates the act of selling and the granting of a 
license. A court that adopted this view could rely on the favorable 
treatment by the courts of restrictions placed on a licensee in arguing that 
a restriction in the context of a conditioned authorized first sale should be 
enforceable under patent law. Moreover, the enforceability of such a 
restriction through a patent infringement remedy was consistent with the 
perspective that an express condition placed upon the buyer of a 
patented product limited the scope of the implied license and the extent of 
patent exhaustion. The Supreme Court in Henry relied on the reasoning 
set forth in this paragraph in providing its only endorsement, albeit time-
limited, of the conditional sale doctrine.136 
Third, a review of the Supreme Court’s patent exhaustion 
jurisprudence indicates that the Court has failed to emphasize the 
important distinction between a restriction placed by a patent holder on 
its manufacturing licensee and a post-sale restriction placed by a patent 
holder on the buyer of its patented product. The former is relevant to a 
determination as to whether there has been an authorized first sale. The 
latter may be unenforceable through a patent infringement remedy as a 
result of patent exhaustion. Understanding the difference between the 
two types of restrictions is essential for an appreciation of the distinction 
between a conditioned authorized first sale by a patent holder, such as 
occurred in Henry, and an infringing sale by a manufacturing licensee, 
such as the one under consideration in General Talking Pictures. In both 
instances, the Court found that the sale did not result in patent 
exhaustion and that the post-sale restriction was enforceable against the 
buyer through a patent infringement remedy. However, only the sale in 
General Talking Pictures was without the authorization of the patent 
 
 134. Id. at 516 (emphasis added). 
 135. See supra Part I.A. 
 136. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1912). 
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holder. Moreover, the Court’s conclusion that a conditioned authorized 
first sale avoids patent exhaustion was subsequently rejected in Motion 
Picture Patents, while the Court’s position on the infringing sale in 
General Talking Pictures has not changed. By failing to articulate the 
critical difference between the two types of product sales, the Court 
allowed for the perpetuation of the view that both types of sales should 
be treated in the same way from a patent exhaustion perspective. 
Finally, the Court has not always been clear in its exhaustion cases 
as to whether the post-sale restriction under consideration was 
unenforceable under patent law, irrespective of the nature of the 
restriction or because it violated some other law or policy. It is 
noteworthy in that regard that in many of the exhaustion cases listed in 
Table 1, the post-sale restriction under review was considered a violation 
of antitrust or patent misuse law.137 The uncertainty resulting from the 
Court’s failure to clearly explain the role that the nature of the restriction 
had in its finding of patent exhaustion generated confusion as to the 
scope of the exhaustion doctrine. 
Without referencing the Supreme Court’s decision in Henry and the 
fact that it was overruled in Motion Picture Patents, the Federal Circuit in 
Mallinckrodt relied on the above-described ambiguities resulting from 
the Supreme Court’s patent exhaustion jurisprudence to conclude that 
the conditional sale doctrine was alive and well. The Mallinckrodt court 
cited prior Supreme Court case law for the proposition that patent 
exhaustion was only triggered by an unconditional sale,138 and noted that 
the “principle of exhaustion of the patent right did not turn a conditional 
sale into an unconditional one.”139 In addition, the court in Mallinckrodt 
endorsed the concept that the sale of a patented product carries with it a 
license with respect to that product that is the basis for the implied 
license rationale for patent exhaustion.140 In so doing, the Federal Circuit 
rejected the statement of the district court in the case, which had ruled in 
favor of patent exhaustion, that “policy considerations require that no 
conditions be imposed on patented goods after their sale and that 
Mallinckrodt’s restriction could not ‘convert[] what was in substance a 
sale into a license.’”141  
 
 137. As seen below in Table 1, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bauer, Straus, Motion Picture 
Patents, Boston Store, Ethyl Gasoline, Univis, and Masonite involved either a tying or price-fixing 
obligation that the Court ruled was unenforceable under federal patent law and, in some instances, 
void. 
 138. The Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt cited Adams, Mitchell, and Keeler as “cases in which the 
Court considered and affirmed the basic principles that unconditional sale of a patented device 
exhausts the patentee’s right to control the purchaser’s use of the device.” Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. 
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706–07 (Fed. Cir. 1992). See supra note 132. 
 139. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 706. 
 140. Id. at 703. 
 141. Id. (alteration in original). 
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By viewing a sale as comparable to a license, the Mallinckrodt court 
could rely on prior Supreme Court decisions in Bement and United States 
v. General Electric Co.142 that approved the enforcement of a product-
related restriction in the context of a patent license agreement,143 despite 
the fact that neither of these cases involved an authorized first sale or 
addressed the enforceability of a restriction placed by a patent holder on 
the buyer of its patented product.144 Consistent with the implied license 
rationale, the Federal Circuit noted that a patent holder’s right to 
exclude others from making, using, or selling its patented product can be 
waived in whole, through an unconditional sale, or only in part, by 
placing a product-related restriction on a buyer as a condition of the 
sale.145 In the latter instance, the scope of the implied license that 
accompanies the sale of the patented product is limited, as is the extent 
of the exhaustion of the patent holder’s right to exclude others through 
an action for patent infringement.146 
The Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt also rejected the lower court’s 
argument that the Supreme Court’s ruling in General Talking Pictures—
which required an unauthorized sale by a manufacturing licensee for the 
avoidance of patent exhaustion—supported the conclusion that the 
authorized first sale by Mallinckrodt of its patented device to hospitals 
eliminated patent infringement remedies.147 In fact, the Federal Circuit 
 
 142. 272 U.S. 476 (1926). 
 143. See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 703 (“As in other areas of commerce, private parties may 
contract as they choose, provided that no law is violated thereby: ‘[T]he rule is, with few exceptions, 
that any conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to this kind of property, 
imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the right to manufacture or use or sell the 
[patented] article, will be upheld by the courts.’” (alterations in original)); id. at 704–05 (‘“As was said 
in United States v. General Electric Co., the patentee may grant a license ‘upon any condition the 
performance of which is reasonable within the reward which the patentee by the grant of the patent is 
entitled to secure.’” (citation omitted)). 
 144. See supra notes 14, 48; infra note 161. 
 145. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 703 (“The enforceability [under the patent law] of restrictions on 
the use of patented goods derives from the patent grant, which is in classical terms of property: the 
right to exclude. This right to exclude may be waived in whole or in part.” (citation omitted)); id. at 
708 (“‘Unless there is some definite provision in the sale to the contrary, it can properly be assumed 
that as part of the bargain the sale of a device incorporating a patented composition (composed, as 
here, of unpatented elements) authorizes the buyer to continue to use the device so long as the latter 
can and does use the elements he purchased from the patentee or licensor.’” (quoting the Court of 
Claims in General Electric, 572 F.2d at 784, as support for the Federal Circuit’s endorsement of the 
conditional sale doctrine)). 
 146. This argument, based on the implied license rationale for patent exhaustion, mirrors the one 
made by the Supreme Court in Henry. See supra Part I.A. Moreover, the Federal Circuit in B. Braun 
Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, in restating its holding in Mallinckrodt, proffered the tailored 
consideration rationale for patent exhaustion, also discussed in Part I.A as justification for the 
preservation of patent exhaustion remedies in the context of a conditioned authorized first sale of a 
patented product. According to this rationale, which complements the implied license rationale, “[the] 
exhaustion doctrine . . . does not apply to an expressly conditional sale . . . . In such a transaction, it is 
more reasonable to infer that the parties negotiated a price that reflects only the value of the ‘use’ rights 
conferred by the patentee.” B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 147. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 705. 
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viewed the lower court’s reliance on a distinction between an infringing 
sale by a manufacturing licensee and a conditioned authorized first sale in 
determining whether exhaustion has occurred as formalistic line drawing. 
In the words of the Federal Circuit, 
[t]he district court interpreted [the holding in General Talking Pictures] 
as requiring that since the hospitals purchased the [patented] device 
from the patentee Mallinckrodt, not from a manufacturing licensee, no 
restraint on the purchasers’ use of the device could be imposed under 
the patent law. However, in General Talking Pictures the Court did not 
hold that there must be an intervening manufacturing licensee before 
the patent can be enforced against a purchaser with notice of the 
restriction. The Court did not decide the situation where the patentee 
was the manufacturer and the device reached a purchaser in ordinary 
channels of trade. 
  The [patented] device was manufactured by the patentee; but the sale 
to the hospitals was the first sale and was with notice of the restriction. 
Medipart offers neither law, public policy, nor logic, for the proposition 
that the enforceability of a restriction to a particular use is determined by 
whether the purchaser acquired the device from a manufacturing 
licensee or from a manufacturing patentee. We decline to make a 
distinction for which there appears to be no foundation. Indeed, 
Mallinckrodt has pointed out how easily such a criterion could be 
circumvented. That the viability of a restriction should depend on how 
the transaction is structured was denigrated as “formalistic line drawing” 
in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., the Court explaining, in 
overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., that the legality of 
attempts by a manufacturer to regulate resale does not turn on whether 
the reseller had purchased the merchandise or was merely acting as an 
agent of the manufacturer. The Court having disapproved reliance on 
formalistic distinctions of no economic consequence in antitrust analysis, 
we discern no reason to preserve formalistic distinctions of no economic 
consequence, simply because the goods are patented.148 
Adopting this position enabled the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt to 
cite the Supreme Court’s decisions in Mitchell and General Talking 
Pictures as support for the conditional sale doctrine,149 despite the fact that 
in each of these cases the sale was made by a manufacturing licensee that 
lacked the authority to make the sale.150 
Finally, the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt rejected the lower court’s 
reliance on the Supreme Court’s holdings in Motion Picture Patents and 
the Bauer trilogy for the proposition that, following an authorized first 
sale, no post-sale restriction on a patented product is enforceable through 
 
 148. Id. (citations omitted). 
 149. Id. at 707 (“In Mitchell v. Hawley the accused infringer had purchased a patented machine 
that was licensed for use only during the original term of the patent grant. After the patent term was 
extended the defendant argued that by virtue of his purchase he had acquired title free of the license 
condition. The Court disagreed, upholding the restriction.”); id. at 701 (“[I]f Mallinckrodt’s restriction 
was a valid condition of the sale, then in accordance with General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western 
Electric Co., it was not excluded from enforcement under the patent law.” (citation omitted)). 
 150. See supra note 14; infra Table 1. 
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a patent infringement remedy.151 In the view of the Federal Circuit, the 
cases cited by the lower court only “established that price-fixing and tying 
restrictions accompanying the sale of patented goods were per se illegal. 
These cases did not hold—and it did not follow—that all restrictions 
accompanying the sale of patented goods were deemed illegal.”152 
The Federal Circuit concluded its opinion in Mallinckrodt by stating 
that the restriction placed by Mallinckrodt on the hospitals that purchased 
its patented device was enforceable under patent law provided that it was 
not a violation of any applicable law or policy consideration.153 In the 
words of the Federal Circuit, 
the district court erred in holding that the restriction on reuse was, as a 
matter of law, unenforceable under the patent law. If the sale of 
[Mallinckrodt’s patented device] was validly conditioned under the 
applicable law such as the law governing sales and licenses, and if the 
restriction on reuse was within the scope of the patent grant or otherwise 
justified, then violation of the restriction may be remedied by action 
for patent infringement.154 
 2. Counterarguments and the Impact of the Quanta Decision 
The Federal Circuit’s holding in Mallinckrodt in support of the 
conditional sale doctrine is open to a number of counterarguments that do 
not depend on the Supreme Court’s latest decision on patent exhaustion in 
Quanta. First, the Court’s only decision that endorsed the conditional sale 
doctrine (in Henry) was overruled seventy-five years prior to the 
Mallinckrodt court’s resurrection of the doctrine.155 And the Federal 
Circuit in Mallinckrodt relied on many of the same arguments that had 
been made by the Supreme Court in its Henry decision.156 The Federal 
Circuit conveniently neglected to mention the Henry decision in its 
Mallinckrodt opinion. Instead, it chose to limit the scope of the Supreme 
Court’s holdings in Motion Picture Patents, which had overruled Henry, 
 
 151. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 704 (“The district court’s holding that Mallinckrodt’s restriction to 
single patient use was unenforceable was, as we have remarked, based on ‘policy’ considerations. The 
district court relied on a group of cases wherein resale price-fixing of patented goods was held illegal 
[citing Bauer, Straus, and Boston Store], and that barred patent enforced tie-ins [citing Motion Picture 
Patents].”); id. at 706 (“The district court[] stat[ed] that it ‘refuse[s] to limit Bauer and Motion Picture 
Patents to tying and price-fixing not only because their language suggests broader application, but 
because there is a strong public interest in not stretching the patent laws to authorize restrictions on 
the use of purchased goods.’” (final alteration in original)). 
 152. Id. at 704. Note that, as another example of the lack of precision in patent exhaustion 
jurisprudence, the actual question at issue was not whether a post-sale restriction is illegal, but 
whether it is unenforceable through a patent infringement remedy, based on the exhaustion of the 
applicable patent as a result of an authorized first sale. 
 153. Id. at 709. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917). See supra 
note 50. 
 156. See supra Part I.A and the various references to the Supreme Court’s Henry decision 
throughout supra Part I.C. 
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and its companion cases (Bauer, Straus, and Boston Store) by arguing 
that those cases did not reject every post-sale restriction on a patented 
product, but only those that violated antitrust or patent misuse law, such 
as price-fixing or tying obligations. However, as the district court in 
Mallinckrodt correctly noted, in its refusal to limit the reach of those 
cases to price-fixing and tying restrictions, the language in those cases 
suggested a broader application of the doctrine of patent exhaustion.157 
While it is true that a number of the restrictions rejected in the Supreme 
Court’s early exhaustion cases were considered problematic under a 
theory of patent misuse or as an antitrust violation, the majority of the 
arguments in support of patent exhaustion following the first authorized 
sale did not rely on the objectionable nature of the restriction at issue. 
Instead, the case was made that the authorized sale of the patented 
product by or on behalf of the patent holder for consideration moved the 
product outside of the scope of the statutorily defined patent monopoly 
and rendered post-sale restrictions unenforceable under patent law.158 
Following the lead of the Supreme Court in Henry, the Federal 
Circuit in Mallinckrodt placed considerable weight on the fact that a 
number of the prior decisions by the Court in which an authorized first 
sale was held to result in patent exhaustion involved unconditional sales 
and that the words “without conditions” or “unconditional” frequently 
qualified the Court’s explanation of the type of sale that triggered 
exhaustion.159 As noted above, such language was used in the Court’s 
decision in Motion Picture Patents in overruling Henry, despite the fact 
that the sale in that case was in fact conditioned. While this seemingly 
inappropriate use of the term “unconditional” may simply reflect a lack of 
precision by the Court in its early patent exhaustion rulings, another 
explanation has been suggested: 
In Mitchell, the Court did allude to the notion of an unconditional sale, 
observing that the patent right is exhausted when the patentee ‘has 
himself constructed a machine and sold it without any conditions, or 
authorized another to construct, sell, and deliver it . . . without any 
conditions.’ But at that time, a ‘conditional’ sale would have been 
understood as an agreement to sell where title would not convey until 
performance of a condition precedent. See, e.g., Harkness v. Russell, 
118 U.S. 663, 666 (1886) (describing a “conditional sale” as a “mere 
agreement to sell upon a condition to be performed” in which title 
does not pass until the condition precedent is performed). 
  That narrower understanding of “conditional” is consistent with this 
Court’s other patent-exhaustion cases, which explain that the doctrine 
is triggered “if a person legally acquires a title to” a patented item; 
when a patented item is “lawfully made and sold” or “passes to the 
hands of the purchaser”; or upon “the purchase of the article from one 
 
 157. See supra note 151. 
 158. See supra Part I.A. 
 159. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 706–07. 
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authorized by the patentee to sell it” . . . . See Motion Picture Patents, 
243 U.S. at 515–516 (describing as an “unconditional sale” a sale made 
subject to restrictions on resale price). Thus, under this Court’s cases, if 
a purchaser acquires title to an item embodying the patented invention 
through a sale authorized by the patentee, the patent is exhausted—
regardless of the patentee’s purported imposition of an explicit 
restriction on use or resale.160 
The above interpretation of the meaning of the word “unconditional” 
undercuts the Federal Circuit’s argument in Mallinckrodt that an 
authorized sale of a patented product in which title passes to the buyer, but 
which is conditioned by placing a restriction on the buyer’s use or 
disposition of the product, does not trigger patent exhaustion. 
As discussed above, the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt merged the 
concepts of sale and license in its adoption of the implied license rationale 
for patent exhaustion. This allowed the court to rely on Supreme Court 
cases that enforced a product-related license restriction in arguing in favor 
of the conditional sale doctrine, despite the fact that these cases did not 
address the enforceability under patent law of a restriction placed on the 
buyer of a patented product as a condition of the sale.161 Moreover, the 
Federal Circuit dismissed the district court’s interpretation of General 
Talking Pictures as requiring, for the avoidance of patent exhaustion, an 
unauthorized sale by an intervening manufacturing licensee who lacked 
the authority from the patent holder to make a sale in disregard of a 
restriction placed by the patent holder on the licensee.162 This enabled the 
appellate court to ignore the fundamental distinction between a 
conditioned authorized first sale (as occurred in Mallinckrodt) and an 
infringing sale (as occurred in General Talking Pictures). This strategy 
was the basis for the Federal Circuit’s noteworthy use of Supreme Court 
precedent to rule in favor of the conditional sale doctrine in Mallinckrodt.  
The Supreme Court cases relied on by the Federal Circuit in 
Mallinckrodt (Mitchell, Bement, General Electric, and General Talking 
Pictures) each involved an infringing sale by a manufacturing licensee as 
opposed to a conditioned authorized first sale.163 The Supreme Court in 
 
 160. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 32, at 20–21 
(alteration in original) (selected citations omitted). 
 161. In both Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902) (cited in Henry), and United States v. 
General Electric, 272 U.S. 476 (1926) (decided after Henry), the Supreme Court held that the product-
related restriction under consideration placed by the patent holder on its manufacturing licensee was 
enforceable against a licensee that had failed to honor the restriction in its sale of the patented product. 
In neither case did the court consider any restriction placed by the patent holder on the buyer. 
 162. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 701. 
 163. Note that the Supreme Court ruled in favor of patent exhaustion where a first sale was made 
by a manufacturing licensee that was authorized by the patent holder to make the sale. See Quanta 
Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement 
Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Motion Picture Patents 
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). In all of these cases, an authorized first sale was made 
by a manufacturing licensee and in each case the Court concluded that the sale exhausted all patent 
remedies and rendered the restriction associated with the sale unenforceable under federal patent law. 
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Henry relied on the same strategy, citing Mitchell and Bement, in its 
subsequently overruled holding that a conditioned authorized first sale 
preserves patent infringement remedies.164 Recall that Justice Lurton, in 
his opinion in Henry, had to look to his prior Sixth Circuit decision in 
Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener for a ruling in which a conditioned 
authorized first sale by a patent holder did not trigger patent exhaustion.165 
The Federal Circuit’s use of Supreme Court precedent in Mallinckrodt, 
mirroring that of the Supreme Court in Henry, raises legitimate concerns 
as to the soundness of its holding in support of the conditional sale 
doctrine. 
The above review of the Supreme Court’s patent exhaustion case law 
that was available to, and relied on by, the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt 
suggests that there were flaws in the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in that 
case. The Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Quanta, if anything, 
casts further doubt on the validity of the conditional sale doctrine as 
articulated in Mallinckrodt. As discussed in Part I.B.1, the Supreme 
Court in Quanta laid down a per se rule for patent exhaustion, that is, 
that an authorized first sale of a product exhausts any patents covering or 
substantially embodied in the product, and prevents the patent holder 
from relying on patent law to control the post-sale use or disposition of 
that product. No mention is made in the Quanta decision of an ability of 
the patent holder to preserve its patent infringement remedies by placing 
a post-sale restriction on its buyer as a condition of the sale. 
The Supreme Court in Quanta deftly avoided any discussion of 
Mallinckrodt, but did so in a way that was consistent with the difference in 
the fact patterns in Quanta and in Mallinckrodt. Quanta involved a sale by 
a manufacturing licensee (Intel). The Court’s focus in deciding the case 
was whether or not the manufacturing licensee was granted the right by 
the patent holder (LGE) to make the sale, despite the understanding by 
the manufacturing licensee and by the buyer (Quanta) that the patent 
holder did not intend for the products that substantially embodied its 
patent rights (the Licensed Intel Products) to be used with products other 
than those also produced by the manufacturing licensee.166 In deciding that 
the sales made by the manufacturing licensee were authorized—that is, 
that they were not infringing sales—the Court concluded that the sales by 
the manufacturing licensee triggered patent exhaustion, thereby 
extinguishing patent remedies and rendering any post-sale restrictions on 
the products sold unenforceable under patent law. This conclusion 
resolved the case in Quanta and allowed the Court to refrain from a 
discussion of the conditioned authorized sale doctrine, in which the focus 
 
None of these Supreme Court cases involved a fact pattern similar to the ones in Heaton-Peninsular 
Button-Fastener, Henry, and Mallinckrodt. See supra Part I.A, note 14; infra Table 1. 
 164. See supra Part I.A. 
 165. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 38 (1911).  
 166. Quanta Computer, 553 U.S. at 638. 
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of the analysis is not on whether the selling party has the authority to sell 
the patented product, but on whether an authorized seller has a right to 
rely on patent remedies to enforce post-sale restrictions on a buyer. 
However, the fact that the Quanta Court did not deem it necessary to 
address the question of whether Quanta was bound by any contractual 
obligation to refrain from combining the Licensed Intel Products with 
non-Intel components (for example, on the basis of the written notice 
that Intel was required to provide to Quanta in connection with the sale) 
is of relevance to an assessment of the viability of Mallinckrodt’s 
conditional sale doctrine. It indicates that, from the Court’s perspective, 
once it had been determined that Intel was authorized to sell the Licensed 
Intel Products to Quanta, patent remedies were exhausted by the sale and 
a post-sale restriction placed on Quanta could not preserve such remedies. 
This interpretation supports a conclusion that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Quanta overruled Mallinckrodt. 
Finally, the Quanta Court’s rejection of the implied license rationale 
for patent exhaustion undermined one of the central arguments relied on 
by the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt in its endorsement of the 
conditional sale doctrine. It called into question the Federal Circuit’s 
treatment of a sale as a license167 and its reliance on restricted patent 
 
 167. It is worth noting that in LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics, Inc., 453 F.3d 1364 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006), the decision that was reversed by the Supreme Court in Quanta, the Federal Circuit had 
argued that the license granted by LGE to Intel to manufacture and sell products that substantially 
embodied the LGE patents was itself a sale for patent exhaustion purposes. Id. at 1370. This is the flip 
side of a claim that a sale is a license. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Quanta offered no acceptance, 
nor even a recognition, of this conclusion by the Federal Circuit in Bizcom. But see LG Elecs., Inc. v. 
Hitachi, Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1047–48 (N.D. Cal. 2009). At first glance, the positions taken by 
the Federal Circuit in Bizcom and the Supreme Court in Quanta regarding the issue of whether a 
license is a sale for exhaustion purposes are the opposite of what would be expected if one accepts the 
reasonable conclusion that, in recent years, the Federal Circuit has been more protective of a patent 
holder’s rights than the Supreme Court has been. By viewing a license as the equivalent of a sale for 
exhaustion purposes, the Federal Circuit has expanded the type of contractual relationships in which a 
patent holder could lose its patent infringement remedies as a result of exhaustion. In contrast, the 
Supreme Court’s failure to embrace the view that a license is the equivalent of a sale for exhaustion 
purposes limits the potential impact of the patent exhaustion doctrine. On closer analysis, however, 
the positions adopted by the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court are consistent with their apparent 
biases as they relate to the rights of the patent holder. In downplaying the distinction between a 
license and a sale, the Federal Circuit has provided support for its conditional sale doctrine (as 
articulated in Mallinckrodt) that offers a patent holder an effective means of preserving its patent 
infringement remedies. The reasoning is as follows: One interpretation of patent exhaustion is that in 
providing a patented product to a party in exchange for consideration, a patent holder has granted to 
that party an implied license under any patents embodied in the product. However, this implied 
license can be limited by an express contractual restriction placed on the party that obtains the 
product, thereby preserving the patent holder’s infringement remedies in the event that such party 
fails to honor the restriction. In effect, the Federal Circuit has conflated the concepts of the granting of 
a license and the making of a sale, and in so doing has bolstered its argument in support of the 
conditioned sale doctrine by allowing for the avoidance of patent exhaustion through use of an express 
contractual limitation of the implied license that accompanies the disposition of a product to a third 
party for consideration. In contrast, the Supreme Court in Quanta rejected the implied license 
rationale for patent exhaustion in favor of its reliance on an authorized first sale as the key to trigger 
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license cases such as Bement and General Electric in concluding that 
patent exhaustion can be avoided by conditioning an authorized first sale 
to a buyer. Moreover, the Quanta Court’s rejection of the implied license 
rationale also eliminated one of the more compelling arguments in favor 
of the conditional sale doctrine, namely, that an express condition placed 
upon the buyer of a patented product limited the scope of the implied 
license that accompanied the sale of the product and preserved patent 
infringement remedies. 
Adopting the view that Quanta overruled Mallinckrodt and that the 
conditional sale doctrine is no longer good law revives the Federal 
Circuit’s admonition in Mallinckrodt that the law of patent exhaustion 
should not be interpreted so as to constitute “formalistic line drawing” of 
“no economic consequence.”168 In the absence of an ability to preserve 
patent infringement remedies through conditioning an authorized first sale 
to a buyer of a patented product, a patent holder who wished to impose 
post-sale restrictions on its buyer that would be enforceable under patent 
law would need to sell through an intervening manufacturing licensee. In 
essence, the patent holder could “restrict the use of a product by sales 
through a licensee in a manner that would not be permitted if the patent 
[holder] sold the product directly.”169 Unlike the Federal Circuit in 
Mallinckrodt, the Supreme Court in Quanta recognized the important 
distinction between an infringing sale by a manufacturing licensee and a 
conditioned authorized first sale. The former does not trigger patent 
exhaustion while the latter does. A discussion of whether an important 
 
patent exhaustion. While this approach limits the impact of the patent exhaustion doctrine to the sale 
of (as opposed to the license of rights with respect to) a patented product, it undermines any limited 
implied license argument that can be relied on to support Mallinckrodt’s conditional sale doctrine, 
which preserves patent infringement remedies despite the authorized first sale of a patented product. 
Note that the Federal Circuit in Bizcom relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. 
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942), in concluding that a license can be considered the equivalent of a 
sale for patent exhaustion purposes. The Bizcom court cited the following passage from Masonite in 
justifying its conclusion: “[T]his Court has quite consistently refused to allow the form into which the 
parties chose to cast the transaction to govern. The test has been whether or not there has been such a 
disposition of the article that it may fairly be said that the patentee has received his reward for the use 
of the article.” Id. at 278. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to debate whether Masonite 
provides adequate support for the conclusion reached by the Federal Circuit in Bizcom that a license 
can constitute a sale for patent exhaustion purposes, the following distinction is noteworthy: 
According to the Federal Circuit in Bizcom, the license granted by LGE to Intel to LGE’s entire 
portfolio of computer-related patents constituted a sale for patent exhaustion purposes, despite the 
fact that Intel was granted the right to manufacture products covered by such patents for future sale 
and that the so-called “sale” by LGE did not involve the transfer of a physical object from LGE to 
Intel. In contrast, the “sale” in Masonite that triggered exhaustion involved the transfer of a patented 
product manufactured by the patentee to a network of del credere agents who sold the product on 
behalf of the patentee, pursuant to the patentee’s pricing restrictions, without ever gaining title to the 
product (an arrangement that, according to the Supreme Court, violated the Sherman Act, rendering 
the pricing restrictions unenforceable). 
 168. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1992). See supra Parts I.B.2.b, 
I.C.1. 
 169. See Holman, supra note 109, at *4. 
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judge-made doctrine such as patent exhaustion should critically depend on 
such a distinction is beyond the scope of this Article.170 What matters for 
our purposes is that the weight of the evidence indicates that 
Mallinckrodt’s conditional sale doctrine was rejected in Quanta, a view 
adopted by a majority of commentators171 and at least one district court.172 
 
170. Thomas G. Hungar, who presented the oral argument before the Supreme Court on behalf of 
the United States in Quanta, has provided the following response to claims that the Quanta decision 
can lead to anomalous outcomes based on formalistic line drawing of little economic consequence:  
Some commentators have criticized the rule that patent holders can limit their licensees’ 
right to sell and enforce that limitation by means of patent infringement suits, viewing 
that result as anomalous in light of patent holders’ inability to restrict the post-sale rights 
of purchasers. But that seeming anomaly is in fact no anomaly at all, when one 
understands the principle underlying the patent-exhaustion doctrine. The doctrine is 
based on the proposition that, by its very nature, exercise of the statutory right to sell a 
patented article removes that article from the scope of the patent laws. 
  A mere license is not the sale of a patented article, and thus a mere licensee has no 
basis on which to claim exhaustion; its rights are limited to the scope of the license. 
Because exhaustion is triggered only by an authorized sale, licensee sales that are not 
authorized by the license do not give rise to exhaustion but instead constitute patent 
infringement. Finally, to the extent the charge of ‘anomaly’ rests on the assumption that 
the Supreme Court’s patent-exhaustion doctrine permits patent holders to impose post-
sale restrictions through licensees that they could not impose directly, that underlying 
assumption is incorrect. Patent holders are free to decide when and on what terms they 
will sell their patented products and thus could enforce directly, by simple refusals to 
sell, the same sorts of restrictions that they can require their licensees to follow on pain 
of patent infringement. For example, as in General Talking Pictures, a patent holder 
could authorize its licensee to sell only to certain types of customers, or alternatively the 
patent holder could achieve the same result by selling its patented products directly and 
choosing to limit the customers to whom it sells or the circumstances in which it will sell 
to different classes of customers. The exhaustion doctrine operates the same way in 
either instance: once an authorized sale occurs, whether by the patent holder or the 
licensee, exhaustion follows. To be sure, the patent holder by definition cannot make an 
unauthorized sale, absent extraordinary circumstances such as plainly ultra vires actions 
by corporate employees, but it can exercise its patent right to refuse to make undesired 
sales or alternatively can employ its patent right to prevent its licensees from making 
such sales. 
Hungar, supra note 110, at 537–38 n.108 (citations omitted). 
 171. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 502 (“In its 2008 Quanta decision the Supreme Court 
unanimously rejected the Federal Circuit’s approach [in Mallinckrodt] and restored the first sale rule 
to its original broad scope.”); Hungar, supra note 110, at 529–30 (“In the Quanta opinion, the Supreme 
Court did not explicitly overrule or even cite Mallinckrodt, and accordingly, questions have arisen 
regarding the continued vitality of that case and its Federal Circuit progeny, with various 
commentators vigorously asserting both sides of the question. A careful examination of the manner in 
which the Quanta case was litigated and decided, however, sheds considerable light on that question, 
and indicates that there is no longer any room for continued adherence to the Mallinckrodt line of 
cases.”); McDermott, supra note 109, at 76 (“The line of Federal Circuit precedents beginning with 
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart Inc (Fed. Cir. 1992) is almost certainly not good law in light of the 
analysis in Quanta.” (quoting John Duffy, Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law 
School)); Holman, supra note 109, at *1 (“[I]t appears to me that Quanta implicitly overrules 
Mallinckrodt . . . .”). But see LaFuze et al., supra note 51, at 317 (“In failing to mention the 
Mallinckrodt case and the conditional sale doctrine in the Quanta opinion, the Supreme Court left the 
status of the conditional sale doctrine unclear. Several ways of reconciling the opinion with the 
doctrine exist. . . . Ultimately, leaving the scope of the conditional sale doctrine intact is the best way 
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II.  Enforceability of Contract-Based Post-Sale Restrictions 
Through a Breach of Contract Remedy 
In Part I, we argued that the Supreme Court in Quanta laid down a 
per se rule for patent exhaustion, that is, that an authorized first sale of a 
product exhausts any patents covering or substantially embodied in the 
product, and prevents the patent holder from relying on patent law to 
control the post-sale use or disposition of that product. The Court, in its 
unanimous decision, provided no support for the conditional sale doctrine, 
as articulated in Mallinckrodt, that permits a patent holder to preserve its 
patent infringement remedies by placing a post-sale restriction on its buyer 
as a condition of the sale. Based on a review of Supreme Court patent 
exhaustion jurisprudence, including its recent decision in Quanta, we 
concluded that Mallinckrodt has been overruled. Yet even if one allows 
for the possibility that the conditional sale doctrine remains good law, 
there is sufficient uncertainty regarding the status of the doctrine to 
suggest that it would be ill-advised for a patent holder that intends to 
control the post-sale use or disposition of its patented product to ignore 
the possible use of contract-based post-sale restrictions regarding the 
product. The issue then is whether such restrictions are enforceable 
through a breach of contract remedy, even if patent infringement remedies 
have been exhausted. The Quanta Court raised but did not resolve this 
issue in the following footnote to its opinion:  
We note that the authorized nature of the sale to Quanta does not 
necessarily limit LGE’s other contract rights. LGE’s complaint does not 
include a breach-of-contract claim, and we express no opinion on 
whether contract damages might be available even though exhaustion 
operates to eliminate patent damages. See Keeler v. Standard Folding-
Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 . . . (1895) (“Whether a patentee may protect 
himself and his assignees by special contracts brought home to the 
purchasers is not a question before us, and upon which we express no 
 
for courts to ‘promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and the useful [a]rts.’”). 
 172. Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585 (E.D. Ky. 
2009) (“After reviewing Quanta, Mallinckrodt, and the parties’ arguments, this Court is persuaded that 
Quanta overruled Mallinckrodt sub silentio.”). It is noteworthy, however, that the Federal Circuit has 
continued to cite Mallinckrodt and Braun with approval in its post-Quanta decisions, e.g., Princo Corp. 
v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott 
Laboratories, and Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., we explained the rationale underlying the 
[patent misuse] doctrine. As a general matter, the unconditional sale of a patented device exhausts the 
patentee’s right to control the purchaser’s use of the device thereafter, on the theory that the patentee 
has bargained for, and received, the full value of the goods. That “exhaustion” doctrine does not 
apply, however, to a conditional sale or license, where it is more reasonable to infer that a negotiated 
price reflects only the value of the “use” rights conferred by the patentee.” (citations omitted)); 
Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 80 USLW 3380, 2012 
WL 4748082 (2012) (“[In Monsanto Co. v. McFarling,] [t]his court held, based on Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. 
Medipart, Inc., that the conditions in Monsanto’s Technology Agreement were valid and legal and did 
not implicate the doctrine of patent exhaustion. In any event, the court stated, ‘[t]he “first sale” 
doctrine of patent exhaustion . . . [wa]s not implicated, as the new seeds grown from the original batch 
had never been sold. The price paid by the purchaser ‘reflects only the value of the ‘use’ rights 
conferred by the patentee.’” (alterations in second sentence in original) (citations omitted)). 
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opinion. It is, however, obvious that such a question would arise as a 
question of contract, and not as one under the inherent meaning and 
effect of the patent laws”).173 
In this Part, we address this issue by considering the following 
questions: Can a contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product 
be enforced through a breach of contract remedy? Does the answer to the 
first question depend on the nature of the post-sale restriction? And if only 
some contract-based post-sale restrictions are enforceable, which ones? 
We also consider the relative benefit to a patent holder of a breach of 
contract remedy as compared to a patent infringement remedy. 
A. Is ANY Contract-Based Post-Sale Restriction on a Patented 
Product Enforceable Though a Breach of Contract Remedy? 
A determination of whether any contract-based post-sale restriction 
on a patented product can be enforced through a breach of contract 
remedy under state law, irrespective of the nature of the restriction, 
requires an assessment of whether such enforcement (i) constitutes an 
impermissible attempt to contract around the doctrine of patent 
exhaustion that is preempted under federal patent law, (ii) is contrary to 
the related but later developed doctrine of patent misuse, or (iii) is a 
violation of the public policies against restraints on alienation or 
restraints of trade, which have also been linked to the exhaustion 
doctrine.174 We consider each of these questions in this Part. 
 1. Is a Contract-Based Post-Sale Restriction on a Patented Product 
an Impermissible Attempt to Contract-Around Patent Exhaustion? 
The initial question is whether any post-sale restriction placed by a 
patent holder on the buyer of its patented product is enforceable through a 
breach of contract remedy under state law. And the first hurdle to 
overcome in answering this question is to determine whether the inclusion 
of any such restriction in a contract is a violation of any objective of federal 
patent law that underlies the patent exhaustion doctrine, rendering the 
provision void as a result of the preemptive effect of federal law on 
conflicting state contract law. It is noteworthy that the Quanta Court’s 
footnote concerning the potential use of a breach-of-contract remedy to 
enforce a post-sale restriction cited the Court’s earlier statement in 
Keeler regarding the issue.175 The Keeler quotation is of significance not 
only as evidence of the Supreme Court’s prior failure to resolve this issue 
but also as an expression of the Court’s position on the limit of the patent 
exhaustion doctrine. Specifically, the quotation from Keeler included the 
following language:  
 
 173. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 637 n.7 (2008). 
 174. See supra Part I.A. 
 175. Quanta, 533 U.S. at 637 n.7. 
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Whether a patentee may protect himself and his assignees by special 
contracts brought home to the purchasers is not a question before us, 
and upon which we express no opinion. It is, however, obvious that 
such a question would arise as a question of contract, and not as one 
under the inherent meaning and effect of the patent laws.176  
We interpret the emphasized language as setting a limit on the scope of 
patent exhaustion (which is a doctrine that emanates from “the inherent 
meaning and effect of the patent laws”), indicating that while patent 
exhaustion eliminates patent infringement remedies in the context of the 
breach of a post-sale restriction on a patented product, it does not work 
to void every such restriction as an impermissible work-around of the 
patent exhaustion doctrine. 
While the Keeler statement is instructive, it was offered in a 
nineteenth century patent exhaustion decision whose outcome was not 
dependent on the accuracy of the statement.177 Accordingly, a more 
comprehensive evaluation of the question of whether a contract-based 
post-sale restriction on a patented product is an impermissible attempt to 
contract around patent exhaustion is required. And such an evaluation 
involves a determination of whether the enforcement of a post-sale 
restriction on a patented product through a breach of contract remedy is 
incompatible with any patent law objective that underlies patent 
exhaustion. As discussed in Part I.A, the Court has provided a variety of 
justifications for the exhaustion doctrine. However, the justification that 
has been relied on most frequently, and is consistent with the Court’s 
recent holding in Quanta, is that the authorized first sale of a patented 
product, which provides the patent holder with compensation for the 
relinquishment of its rights, moves the product outside of the limits of the 
statutorily defined patent monopoly and renders post-sale restrictions 
unenforceable under patent law. This justification for the doctrine of 
patent exhaustion reflects an objective of federal patent law that had 
already been articulated at the time of the Supreme Court’s development 
of the judge-made doctrine of patent exhaustion.178 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.179 
provides a succinct description of the objectives of the federal patent 
system: 
First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it 
promotes disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation and to 
permit the public to practice the invention once the patent expires; third, 
the stringent requirements for patent protection seek to assure that ideas 
in the public domain remain there for the free use of the public.180 
 
 176. Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895) (emphasis added). 
 177. Keeler was a patent infringement case that did not include a breach of contract claim. 
 178. See Donald Chisum, Chisum on Patents OV-2–OV-7 (2012). 
 179. 440 U.S. 257 (1979). 
 180. Id. at 262; see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974) (“The stated 
objective of the Constitution in granting the power to Congress to legislate in the area of intellectual 
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In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Stiffel Co.181 and Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder 
Craft Boats, Inc.,182 the Supreme Court cited the additional goal of 
promoting “national uniformity in the realm of intellectual property.”183 
Sears also focused on the careful balance introduced into the federal 
patent system designed “to promote invention while at the same time 
preserving free competition,”184 but this emphasis on free competition is 
part of the broader objective of leaving ideas in the public domain 
available for public use. And Bonito Boats discussed the need for a 
“clear federal demarcation between public and private property” and the 
importance of “resolving the constant tension between private right and 
public access,”185 but this public/private issue is also part of the broader 
objective of assuring that ideas in the public domain remain there for 
public use. 
 
property is to ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ The patent laws promote this 
progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often 
enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development. The productive effort thereby fostered will 
have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture 
into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens. 
In return for the right of exclusion—this ‘reward for inventions,’—the patent laws impose upon the 
inventor a requirement of disclosure. . . . [T]he patent laws require that the patent application shall 
include a full and clear description of the invention and ‘of the manner and process of making and using 
it’ so that any person skilled in the art may make and use the invention. When a patent is granted and 
the information contained in it is circulated to the general public and those especially skilled in the 
trade, such additions to the general store of knowledge are of such importance to the public weal that 
the Federal Government is willing to pay the high price of 17 years of exclusive use for its disclosure, 
which disclosure, it is assumed, will stimulate ideas and the eventual development of further significant 
advances in the art. The Court has also articulated another policy of the patent law: that which is in the 
public domain cannot be removed there from by action of the States.” (citations omitted)). 
 181. 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
 182. 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
 183. Id. at 162; see Sears, 376 U.S. at 231 n.7 (“The purpose of Congress to have national uniformity in 
patent and copyright laws can be inferred from such statutes as that which vests exclusive jurisdiction to 
hear patent and copyright cases in federal courts.”); infra notes 184, 185. 
 184. Sears, 376 U.S. at 230–31 (“[T]he patent system is one in which uniform federal standards are 
carefully used to promote invention while at the same time preserving free competition.”). 
 185. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 162–63 (“The Florida scheme [under consideration in this case] 
blurs this clear federal demarcation between public and private property. One of the fundamental 
purposes behind the Patent and Copyright Clauses of the Constitution was to promote national 
uniformity in the realm of intellectual property. Since the Patent Act of 1800, Congress has lodged 
exclusive jurisdiction of actions ‘arising under’ the patent laws in the federal courts, thus allowing for 
the development of a uniform body of law in resolving the constant tension between private right and 
public access. Recently, Congress conferred exclusive jurisdiction of all patent appeals on the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in order to ‘provide nationwide uniformity in patent law.’ This 
purpose is frustrated by the Florida scheme, which renders the status of the design and utilitarian 
‘ideas’ embodied in the boat hulls it protects uncertain. Given the inherently ephemeral nature of 
property in ideas, and the great power such property has to cause harm to the competitive policies 
which underlay the federal patent laws, the demarcation of broad zones of public and private right is 
‘the type of regulation that demands a uniform national rule.’ Absent such a federal rule, each State 
could afford patent-like protection to particularly favored home industries, effectively insulating them 
from competition from outside the State.” (citations omitted)). 
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A core objective of federal patent law that is implicated in the Court’s 
justification for patent exhaustion is that the patent system must ensure 
that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the public 
and “cannot be removed therefrom by action of the States.”186 
Consideration of this objective is relevant to an assessment of whether a 
contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product is enforceable 
under state contract law or whether such enforcement is prohibited as an 
impermissible attempt to contract around patent exhaustion, a judge-
made doctrine developed to further this objective. As the Court stated in 
its Sears decision (in which it held that a state’s unfair competition law 
was incompatible with federal patent law and therefore preempted), 
[federal patent law], like other laws of the United States enacted 
pursuant to constitutional authority, [is] the supreme law of the land. 
When state law touches upon the area of these federal statutes, it is 
‘familiar doctrine’ that the federal policy ‘may not be set at naught, or 
its benefits denied’ by the state law. This is true, of course, even if the 
state law is enacted in the exercise of otherwise undoubted state 
power.187 
In English v. General Electric Co.,188 the Court summarized the three 
circumstances in which state law is preempted under the Supremacy 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution: 
First, Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its enactments 
pre-empt state law. . . . 
  Second, in the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is 
pre-empted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress 
intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively. Such an 
intent may be inferred from a ‘scheme of federal regulation . . . so 
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no 
room for the States to supplement it,’ or where an Act of Congress 
‘touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the 
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws 
on the same subject.’ . . . 
  Finally, state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts 
with federal law. Thus, the Court has found pre-emption where it is 
impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal 
requirements, or where state law “stands as an obstacle to the 
 
 186. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974); see supra note 180. Note that in 
Part II.B.2, infra, we discuss another objective of federal patent law implicated in the Supreme Court’s 
justification for patent exhaustion, that is, that the patent system should provide sufficient incentive to 
inventors (but no more) to promote invention for the public good, where such incentive is in the form 
of a one-time payment made at the time of the authorized first sale of a patented product (the single 
reward interpretation discussed in Part I.A). This objective is relevant to an analysis of the 
enforceability of a specific type of contract-based restriction that requires that the buyer of a patented 
product make ongoing post-sale payments for the recurring use of the product—a so-called double 
royalty obligation; see also infra note 331 for a discussion of a variation of the argument against double 
royalties that is relevant to an analysis of the enforceability of any contract-based post-sale restriction. 
 187. Sears, 376 U.S. at 229 (citations omitted). 
 188. 496 U.S. 72 , 78 (1990). 
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accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”189 
Federal patent law does not provide for explicit preemption.190 Nor is field 
preemption applicable to an assessment of whether an objective of federal 
patent law that underlies patent exhaustion preempts the enforcement of a 
contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product under state 
contract law. As the Supreme Court stated in Aronson,191 in which the 
Court considered the enforceability under state law of a royalty payment 
obligation in a license agreement involving intellectual property, 
“[c]ommercial agreements traditionally are the domain of state law. State 
law is not displaced merely because the contract relates to intellectual 
property which may or may not be patentable; the states are free to 
regulate the use of such intellectual property in any manner not 
inconsistent with federal law.”192 
The issue under consideration in this Part can be addressed, 
however, through a conflict preemption analysis. While it is difficult to 
make a case that an effort by a private party to enforce a contract-based 
post-sale restriction on a patented product under state law makes it 
impossible for that party to comply with both state and federal 
requirements, such an effort may stand “as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of” 
federal patent law.193 The Supreme Court in Aronson relied on this form of 
conflict preemption, which has been labeled interference preemption,194 in 
its assessment of whether federal patent law preempted the enforcement 
 
 189. Id. at 78–79 (alterations within internal quotations in original) (citations omitted). 
 190. See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(“[F]ederal patent law plainly does not provide for explicit preemption . . . .”). 
 191. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil, Inc., 440 U.S. 257 (1979). 
 192. Id. at 262 (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974)); see Cover v. 
Hydramatic Packing Co., 83 F.3d 1390, 1393 (1996) (“With respect to field pre-emption, Title 35 
occupies the field of patent law, not commercial law between buyers and sellers.”); Bonito Boats, Inc. 
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 154 (1989) (“The pre-emptive sweep of our decisions in 
Sears and Compco has been the subject of heated scholarly and judicial debate. Read at their highest 
level of generality, the two decisions could be taken to stand for the proposition that the States are 
completely disabled from offering any form of protection to articles or processes that fall within the 
broad scope of patentable subject matter. . . . That the extrapolation of such a broad pre-emptive 
principle from Sears is inappropriate is clear from the balance struck in Sears itself. . . . [W]hile Sears 
speaks in absolutist terms, its conclusion that the States may place some conditions on the use of trade 
dress indicates an implicit recognition that all state regulation of potentially patentable but unpatented 
subject matter is not ipso facto pre-empted by the federal patent laws. What was implicit in our 
decision in Sears, we have made explicit in our subsequent decisions concerning the scope of federal 
pre-emption of state regulation of the subject matter of patent [citing Kewanee and Aronson].” 
(citations omitted) (paragraphing omitted)).  
 193. Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262. 
 194. See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67 Md. L. Rev. 616, 622 n.29 
(2008) (“‘[I]nterference preemption’ occurs where state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”). 
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of a contract-based royalty payment obligation through a breach of 
contract remedy.195 
The Supreme Court has identified two presumptions that guide an 
interference preemption analysis.196 The first is that such an analysis is 
based on the Court’s “oft-repeated comment . . . that ‘[t]he purpose of 
Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case. As a 
result, any understanding of the scope of a pre-emption statute must rest 
primarily on ‘a fair understanding of congressional purpose.’”197 For our 
analysis, the “congressional purpose” to consider is expressed in the 
above-mentioned patent law objective that underlies the patent exhaustion 
doctrine, namely, that ideas in the public domain should remain available 
for free use of the public and cannot be removed by action of the states. 
The second presumption identified by the Court is that “because the 
States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long 
presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of 
action. In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which 
Congress has ‘legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally 
occupied,’ we ‘start with the assumption that the historic police powers of 
the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was 
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’”198 This presumption against 
preemption requires that in assessing whether the enforcement of any 
contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product would 
interfere with a core objective of federal patent law in a way that requires 
preemption, we must consider not only the objective that is purportedly 
interfered with but also the extent of the interference that would result 
from such enforcement under state contract law. In the Supreme Court’s 
seminal patent law preemption decisions in which conflict preemption by 
federal patent law invalidated state law,199 the Court has made it clear 
that something more than mere interference is required for preemption, 
e.g., the enforcement of the state law under consideration would be too 
great an encroachment on200 or a significant frustration of,201 or would 
 
 195. Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262 (“In this as in other fields, the question of whether federal law pre-
empts state law ‘involves a consideration of whether that law ‘stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”). 
 196. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485–86 (1996). 
 197. Id. (citations omitted). This comment was initially made in Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 
375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963). 
 198. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 199. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 
395 U.S. 653 (1969); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & 
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
 200. See Sears, 376 U.S. at 232 (“States could allow perpetual protection to articles too lacking in 
novelty to merit any patent at all under federal constitutional standards. This would be too great an 
encroachment on the federal patent system to be tolerated.” (emphasis added)). 
 201. See Lear, 395 U.S. at 673 (“The parties’ contract, however, is no more controlling on this issue 
than is the State’s doctrine of estoppel, which is also rooted in contract principles. The decisive 
question is whether overriding federal policies would be significantly frustrated if licensees could be 
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result in substantial interference with,202 federal patent law. Accordingly, 
an interference preemption analysis does not lend itself to absolute, 
bright-line pronouncements, but must be argued in terms of “degrees of 
interference” and the identification of a potentially arbitrary line that 
must be crossed to justify preemption. 
The very purpose of a contract-based post-sale restriction on a 
patented product is to enable the patent holder to maintain some measure 
of control of the downstream use or disposition of the product, despite the 
fact that the authorized first sale of the product places it outside of the 
limits of any relevant patent. If the enforcement of any such restriction 
through a breach of contract remedy under state law constitutes too great 
an encroachment on, or a significant frustration of, or would result in 
substantial interference with the patent law objective (reflected in the 
doctrine of patent exhaustion) of ensuring that ideas in the public domain 
remain there, then such enforcement must be preempted by federal law. 
If, on the other hand, exhaustion of the patent remedy is enough to meet 
this objective of the patent system, and enforcement of the breach of 
contract remedy under state law does not meet the requisite degree of 
interference to justify preemption, then such enforcement should be 
permitted. In Bonito Boats,203 the Supreme Court’s most recent discussion 
of federal patent law preemption, the Court provided an analytical 
approach to addressing the above issue regarding the enforcement of 
contract-based post-sale restrictions on patented products. The question 
before the Court in Bonito Boats was whether a Florida statute prohibiting 
“the use of a direct molding process to duplicate unpatented boat hulls” 
and “the knowing sale of hulls so duplicated” conflicts with “strong federal 
policy favoring free competition in ideas not meriting patent protection” 
and thus is preempted by the Supremacy Clause.204 Relying on its prior 
decisions in Sears205 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,206 the 
Court in Bonito Boats concluded that the Florida statute was preempted 
by the Supremacy Clause because a state cannot offer patent-like 
protection to intellectual creations that are in the public domain.207 
 
required to continue to pay royalties during the time they are challenging patent validity in the courts. 
It seems to us that such a requirement would be inconsistent with the aims of federal patent policy.” 
(emphasis added) (paragraphing omitted)). 
 202. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156–57 (“A state law that substantially interferes with the 
enjoyment of an unpatented utilitarian or design conception which has been freely disclosed by its 
author to the public at large impermissibly contravenes the ultimate goal of public disclosure and use 
which is the centerpiece of federal patent policy.” (emphasis added)). 
 203. 489 U.S. at 141. 
 204. Id. at 141–42. 
 205. 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
 206. 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
 207. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156 (“[T]he States may not offer patent-like protection to 
intellectual creations which would otherwise remain unprotected as a matter of federal law.”). 
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Applying the rule of Bonito Boats to the question of whether a 
contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product is enforceable 
under state law requires a determination of the meaning of the terms 
“patent-like protection” and “in the public domain.” In Bonito Boats, as 
in Sears208 and in Compco,209 a state law that enjoined the copying of an 
article that was clearly in the public domain was held to provide “patent-
like protection” and was, accordingly, preempted as inconsistent with an 
objective of federal patent law. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,210 
another of the Supreme Court’s seminal patent law preemption cases, 
the Court refused to preempt a state law trade secret action to enjoin the 
disclosure or use of company trade secrets by former employees. The 
Kewanee Court based its holding on its dual conclusion that (1) “[t]rade 
secret law provides far weaker protection in many respects than the 
patent law,”211 that is, does not provide “patent-like protection,” and 
(2) “[t]he subject of a trade secret must be secret, and must not be of 
public knowledge or of a general knowledge in the trade or business,”212 
i.e., is not “in the public domain.” Finally, in Aronson,213 the Court held 
that a licensee’s contractual obligation to continue to pay royalties to the 
inventor of a novel design for the rights to manufacture and sell a 
product incorporating the design was enforceable under state law, 
despite the fact that no patent covering the design was ever issued and 
that the first sale of the product by the licensee placed the previously 
confidential design in the public domain.  
In concluding that enforcement of the royalty provision under state 
contract law was not preempted by federal patent law, the Court ruled 
that a contractual royalty payment obligation placed on a licensee for the 
right to exploit a product design that was clearly in the public domain 
was not the equivalent of “patent-like protection,” as that term is applied 
in a preemption analysis. In essence, the Court held that, despite the fact 
that the inventive design had entered the public domain and was free for 
unfettered use by any party other than the licensee, the ongoing burden 
 
 208. Sears, 376 U.S. at 232–33 (“[B]ecause of the federal patent laws a State may not, when the 
article is unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article itself or award damages for 
such copying [under the State’s unfair competition law].”). 
 209. Compco, 376 U.S. at 234 (“[T]he use of a state unfair competition law to give relief against 
copying of an unpatented industrial design [in the form of an injunction and damages] conflicts with 
the federal patent laws.”). 
 210. 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
 211. Id. at 489–90 (“Trade secret law provides far weaker protection in many respects than the 
patent law. While trade secret law does not forbid the discovery of the trade secret by fair and honest 
means, e.g., independent creation or reverse engineering, patent law operates ‘against the world,’ 
forbidding any use of the invention for whatever purpose for a significant length of time. The holder of 
a trade secret also takes a substantial risk that the secret will be passed on to his competitors, by theft 
or by breach of a confidential relationship, in a manner not easily susceptible of discovery or proof. 
Where patent law acts as a barrier, trade secret law functions relatively as a sieve.” (citation omitted)). 
 212. Id. at 475. 
 213. 440 U.S. 257 (1979). 
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placed on the licensee in exchange for the rights to make and sell a 
product based on the design was justified by the benefit provided the 
licensee in being “the first to introduce a new product to the market.”214 
For our purposes, the Court ruled that, under the circumstances in 
Aronson, a less than “patent-like” control exerted by the inventor, that is, 
a royalty burden on the sale by a licensee of a product in the public 
domain, was not preempted under federal patent law and was enforceable 
under state contract law. 
Contract-based, post-sale restrictions on patented products can vary 
in their form and effect, e.g., a restriction on the use or disposition of the 
product or a royalty payment obligation attached to the use or resale of 
the product. It is arguable as to whether each and every such restriction 
provides the patent holder with “patent-like protection” with respect to 
its product following an authorized first sale (although the Court’s 
holding in Aronson would indicate that a royalty payment obligation is 
not the equivalent of such protection). However, the following points 
suggest that not all such restrictions are unenforceable through a breach 
of contract remedy as a result of preemption under the standard set forth 
in Bonito Boats. First, the remedy under state contract law for a buyer’s 
breach of any such post-sale restriction would typically be monetary 
damages and not injunctive relief, raising the reasonable question of 
whether the state (through a breach of contract remedy) is, in fact, 
providing “patent-like protection” to a patent holder who authorizes the 
sale of the patented product but subjects the buyer to a contract-based, 
post-sale restriction. The distinction between monetary damages and 
injunctive relief in assessing whether “patent-like protection” is being 
provided by enforcement of a breach of contract remedy under state law 
is highlighted in the following excerpt from Justice Douglas’ dissent in 
Kewanee Oil. Arguing against the approval of injunctive relief under a 
state’s trade secret law, Justice Douglas noted the following: 
A suit to redress theft of a trade secret is grounded in tort damages for 
breach of a contract—a historic remedy. Damages for breach of a 
confidential relation are not pre-empted by this patent law, but an 
injunction against use is pre-empted because the patent law states the 
only monopoly over trade secrets that is enforceable by specific 
performance; and that monopoly exacts as a price full disclosure. A 
trade secret can be protected only by being kept secret. Damages for 
breach of a contract are one thing; an injunction barring disclosure 
does service for the protection accorded valid patents and is therefore 
pre-empted.215 
While the Supreme Court’s recent decision in eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C.216 (in which the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s 
 
 214. Id. at 263. 
 215. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 498–99 (citation omitted). 
 216. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
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“general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent 
infringement absent exceptional circumstances”217 in favor of the 
traditional four-factor test for injunctive relief) minimizes this distinction, 
it is certainly the case that the Court considered the availability of 
injunctive relief as a central element in the meaning of the term “patent-
like protection” in its seminal patent law preemption decisions.218 
Second, it is questionable that a patented product that is the subject 
of a contract-based post-sale restriction truly enters the public domain 
upon authorized first sale, where a valid, unexpired patent covering the 
product is exhausted only with respect to the purchased product and 
where the buyer is the only party that is contractually bound to adhere to 
the agreed-to restrictions that are a condition of the sale. In other words, 
there is a reasonable argument to be made that patent exhaustion in that 
context is sufficiently distinct from patent expiration/invalidation to 
justify a different treatment when it comes to determining what is “in the 
public domain” for unfettered use by the public. The definition of public 
domain has varied in the Supreme Court’s patent law preemption 
jurisprudence from Sears through Kewanee Oil to Bonito Boats, ranging 
from ideas not patented to ideas that are generally available to the 
public.219 The Court, however, has never concluded that an idea embodied 
 
 217. Id. at 391 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 
vacated, 547 U.S. 388 (2006)). 
 218. Each of the Supreme Court’s seminal patent law preemption decisions preceded its decision 
in eBay and were issued during the period when injunctive relief was the remedy for patent 
infringement in the absence of exceptional circumstances. See Part II.B.3. 
 219. See S. Stephen Hilmy, Bonito Boats’ Resurrection of the Preemption Controversy: The Patent 
Leverage Charade and the Lanham Act “End Around,” 69 Tex. L. Rev. 729, 746–49 (1991) ). (“[A] key 
interpretive move made in the Bonito Boats opinion concerns the notion of public domain. . . . [T]he 
Bonito Boats Court stressed that ‘because the public awareness of a trade secret is by definition 
limited, . . . “the policy that matter once in the public domain must remain in the public domain is not 
incompatible with the existence of trade secret protection.”’ However, the Court here has simply 
adopted, but not reconciled, the shift of meaning that the Kewanee and Aronson opinions used to 
circumvent the Sears-Compco strong free competition policy rationale. This shift of meaning involves 
a confusion of a trade secret notion of public domain and a patent law notion of public domain: a 
confusion of publicity or nonsecrecy with the status of being unpatented or unpatentable. 
The Court’s suggestion that ‘public awareness of a trade secret is by definition limited’ and 
therefore trade secrets are not in the public domain, rests on a trade secrets notion of public 
domain. . . . 
. . . . The argument adopted by Bonito Boats is that since the patent law free competition 
rationale rests on a policy of ‘favoring the full and free use of ideas in the public domain,’ and trade 
secrets are by definition not in the public domain, then there is no clash between trade secret law and 
the Sears-Compco patent preemption rationale. 
The concept of public domain at work in the Sears-Compco rationale for patent law preemption, 
however, is not defined in terms of substantial secrecy, but rather in terms of whether an article is 
patented or is capable of being patented. Sears-Compco uses public domain in a patent law sense to 
designate generally the domain of articles that are unprotected by federal patent law. . . . 
An article can be unprotected by a patent for any number of reasons: (1) the article can fail to 
meet the usefulness, novelty, and non-obviousness requirements for patentability under the patent 
laws, (2) the article may have been granted patent protection but subsequently lost that protection 
either through expiry of the term of the patent or invalidation . . . or (3) the owner of the article may 
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in a patented product that has been sold with the authority of the patent 
holder has entered the public domain. 
In the end, one is left with a question of whether state law 
enforcement of a contract-based, post-sale restriction on a patented 
product, while not truly “patent-like protection,” is “too great an 
encroachment on the federal patent system to be tolerated,”220 where the 
restriction is placed on a product that is not clearly “in the public domain,” 
as that term has been used, with some variability, by the Supreme Court in 
its patent law preemption analyses. Application of the preemption 
standard provided by the Supreme Court in its Bonito Boats decision 
suggests that not every contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented 
product is unenforceable through a breach of contract remedy under 
state law, but it does not resolve the issue. 
Accordingly, another approach to patent law preemption, relied on 
by the Supreme Court in its decision in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,221 is worthy of 
consideration in addressing the enforceability of post-sale restrictions. The 
Court’s opinion in Lear does not read as a classic federal law preemption 
analysis (in fact, the word “preemption” is not used in the text of the 
opinion), but it clearly relied on the Supremacy Clause and a conflict with 
federal patent law to reject the state common law doctrine of licensee 
estoppel and to void a contract-based royalty payment obligation. In 
Lear, the Court considered whether the doctrine of licensee estoppel, 
which barred a patent licensee from challenging the validity of a licensed 
patent, and an express contract provision that obligated the licensee to 
continue to pay royalties until the licensed patent had been invalidated, 
impermissibly interfered with an objective of federal patent law.222  
Citing its prior decisions in Sears and in Compco, the Lear Court 
identified the relevant objective as the requirement under federal law 
that “all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common good 
 
simply choose not to seek patent protection. 
However, what is left in the public domain in the Sears-Compco patent law sense may not be in 
the public domain in the trade secret law sense. . . . [P]atent law may leave in the public domain 
something which nevertheless satisfies the relative secrecy standards requisite for state trade secret 
protection. Furthermore, given that Sears-Compco tended to equate public domain with anything that 
is unprotected by federal patent, mere failure to seek patent protection leaves something in the public 
domain for Sears-Compco patent law purposes, and thus there is an even greater overlap (and clash) 
of the nonpublic domain of trade secrets and the Sears-Compco public domain of patent law. 
It was on the basis of the broader Sears-Compco patent law sense of public domain, not a trade 
secret conception of public domain, that Justices Black, Warren, Douglas, Brennan, Blackmun, and 
Marshall dissented to attempts to modify the course set by Sears-Compco. It was the blurring of these 
two incongruous senses of public domain that allowed the Burger Court to circumvent the Sears-
Compco free competition preemption rationale. Sears-Compco can be reconciled with Kewanee and 
Aronson only by blurring (as the Bonito Boats opinion does) these two incongruous senses of public 
domain.” (alterations within internal quotations in original) (footnotes omitted)). 
 220. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964). 
 221. 395 U.S. 653 (1969). 
 222. Id. at 656, 673. 
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unless they are protected by a valid patent.”223 The specific issue in Lear 
was whether the state, by preventing or discouraging the timely 
elimination of wrongly issued patents, was providing “patent-like 
protection” to ideas that should be freely available for public use.224 In 
deciding the issue, the Lear Court engaged in a balancing test that pitted 
federal patent law against state contract law. Despite its acknowledgment 
that “the law of contracts forbids a purchaser to repudiate his promises 
simply because he later becomes dissatisfied with the bargain he has 
made,”225 the Court rejected, as incompatible with federal patent law, the 
doctrine of licensee estoppel, “which is . . . rooted in contract 
principles.”226 and the licensee’s contractual obligation to continue to 
make royalty payments during its challenge of the validity of the patent 
at issue. Regarding licensee estoppel, the Court concluded that 
the equities of the licensor do not weigh very heavily when they are 
balanced against the important public interest in permitting full and 
free competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the 
public domain. Licensees may often be the only individuals with 
enough economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an 
inventor’s discovery. If they are muzzled, the public may continually be 
required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or 
justification. We think it plain that the technical requirements of 
contract doctrine must give way before the demands of the public 
interest in the typical situation involving the negotiation of a license 
after a patent has issued.227 
In voiding the contract-based royalty payment obligation, the Court 
stated that 
[t]he parties’ contract . . . is no more controlling on this issue than is the 
State’s doctrine of estoppel . . . . The decisive question is whether 
overriding federal policies would be significantly frustrated if licensees 
could be required to continue to pay royalties during the time they are 
challenging patent validity in the courts. 
  It seems to us that such a requirement would be inconsistent with 
the aims of federal patent policy. Enforcing this contractual provision 
would give the licensor an additional economic incentive to devise 
every conceivable dilatory tactic in an effort to postpone the day of 
final judicial reckoning. We can perceive no reason to encourage 
dilatory court tactics in this way. Moreover, the cost of prosecuting 
slow-moving trial proceedings and defending an inevitable appeal 
might well deter many licensees from attempting to prove patent 
invalidity in the courts. The deterrent effect would be particularly 
severe in the many scientific fields in which invention is proceeding at a 
rapid rate. In these areas, a patent may well become obsolete long 
before its 17-year term has expired. If a licensee has reason to believe 
that he will replace a patented idea with a new one in the near future, 
 
 223. Id. at 668. 
 224. Id. at 656. 
 225. Id. at 668. 
 226. Id. at 673. 
 227. Id. at 670–71. 
April 2013]       CONTRACT-BASED POST-SALE RESTRICTIONS 609 
he will have little incentive to initiate lengthy court proceedings, unless 
he is freed from liability at least from the time he refuses to pay the 
contractual royalties. Lastly, enforcing this contractual provision would 
undermine the strong federal policy favoring the full and free use of 
ideas in the public domain. For all these reasons, we hold that Lear 
must be permitted to avoid the payment of all royalties accruing after 
Adkins’ 1960 patent issued if Lear can prove patent invalidity.228 
The Lear decision was followed by a series of federal district and 
appellate court decisions that considered the enforceability under state 
law of contract-based disincentives to patent validity challenges.229 The 
approach to patent law preemption that emerged from Lear and the 
cases that followed is applicable to our analysis of the enforceability of 
contract-based, post-sale restrictions on patented products, and consists 
of the following three steps: First, identify the patent law objective being 
threatened by the contract restriction under consideration. In Lear, as in 
our analysis, the objective is the need for ideas in the public domain to 
remain there and not be removed by an action of a state. Second, 
determine the degree of interference with the objective. This step was of 
particular importance in Lear, where the Court acknowledged the 
significance of enforcing contract terms agreed to by private parties. In the 
balancing test performed in Lear, the Court voided a contract provision 
only where it “significantly frustrated” an overriding federal policy and left 
a licensee with “little incentive” to challenge a licensed patent.230 As one 
commentator noted, the “Lear decision was based upon a policy of 
‘eliminating obstacles to suit by those disposed to challenge the validity 
of a patent,’ but the ‘spirit of Lear’ cannot logically demand that any and 
all rules of contract law . . . be ignored to give licensees every possible 
incentive to challenge patent validity.”231  
Third, and finally, determine whether policy considerations, other 
than those involved in a weighing of an objective of federal patent law 
against a requirement of state contract law, come into play in assessing a 
contract-based restriction. Such considerations may shift the balance in 
favor of enforcing the restriction under state law. For example, despite 
the Lear Court’s rejection of licensee estoppel in the context of a typical 
patent license agreement, the Federal Circuit subsequently held that 
contract-based restrictions on patent validity challenges were 
enforceable under state law where they were necessary to avoid 
“unfairness and injustice” (as in the case of assignor estoppel),232 or were 
 
 228. Id. at 673–74. 
 229. See Alfred C. Server & Peter Singleton, Licensee Patent Validity Challenges Following 
MedImmune: Implications for Patent Licensing, 3 Hastings Sci. & Tech. L.J. 243, 333–97 (2011). 
 230. Lear, 395 U.S. at 673–74. 
 231. J. Thomas McCarthy, “Unmuzzling” the Patent Licensee: Chaos in the Wake of Lear v. Adkins 
(Part II—Conclusion), 59 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 544, 568 (1977) (footnote omitted). 
 232. See Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1224–25 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[I]t is 
the implicit representation by the assignor that the patent rights that he is assigning (presumably for 
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justified in light of the strong public interest in the settlement of patent 
litigation (as in the case of a no-challenge clause included in a settlement 
agreement).233 As noted by the Federal Circuit,234 these additional policy 
considerations were not included in the Lear balancing test and allowed 
for a preemption analysis outcome that differed from the one reached by 
the Supreme Court in Lear. What is important for our purposes is that 
the Lear approach to preemption analysis is based on a case-by-case 
review of the contract restriction under consideration. This approach is 
consistent with a conclusion that Supreme Court patent law preemption 
jurisprudence does not dictate that every attempt to enforce a contract-
based post-sale restriction on a patented product must be preempted as an 
impermissible work around of a core patent law objective reflected in the 
doctrine of patent exhaustion. 
It is noteworthy that our conclusion that at least some contract-based 
post-sale restrictions on patented products will survive a preemption 
challenge and be enforceable under state law is consistent with the 
legislative history of the federal copyright statute’s first sale doctrine. 
Section 109(a) of the federal copyright statute reads, in part, as follows: 
“[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under 
this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the 
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the 
possession of that copy or phonorecord.”235 However, the legislative 
history regarding the adoption of the first sale doctrine under federal 
copyright law included the following statement: 
[T]he outright sale of an authorized copy of a book frees it from any 
copyright control over its resale price or other conditions of its future 
 
value) are not worthless that sets the assignor apart from the rest of the world and can deprive him of 
the ability to challenge later the validity of the patent. To allow the assignor to make that 
representation at the time of the assignment (to his advantage) and later to repudiate it (again to his 
advantage) could work an injustice against the assignee.”); id. at 1225 (“[W]e believe that the primary 
consideration in now applying the doctrine [of assignor estoppel] is the measure of unfairness and 
injustice that would be suffered by the assignee if the assignor were allowed to raise defenses of patent 
invalidity. Our analysis must be concerned mainly with the balance of equities between the parties.”). 
 233. See Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[W]hile the federal 
patent laws favor full and free competition in the use of ideas in the public domain over the technical 
requirements of contract doctrine, settlement of litigation is more strongly favored by the law.”); see 
also Diversey Lever, Inc. v. Ecolab, Inc., 191 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 
F.2d 469 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 234. See Diamond Scientific, 848 F.2d at 1224–25 (“Our holding is that this is a case in which public 
policy calls for the application of assignor estoppel. We are, of course, not unmindful of the general 
public policy disfavoring the repression of competition by the enforcement of worthless patents. Yet 
despite the public policy encouraging people to challenge potentially invalid patents, there are still 
circumstances in which the equities of the contractual relationships between the parties should deprive 
one party (as well as others in privity with it) of the right to bring that challenge.”); see also Flex-Foot, 
238 F.3d at 1369 (“Clearly, the importance of res judicata and its hierarchical position in the realm of 
public policy was not a relevant consideration in Lear and therefore the Supreme Court never 
evaluated the importance of res judicata and whether it trumps the patent laws’ prescription of full and 
free competition in the use of ideas that are in reality a part of the public domain.”). 
 235. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (a) (2012). 
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disposition. . . . . This does not mean that conditions on future 
disposition of copies or phonorecords, imposed by a contract between 
their buyer and seller, would be unenforceable between the parties as a 
breach of contract, but it does mean that they could not be enforced by 
an action for infringement of copyright.236 
The clear meaning of the above statement is that, with respect to the 
federal copyright laws, an authorized first sale of a copyrighted item will 
eliminate infringement remedies, but not necessarily contract remedies 
under state law, which are not preempted by the federal copyright 
statute. This conclusion is all the more significant in light of the stated 
position of the Supreme Court that the same rules of interpretation and 
application apply to both the copyright statute and the patent statute.237 
2. Is a Contract-Based Post-Sale Restriction on a Patented 
Product Per Se Patent Misuse? 
Another argument against the enforceability of any contract-based 
post-sale restriction on a patented product through a breach of contract 
remedy, irrespective of the nature of the restriction, is that the inclusion 
of such a restriction in a contract constitutes per se patent misuse. Patent 
misuse is an affirmative defense to a claim of patent infringement.238 
Misuse will be found if a patent is used in an effort to impermissibly 
broaden the physical or temporal scope of the patent monopoly or in 
violation of antitrust law.239 Where a patent has been misused in 
negotiating a license or sale agreement, the offending contractual 
provision is invalid and the misused patent is unenforceable, even against 
third party infringers, until the misuse terminates and its consequences 
are fully dissipated.240 
Like patent exhaustion, patent misuse is a judge-made doctrine.241 
Also like patent exhaustion, patent misuse focuses on the scope of the 
 
 236. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 79 (1976). 
 237. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 579 n.3 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“It bears 
noting that in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., the Court repeatedly referred to the patent and 
copyright statutes as if the same rules of interpretation applied to both.” (citation omitted)). 
 238. Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Patent misuse is 
an affirmative defense to an accusation of patent infringement . . . .”). See Chisum, supra note 178, 
§ 19.04 (Patent Misuse Defense). 
 239. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343–44 (1971) (“[T]he 
Court has condemned attempts to broaden the physical or temporal scope of the patent monopoly.”) 
(citing, inter alia, Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 
488 (1942); Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. 
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917)); see also Chisum, supra note 178, § 19.04 (Patent Misuse 
Defense); Robert J. Hoerner, The Decline (And Fall?) of the Patent Misuse Doctrine in the Federal 
Circuit, 69 Antitrust L.J. 669, 669–73 (2001); Alfred C. Server et al., Reach-Through Rights and the 
Patentability, Enforcement, and Licensing of Patents on Drug Discovery Tools, 1 Hastings Sci. & Tech. 
L.J. 21, 65–75 (2009). 
 240. See Chisum, supra note 178, § 19.04 (Patent Misuse Defense); Server et al., supra note 239, at 
65–75. 
 241. See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Hovenkamp, 
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statutorily conferred patent monopoly. As discussed elsewhere in this 
Article, the Supreme Court’s justification for patent exhaustion is that the 
authorized first sale of a patented product places the product beyond the 
limits of any patents that cover or are substantially embodied in that 
product, thereby exhausting patent infringement remedies.242 In the case 
of patent misuse, the Court has held that a contract provision extending 
the physical or temporal scope of a patent that results from the leverage 
provided by such patent is void and the patent is unenforceable until the 
misuse ends and its consequences are dissipated.243 The latter doctrine’s 
focus on patent scope makes it relevant to an analysis of whether a 
contract-based restriction on a patented product following an authorized 
first sale, which places the product outside of the patent monopoly, is 
enforceable under state contract law. 
However, patent exhaustion and patent misuse are separate 
doctrines, despite their shared focus on the limits of the patent 
monopoly. The beginning of the Supreme Court’s patent exhaustion 
jurisprudence in McQuewan (1852) predates that of the Court’s patent 
misuse jurisprudence in Motion Picture Patents (1917),244 indicating that 
the exhaustion doctrine operates to eliminate patent infringement 
remedies in the context of a violation of a post-sale restriction on a 
patented product without reliance on the later-developed doctrine of 
patent misuse. Moreover, the fact that the doctrines are distinguishable 
justifies a separate assessment of the impact of the misuse doctrine on the 
enforceability of a contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented 
product through a breach of contract remedy from the one provided in 
Part II.A.1 on the impact of the exhaustion doctrine. In this Part, we 
undertake such an assessment and, based on a review of relevant Supreme 
Court patent misuse jurisprudence, related Federal Circuit case law, and 
an amendment to the federal patent statutes, we conclude that the patent 
misuse doctrine does not mandate that every contract-based post-sale 
restriction on a patented product is unenforceable under state law. 
As discussed in Parts I.A and I.C, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Motion Picture Patents was critical to the development of the Court’s 
 
supra note 8, at 491. 
 242. See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852) (“[W]hen the machine passes to the hands 
of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly [created by Congress in enacting the 
federal patent laws].”). 
 243. See supra notes 239, 240. 
 244. See Blonder-Tongue Labs, 402 U.S. at 343–44; Princo, 616 F.3d at 1326. Note that other 
Supreme Court cases have been cited as the start of the Court’s patent misuse jurisprudence, such as 
Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931) (cited by 
Chisum, supra note 178, §19.04 [1] [b] (Patent Misuse Defense) (referring to the “Supreme Court 
‘Tying’ Cases—Carbice, Morton & Mercoid”)), and Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 
(1942) (cited by Hoerner, supra note 239, at 670). Accepting either of these later cases as the Court’s 
first application of the patent misuse doctrine does not undermine the point that that doctrine was 
developed after the patent exhaustion doctrine. 
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patent exhaustion jurisprudence in that it rejected the conditional sale 
doctrine endorsed in its prior decision in Henry. The Motion Picture 
Patents opinion is also significant in that it provides the first support for 
the conclusion that not all contract-based post-sale restrictions on 
patented products constitute patent misuse. The Court considered two 
distinct issues in Motion Picture Patents. It first addressed the question of 
whether, in contrast to the conditional sale doctrine, an authorized first 
sale of a patented product invariably exhausts patent infringement 
remedies.245 In concluding that such a sale does, indeed, exhaust patent 
remedies, irrespective of any conditions that are attached to the sale, the 
Court rejected the conditional sale doctrine and resolved the question 
regarding the impact of patent exhaustion.246 
Not content to end the analysis there, and recognizing the need to 
deal with the precedent set by its earlier pro-patent decision in Henry, 
the Court in Motion Picture Patents then addressed the enforceability of 
the particular post-sale restriction under consideration in the case which, 
as in Henry, was a tying obligation placed on the buyer of the patented 
product.247 The Court concluded that the provision at issue was evidence 
of the patent holder’s effort “to, in effect, extend the scope of its patent 
monopoly by restricting the use of it to materials necessary in its 
operation, but which are no part of the patented invention . . . . The 
patent law furnishes no warrant for such a practice . . . .”248 This is the 
language of patent misuse, and many consider the Court’s decision in 
Motion Picture Patents to be the beginning of the Supreme Court’s 
patent misuse jurisprudence.249 In declaring the tying provision invalid as 
an impermissible extension of patent scope, the Court in Motion Picture 
Patents eliminated any argument that the provision was enforceable 
under state contract law or any other legal theory.250 The point for our 
 
 245. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 515–16 (1917). 
 246. Id. See Part I.C. 
 247. Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 515–16, 518. See infra note 251. 
 248. Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 516–17. 
 249. See id. In rejecting the tying provision under consideration, the Court noted that such a 
provision could be challenged as a violation of the Clayton Act, an antitrust statute enacted by 
Congress in the interval between the Court’s decision in Henry and the decision that it was handing 
down in Motion Picture Patents. While the Court in Motion Picture Patents did not explore the matter 
further, it stated that “[o]ur conclusion [based on a patent misuse analysis] renders it unnecessary to 
make the application of this statute to the case at bar which the Circuit Court of Appeals made of it 
but it must be accepted by us as a most persuasive expression of the public policy of our country with 
respect to the question before us.” Id. at 517–18. 
 250. Id. at 518. (“Coming now to the terms of the notice attached to the [film projecting] machine 
sold . . . under the license of the plaintiff [and covered by the plaintiff’s patent in suit]. . . . This 
notice . . . provides that the machine . . . may be used only with moving picture films containing the 
invention of reissued [and subsequently expired] patent No. 12,192, so long as the plaintiff continues to 
own this reissued patent. Such a restriction is invalid because such a film is obviously not any part of 
the invention of the patent in suit; because it is an attempt, without statutory warrant, to continue the 
patent monopoly in this particular character of film after it has expired, and because to enforce it 
would be to create a monopoly in the manufacture and use of moving picture films, wholly outside of 
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purposes is that the Court in Motion Picture Patents would not have 
needed to delve into the particular problem raised by the tying provision 
under consideration if the inclusion of any post-sale restriction on a 
patented product in a contract between an authorized seller and a buyer 
constituted an impermissible extension of the patent scope under the 
misuse doctrine that rendered the restriction unenforceable under state 
contract law. Instead, the Court focused on the particular provision 
before it, supporting a case-by-case application of the patent misuse 
doctrine in evaluating a post-sale restriction. In essence, the Court in 
Motion Picture Patents applied the exhaustion doctrine to eliminate 
patent infringement remedies. It relied on the misuse doctrine to void a 
contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product, but only after 
an evaluation of the nature and impact of the particular restriction under 
consideration—in that case, a problematic tying provision. 
The argument that every contract-based post-sale restriction on a 
patented product is void under the misuse doctrine is based on the view 
that the patent holder has misused the leverage of its patent by 
attempting to exert downstream control over its patented product after 
an authorized first sale has placed the product beyond the scope of the 
patent. However, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Automatic Radio 
Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.251 and Zenith Radio Corp. 
v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.252 stand for the proposition that not all 
contract-based extensions of patent scope constitute patent misuse.  
These cases addressed the enforceability under state law of a 
contract provision that calls for the payment of a total sales royalty in the 
context of a patent license agreement. A total sales royalty obligation 
requires a patent licensee to pay royalties on the sale of products that are 
calculated not only on the sales of the products covered by the licensed 
patent, but also on the sales of products that are not covered. Such an 
obligation is clearly a physical extension of patent scope.253 The holdings 
in Automatic Radio and Zenith reflect the Court’s conclusion that a 
contract provision that obligates a patent licensee to pay a total sales 
royalty is enforceable, provided that the inclusion of the provision in the 
contract is not the result of coercion by the patent holder.254 This would 
 
the patent in suit and of the patent law as we have interpreted it.” (paragraphing omitted)). 
 251. 339 U.S. 827 (1950). 
 252. 395 U.S. 100 (1969). 
 253. See Server et al., supra note 239, at 75–92. 
 254. See Zenith Radio, 395 U.S. at 138–39 (“If convenience of the parties [as in Automatic Radio] 
rather than patent power [as in this case] dictates the total-sales royalty provision, there are no misuse 
of the patents and no forbidden conditions attached to the license . . . . [W]e do not read Automatic 
Radio to authorize the patentee to use the power of his patent to insist on a total-sales royalty and to 
override protestations of the licensee that some of his products are unsuited to the patent or that for 
some lines of his merchandise he has no need or desire to purchase the privileges of the patent.”); 
Automatic Radio, 339 U.S. at 834 (1950) (“Sound business judgment could indicate that . . . [a total 
sales royalty] payment represents the most convenient method of fixing the business value of the 
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suggest, by analogy, that at least some mutually agreed-to, contract-based 
post-sale restrictions placed on a patented product are enforceable under 
contract law, despite the fact that the post-sale restriction would appear to 
be an effort by the patent holder to extend the reach of its patent 
monopoly. 
Admittedly, the Automatic Radio/Zenith line of cases only addresses 
contract provisions that extend the physical scope of the patent monopoly, 
where a non-coerced agreement by the parties to a contract can avoid 
patent misuse. The Supreme Court’s decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co.,255 
however, which addressed a temporal extension of patent scope, presents a 
different challenge. In that case, the Court concluded that a contract 
provision that required the user of a patented product to pay the same 
royalty after the expiration of the applicable patents as it paid prior to 
the expiration was an impermissible temporal extension of patent scope 
that could not be contracted around, in other words, a per se patent 
misuse violation.256  
It could be argued, by analogy, that every contract-based restriction 
placed on a patented product following an authorized first sale that 
exhausts the patent right with respect to that product is a per se patent 
misuse violation, rendering the offending contract provision void under 
Brulotte. This argument, however, neglects the fact that Brulotte was 
actually a patent exhaustion case, as well as a patent misuse case, that 
distinguished between the expiration of a patent and the exhaustion of a 
patent with respect to an individual product. The patented hop-picking 
machine at the center of the controversy in Brulotte was actually 
purchased by the user.257 The post-sale restriction placed on the use of 
the machine was in the form of a royalty burden that obligated the user 
to pay royalties for the continued use of the machine even after the 
patents covering the machine had expired.258 The Court ruled that the 
survival of the post-sale restriction following the expiration of the relevant 
patents was “a telltale sign”259 that the patent holder was attempting to 
project its patent monopoly beyond the patent term and, therefore, a 
per se patent misuse violation rendering the royalty payment provision 
unenforceable. Of particular note, for our purposes, is the fact that the 
payment provision was held to be unenforceable from the point in time at 
which the patents expired, not from the point of patent exhaustion 
triggered by the authorized sale of the machine.260 Stated another way, the 
 
privileges granted by the licensing agreement.”). 
 255. 379 U.S. 29 (1964). 
 256. Id. at 32. 
 257. Id. at 29. 
 258. Id. at 29–30. 
 259. Id. at 32. 
 260. Id. at 30. (“Petitioners refused to make royalty payments accruing both before and after the 
expiration of the patents. This suit followed. One defense was misuse of the patents through extension 
of the license agreements beyond the expiration date of the patents. The trial court rendered judgment 
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restriction placed on the patented product was held to be enforceable 
under contract law, despite an authorized first sale that exhausted the 
patent rights with respect to the product, until the time that the relevant 
patents expired. According to this interpretation of the Court’s Brulotte 
holding, the case provides additional support for the conclusion that not 
every post-sale restriction on a patented product is unenforceable under 
state contract law as a result of patent misuse. 
The Federal Circuit’s patent misuse decisions have tended to raise 
the threshold for a finding of misuse. For example, in Windsurfing 
International, Inc. v. AMF, Inc.,261 the Federal Circuit stated that the 
“doctrine of patent misuse . . . requires that the alleged infringer show 
that the patentee has impermissibly broadened the ‘physical or temporal 
scope’ of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect,”262 citing the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. 
University of Illinois Foundation.263 However, the italicized language in 
the above quotation was not part of the original statement in Blonder-
Tongue.264 The Federal Circuit added the words “with anticompetitive 
effect,” and in so doing, arguably, raised the bar for a finding of patent 
misuse.265 Any broadening of the physical or temporal scope of the patent 
grant by the patent holder had to have an anticompetitive effect to 
constitute patent misuse.  
In Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co.,266 the Federal Circuit 
added that an anticompetitive effect alone does not itself require a finding 
of patent misuse. Rather, such an effect must outweigh any procompetitive 
benefits of the challenged practice, when “analyzed in accordance with the 
‘rule of reason.’”267 And in Princo Corp. v. International Trade 
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below must be reversed insofar as it allows royalties to be collected which accrued after the last of the 
patents incorporated into the machines had expired.”). 
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Commission,268 the Federal Circuit’s latest substantive decision regarding 
patent misuse, the court narrowed the type of anticompetitive behavior 
that qualifies as patent misuse.269 The net effect of these restatements by 
the Federal Circuit of the law of patent misuse is that it is virtually 
impossible, under that court’s narrow reading of the misuse doctrine,270 
that a contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product would be 
deemed patent misuse without an assessment of the nature and effect of 
the restriction at issue. Whether or not the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of the misuse doctrine is an accurate reflection of Supreme 
Court patent misuse jurisprudence,271 it remains good law and must be 
considered in any assessment of whether a contract-based post-sale 
restriction on a patented product constitutes per se patent misuse, 
rendering the restriction unenforceable under state contract law. 
Finally, a 1988 amendment to the federal patent statute provides 
further support for the conclusion that not all post-sale restrictions on 
patented products are void as a result of patent misuse. The Patent Misuse 
Reform Act added § 271(d) to the patent statute.272 Section 271(d)(5) 
states, in part, that  
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been held to be outside the otherwise broad scope of the patent grant.” (citation omitted)). 
 270. Id. at 1321 (“Patent misuse developed as a nonstatutory defense to claims of patent 
infringement. In the licensing context, the doctrine limits a patentee’s right to impose conditions on a 
licensee that exceeds the scope of the patent right. Because patent misuse is a judge-made doctrine 
that is in derogation of statutory patent rights against infringement, this court has not applied the 
doctrine of patent misuse expansively.”). 
 271. See Server et al., supra note 239, at 70–71 (“It is noteworthy that the Federal Circuit’s 
analytical framework for identifying patent misuse has been the object of criticism by commentators. 
The view generally expressed is that, in contrast to Supreme Court precedent, the Federal Circuit has 
conflated the ‘antitrust type’ of patent misuse and the ‘extension of monopoly type’ of patent misuse, 
such that from the Federal Circuit’s prospective ‘no misuse of any kind can be found unless the patent 
infringement defendant proves that the alleged misuse had ‘anticompetitive effect not justifiable under 
the rule of reason.’ The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the patent misuse doctrine, which appears 
to ignore the pure ‘extension of monopoly type’ misuse, raises the threshold for a showing of patent 
misuse and, according to some, reflects that court’s antipathy to the doctrine in keeping with its pro-
patent bias.” (footnotes omitted)). See supra note 265. 
 272. See Princo, 616 F.3d at 1329–30; Chisum, supra note 178, § 19.04 (Patent Misuse Defense: 
[i] Historical Development & [f] The Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988); Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent 
Misuse and Antitrust Reform: “Blessed Be the Tie?,” 4 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 1, 21–26 (1991); Richard 
Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act and Noerr-Pennington 
Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38 Drake L. Rev. 175, 192–200 (1988). 
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[n]o patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or 
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed 
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his 
having . . . conditioned the . . . sale of the patented product on the . . . 
purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the 
patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the . . . 
patented product on which the . . . sale is conditioned.273  
The qualifier “otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory 
infringement of a patent” allows for the unavoidable effect of patent 
exhaustion in eliminating patent infringement remedies against a buyer of 
the patented product who fails to comply with a post-sale restriction on the 
use or disposition of the product. However, the avoidance of patent misuse 
in conditioning the sale of a patented product would enable a patent 
holder to preserve its right to pursue a third party infringer of the relevant 
patent who had no connection to the product sale. Accordingly, guidance 
as to the actions that a patent holder could undertake in the context of 
selling its patented product that would not be deemed patent misuse is of 
considerable value. Section 271(d)(5) provides such guidance with its 
statement that, in the absence of market power, a tying restriction that 
obligates a buyer of a patented product to purchase another product, 
possibly for post-sale use with the patented product, is not a type of misuse 
or a legal extension of the patent right that would render the restriction 
unenforceable through a breach of contract remedy. Here then is statutory 
support for the conclusion that not all contract-based post-sale restrictions 
on patented products constitute patent misuse, rendering the restriction 
unenforceable under state contract law. 
3. Is a Contract-Based Post-Sale Restriction on a Patented 
Product Void as Against the Public Policies Against Restraints 
on Alienation and Restraints of Trade? 
The final argument to be addressed against the enforceability of any 
contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product is that such a 
restriction conflicts with the public policies against restraints on 
alienation and restraints of trade. This argument has been cited as a basis 
for patent exhaustion274 and has been relied on in efforts to void contract-
 
 273. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012). 
 274. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516–17 (1917) (“[I]t 
is not competent for the owner of a patent, by notice attached to its machine . . . to send its machines 
forth into the channels of trade of the country subject to conditions as to use or royalty to be paid . . . . 
The patent law furnishes no warrant for such a practice, and the cost, inconvenience, and annoyance to 
the public which the opposite conclusion would occasion forbid it.”); Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. 
Co., 243 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1917) (“Courts would be perversely blind if they failed to look through such an 
attempt as this ‘License Notice’ [to fix the resale price of a patented sound-producing machine] thus 
plainly is to sell property for a full price, and yet to place restraints upon its further alienation, such as 
have been hateful to the law from Lord Coke’s day to ours, because obnoxious to the public interest.”). 
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based post-sale restrictions on both patented and unpatented products.275 
The question to be answered in this Part is whether these public policy 
arguments are sufficiently compelling to render every contract-based 
post-sale restriction on a patented product unenforceable. 
The argument that a contract-based post-sale restriction on a product 
contravenes the public policies against restraints on alienation and 
restraints of trade was presented and accepted by the Supreme Court in 
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.276 (overruled in Leegin 
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.277). Dr. Miles involved a series 
of contracts through which the manufacturer of a proprietary medicine, 
whose formula and method of preparation were not patented but instead 
kept secret, attempted to control the sale price of the medicine.278 The 
contracts were between the manufacturer and selected vendors (i.e., 
jobbers, wholesale druggists, and retailers) and specified the parties to 
whom, and the minimum price at which, the medicine could be sold.279 It 
was alleged that the defendant in the case, who was not in privity of 
contract with the manufacturer, had purchased the medicine from 
various vendors in violation of the latters’ contractual obligation to the 
manufacturer and was selling the medicine below the specified price.280 
While the defendant was charged with tortious interference with the 
contractual relationship between the manufacturer and its vendors, the 
case addressed the legality of the system of contracts that placed 
restrictions on the proprietary medicine following its sale.281 In 
concluding that the contract restrictions in Dr. Miles were unenforceable, 
the Court relied on the public policies against restraints on alienation 
and restraints of trade. With respect to restraints on alienation, the Court 
stated the following: 
We come, then, to the . . . question, whether the complainant . . . is 
entitled to maintain the restrictions by virtue of the fact that they relate 
to products of its own manufacture. 
  The basis of the argument appears to be that, as the manufacturer 
may make and sell, or not, as he chooses, he may affix conditions as to 
the use of the article or as to the prices at which purchasers may 
 
 275. See Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. 502; Straus, 243 U.S. 490; Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. 
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907). 
 276. 220 U.S. 373. 
 277. 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 278. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 374. 
 279. Id. at 374–81. 
 280. Id. at 381–82. 
 281. The manufacturer in Dr. Miles argued that certain of its vendors (i.e., jobbers and wholesale 
druggists) were acting as its agents, having never obtained title to the proprietary medicine, and that 
the contractual restrictions placed on these vendors did not burden a product that had been sold. The 
Supreme Court rejected this view on the theory that the contractual scheme under consideration in the 
case was sufficiently broad to obligate vendors who clearly obtained title to the medicine (e.g., 
retailers and wholesalers who purchased from other wholesalers) to adhere to the manufacturer’s 
restrictions regarding resale of the product. Id. at 379–81. 
620 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:561 
dispose of it. The propriety of the restraint is sought to be derived from 
the liberty of the producer. 
  But because a manufacturer is not bound to make or sell, it does not 
follow in case of sales actually made he may impose upon purchasers 
every sort of restriction. Thus a general restraint upon alienation is 
ordinarily invalid. “The right of alienation is one of the essential 
incidents of a right of general property in movables, and restraints 
upon alienation have been generally regarded as obnoxious to public 
policy, which is best subserved by great freedom of traffic in such 
things as pass from hand to hand. General restraint in the alienation of 
articles, things, chattels . . . have been generally held void. ‘If a man,’ 
says Lord Coke, . . . ‘be possessed of a horse or any other chattel, real 
or personal, and give [or sell] his whole interest or property therein, 
upon condition that the donee or vendee shall not alien the same, the 
same is void, because the whole interest and property is out of him, so 
as he hath no possibility of reverter; and it is against trade and traffic 
and bargaining and contracting between man and man.’”282 
In rejecting the contracts under consideration as unlawful restraints 
of trade, the Dr. Miles Court relied on English case law: 
“The true view at the present time,” said Lord Macnaghten in Nordenfelt 
v. Maxim Nordenfelt, “I think, is this: The public have an interest in 
every person’s carrying on his trade freely: so has the individual. All 
interference with individual liberty of action in trading, and all restraints 
of trade of themselves, if there is nothing more, are contrary to public 
policy, and therefore void. That is the general rule.”283 
The Supreme Court in Dr. Miles established a per se rule against a 
vertical restraint in the form of a minimum resale price restriction. In its 
subsequent decisions in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.284 
(overruled in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.285) and Albrecht 
v. Herald Co.286 (overruled in State Oil Co. v. Khan287), the Court extended 
the per se rule to include post-sale non-price vertical restraints and 
maximum resale price restrictions. Each of these subsequent decisions 
relied on the argument set forth in Dr. Miles to conclude that the vertical 
restraint under consideration contravened the public policies against 
restraints on alienation and restraints of trade.288 
 
 282. Id. at 404–05. 
 283. Id. at 406. 
 284. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
 285. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 286. 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 287. 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
 288. The Supreme Court in Dr. Miles cited public policy arguments against restraints on alienation 
and restraints of trade to conclude that the minimum resale price restriction under consideration was 
per se illegal under common law and Sherman Act § 1. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 409. The Court in 
Schwinn relied on Dr. Miles in holding that post-sale non-price vertical restraints were a per se illegal 
restraint of trade under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 382. The Schwinn Court also 
noted, citing Dr. Miles, that the restraints under consideration were a violation of the “ancient rule 
against restraints on alienation.” Id. at 380. The Court in Albrecht relied on United States v. Parke, 
Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960), which in turn relied on Dr. Miles, to conclude that maximum resale 
price restrictions were a per se violation under Sherman Act § 1. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 149–50. 
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The products under consideration in Dr. Miles, Schwinn, and Albrecht 
were not patented.289 Accordingly, it is necessary to consider whether the 
rules against restraints on alienation and restraints of trade also apply to 
post-sale restrictions on patented products. While the Supreme Court in 
Dr. Miles failed to resolve this issue,290 it cited with approval291 the opinion 
of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in John D. Park & Sons Co. 
v. Hartman—a case with a fact pattern that was strikingly similar to that in 
Dr. Miles—that indicated that the public policies against vertical restraints 
would have the same invalidating impact on post-sale restrictions on at 
least certain patented products as on non-patented products.292As the Sixth 
Circuit in Hartman explained, “the exemption from the rule against 
restraint has never been extended to contracts in respect of articles made 
under a patent which have once passed beyond the domain of the patent 
by an original sale without restriction.”293 
The Sixth Circuit’s “without restriction” qualifier in the above 
quotation was a reflection of the growing acceptance of the conditional 
sale doctrine, which was first articulated by Judge Lurton in Heaton-
Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co.294 and allowed for 
an extension of a patentee’s control through the conditioning of the sale 
of a patented product. Lurton’s involvement in the decisions discussed in 
this Part is especially noteworthy, as he delivered the Sixth Circuit’s 
opinions in both Dr. Miles and Hartman, sat on the Supreme Court at the 
time of its Dr. Miles decision (although he took no part in the 
consideration of the decision of that case) and, within months of the 
Court’s Dr. Miles decision, authored the Court’s opinion in Henry v. 
Dick (subsequently overruled by Motion Picture Patents), which 
provided the Supreme Court’s only endorsement of Button-Fastener’s 
conditional sale doctrine.295 In Part I.C.2, we argued that Quanta 
effectively rejected the conditional sale doctrine, holding that an 
authorized first sale of a patented product exhausts the relevant patent 
with respect to the product sold, irrespective of any condition placed on 
the buyer. If our interpretation is correct, then the “without restriction” 
qualifier in the Hartman quote can be ignored and a patented product 
 
 289. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 147–48; Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 379 n.6; Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 382; see infra 
note 290. 
 290. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 382 (“The complainant has no statutory grant. So far as appears, there 
are no letters patent relating to the remedies in question. The complainant has not seen fit to make the 
disclosure required by the statute, and thus to secure the privileges it confers. Its case lies outside the 
policies of the patent law, and the extent of the right which that law secures is not here involved or 
determined.”). See Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 379 n.6 (“We have no occasion here to consider whether a 
patentee has any greater rights in this respect [i.e., that a manufacturer who has sold his product may 
no longer control it].”). 
 291. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 409. 
 292. John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907). 
 293. Id. at 32. 
 294. 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896). 
 295. See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1912). 
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following an authorized sale falls into the same category as an 
unpatented product with respect to the application of the rules against 
vertical restraints. The point is that it is reasonable to ask, in light of the 
early case law regarding vertical restraints, whether the public policies 
against restraints on alienation and restraints of trade would invalidate 
every contract-based post sale restriction on a patented product. 
The answer, as discussed below, is that the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent rulings regarding vertical restraints do not mandate that every 
contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product be voided as an 
unlawful restraint on alienation and restraint of trade. Since its decisions in 
Dr. Miles, Schwinn, and Albrecht, Supreme Court jurisprudence with 
respect to vertical restraints has evolved with the changing times and such 
restraints are no longer considered per se unlawful, but instead are 
assessed on a case-by-case basis under the rule of reason. Each of the 
above noted cases was explicitly overruled by the Court (Dr. Miles in 
Leegin, Schwinn in Continental T.V., and Albrecht in Khan), marking a 
pronounced and consistent shift in the Court’s application of the public 
policies against restraints on alienation and restraints of trade in the 
context of contract-based, post-sale vertical restrictions. In fact, despite 
its finding of a per se violation, the Dr. Miles Court anticipated this shift: 
With respect to contracts in restraint of trade, the earlier doctrine of the 
common law has been substantially modified in adaptation to modern 
conditions. But the public interest is still the first consideration. To 
sustain the restraint, it must be found to be reasonable both with respect 
to the public and to the parties and that it is limited to what is fairly 
necessary, in the circumstances of the particular case, for the protection 
of the covenantee. Otherwise restraints of trade are void as against 
public policy. As was said by this court in Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas. 
Co.,“The decision in Mitchel v. Reynolds, is the foundation of the rule in 
relation to the invalidity of contracts in restraint of trade; but as it was 
made under a condition of things and a state of society different from 
those which now prevail, the rule laid down is not regarded as inflexible, 
and has been considerably modified. Public welfare is first considered, 
and if it be not involved, and the restraint upon one party is not greater 
than protection to the other party requires, the contract may be 
sustained. The question is, whether, under the particular circumstances 
of the case and the nature of the particular contract involved in it, the 
contract is, or is not, unreasonable.”296 
The Supreme Court in Dr. Miles relied on the public policies against 
restraints on alienation and restraints of trade to reject a vertical minimum 
price restraint as a per se violation of both the common law and a federal 
antitrust statute.297 The vertical restraints under consideration in Schwinn 
and in Albrecht were rejected strictly on antitrust grounds as contravening 
§ 1 of the Sherman Act.298 At the time of these subsequent decisions, 
 
 296. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 406 (citations omitted). 
 297. See supra note 288. 
 298. See supra note 288. 
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however, it had long been recognized that the Sherman Act embodied the 
common law and should be treated as a common law statute.299 Moreover, 
“just as the common law adapts to modern understanding and greater 
experience, so too does the Sherman Act’s prohibition on ‘restraint[s] of 
trade’ evolve to meet the dynamics of present economic conditions.”300  
In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,301 which overruled 
Schwinn, the Court finally recognized that changed economic conditions 
required a shift in its treatment of vertical restraints from the application 
of a per se rule to a rule of reason analysis. In State Oil Co. v. Khan302 
(which overruled Albrecht) and in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. 
v. PSKS, Inc.303 (which overruled Dr. Miles), the Court applied the same 
reasoning to reject the per se invalidation of the vertical restraints under 
consideration in those cases. For our purposes, it is clear that the Court has 
adopted the view that a case-by-case, rule of reason approach should be 
taken in assessing the legality (whether under common law or the antitrust 
statutes) of a vertical restraint such as a contract-based post-sale restriction 
on a patented product. A per se rule that every such restriction is unlawful, 
irrespective of the nature of the restriction and its economic effect, is 
incompatible with such a view. 
Finally, we should note that certain vertical restraints in the form of 
personal property servitudes, which “run with the goods” to bind 
downstream purchasers who are not in privity of contract with the original 
seller, have been judged to be enforceable.304 The enforceability of such 
vertical restraints provides additional support for our conclusion that at 
least some contract-based post-sale restrictions on patented products are 
lawful. 
The post-sale vertical restraints under consideration in this Article are 
contract-based and apply to the purchaser of a patented product who has 
entered into some form of binding agreement with an authorized seller. 
 
 299. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 887, 899 (2007) (“From the 
beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common law statute.”); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l 
Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (“Congress . . . did not intend the text of the 
Sherman Act to delineate the full meaning of the statute or its application in concrete situations. The 
legislative history makes it perfectly clear that it expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s 
broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.”). 
 300. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899 (alteration in original). 
 301. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 302. 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
 303. 551 U.S. 887 (2007). 
 304. See Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1449, 1455–60 (2004), 
for a review of the following four cases in which a servitude was enforced by a court: TransWorld 
Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Coupon Exch., Inc., 913 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1990); Tri-Continental Fin. Corp. v. 
Tropical Marine Enters. Co., 265 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1959); Nadell & Co. v. Grasso, 175 Cal. App. 2d 
420 (1959); Clairol, Inc. v. Sarann Co., Inc., 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 433 (Ct. Com. Pl., Pa. 1965); see also 
Robinson, supra, at 1484 (“In fact, as we have seen, courts have recognized such servitudes on 
occasion, sometimes explicitly and sometimes in the guise of other doctrinal categories such as tortious 
interference with contract.”).  
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Likewise, the vertical restraints addressed in the cases reviewed above in 
this Part were placed on the buyer through a contract with the 
manufacturer in the context of the sale of a product.305 In contrast, a 
personal property servitude is a 
non-contractual method of equitable servitudes . . . [that] bind[s] 
successive sub-purchasers. The manufacturer place[s] a notice on the 
chattel or its container, specifying the restriction which [is] to bind all 
later owners, and in this way, anyone who acquire[s] the article, no 
matter how numerous the intervening sales, [is] prevented from being 
a purchaser without notice of the restriction.306 
In that sense, a personal property servitude “runs with the goods” in the 
absence of any contract with a seller. However, as with contract-based 
vertical restraints, personal property servitudes have been challenged as 
contravening the public policies against restraints on alienation and 
restraints of trade.307 In fact, on the basis of the greater impact of personal 
property servitudes (which bind all downstream purchasers in the absence 
of a contractual obligation) such restraints are considered more onerous 
than those limited to a buyer bound by an agreed-to contract obligation, 
and are generally disfavored.308 Nevertheless, the courts have, on occasion, 
rejected the public policy arguments against personal property servitudes 
and found them to be enforceable.309 In those instances, there were other 
considerations that supported the enforcement of the restraint, such as 
protecting the consumer from harm310 and preserving the goodwill of a 
business.311 The point for our purposes is that even in the absence of a 
 
 305. In each of Dr. Miles, Schwinn, Continental T.V., Khan, and Leegin, the vertical restraint under 
consideration was incorporated into an agreement between the manufacturer of a product and its 
buyer. In Albrecht, however, the vertical maximum price restriction at issue was being forced upon a 
buyer through a combination that included the manufacturer and other parties. This distinction did 
not alter the Court’s finding of a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, which applies to 
combinations as well as contracts, and is not relevant to the point being made in this paragraph 
regarding the “non-contractual” nature of a personal property servitude. 
 306. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 945, 953 (1928). 
 307. See Robinson, supra note 304, at 1484 (“[C]ases disallowing servitude restrictions on personal 
property have done so . . . because they run afoul of some exogenous public policy, such as that against 
alienability restraints or restraint of trade.”). 
 308. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 Geo. L.J. 885, 924 (2008) (“The 
costs associated with chattel servitudes are attributable in part to the features that problematic chattel 
servitudes share with problematic land servitudes: the remote and indefinite relationship between the 
parties to be benefited and burdened . . . .”). 
 309. See supra note 304. 
 310. In Clairol, Inc. v. Sarann Co., Inc., 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 433 (1964), the court ruled that the 
manufacturer of a hair care product placed an enforceable equitable servitude on the product by 
printing on bottles intended for professional use only the legend “Professional Use Only.” The 
manufacturer argued that the sale of such bottles, which lacked the necessary instructions for safe and 
effective use, to non-professional retail customers subjected such customers to potential harm and the 
risk of unsatisfactory results. The court agreed and, in support of the manufacturer’s effort to protect 
both the public and its goodwill, enjoined the defendant from making any further sales of such bottles 
to retail customers. 
 311. In Nadell v. Grasso, 175 Cal. App. 2d 420 (1959), the court ruled that an equitable servitude 
on chattel was created when a dealer in food products damaged in transit agreed that the product 
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contractual obligation on a buyer, a post-sale vertical restraint may be 
enforceable, despite the public policies against restraints on alienation and 
restraints of trade. As noted above, this observation is consistent with our 
view that not every contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented 
product is unlawful. 
B. If Some Contract-Based Restrictions Are Enforceable, Which 
Ones and What Benefit Do They Confer? 
Based on our analysis in the preceding Part, we have concluded that 
not every contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product is void 
and, accordingly, a determination of the enforceability of any such 
restriction will require a case-by-case assessment of the restriction. This 
case-by-case approach is consistent with the settled expectations of 
practicing transactional attorneys and their clients, who frequently include 
post-sale restrictions in their contracts. In this Part, we present an 
approach to assessing the enforceability of contract-based post-sale 
restrictions under state law and apply the approach in the analysis of a 
representative restriction. We also discuss the relative benefit to a patent 
holder of a breach of contract remedy as compared to a patent 
infringement remedy. 
1. Approach to Assessing the Enforceability of a Contract-Based 
Post-Sale Restriction on a Patented Product 
Assuming that the first sale of a patented product is authorized and 
that the post-sale restriction under consideration is incorporated into a 
valid contract,312 the following issues should be considered in determining 
whether the restriction is enforceable through a breach of contract 
remedy under applicable state law: First, determine whether an objective 
of federal patent law preempts the enforcement of the particular 
restriction under consideration. The preemption standard articulated by 
the Supreme Court in Bonito Boats provides guidance for making such a 
determination, with a focus on whether a state is attempting to confer 
“patent-like protection” on an idea “in the public domain.” Moreover, the 
approach to patent law preemption reflected in the Lear balancing test is 
particularly well-suited to an assessment of the enforceability of a contract 
 
would not enter the retail market in the manufacturer’s original jars. Acknowledging the importance 
of preserving the goodwill of a business, the court enforced the restriction against a party that 
subsequently purchased the product with notice of the restriction, despite a lack of privity between the 
dealer and the subsequent purchaser; see Clairol, 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 433, discussed supra note 310. 
 312. In this Article, we have not addressed the requirements that a post-sale restriction must meet 
to constitute a legally binding contract between a patent holder and a buyer of its patented product. 
We have assumed that a patent holder who intends to rely on a breach of contract remedy to enforce a 
post-sale restriction against a buyer who fails to honor the restriction will obtain the necessary legal 
advice to present the restriction in a form that documents the requisite “meeting of the minds” under 
applicable state contract law to be binding. 
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provision under state law. As discussed in Part II.A.1, that approach 
includes the identification of the patent law objective being threatened by 
the contract restriction and a determination of the degree of interference 
with that objective. Second, consider whether the inclusion of the 
restriction in a contract constitutes patent misuse.313 The Federal Circuit 
provided an analytical framework for a finding of patent misuse in its 
decision in Virginia Panel.314 In the words of the Federal Circuit: 
  The courts have identified certain specific practices as constituting per 
se patent misuse, including so-called “tying” arrangements in which a 
patentee conditions a license under the patent on the purchase of a 
separable, staple good, and arrangements in which a patentee effectively 
extends the term of its patent by requiring post-expiration royalties. 
Congress, however, has established that other specific practices may not 
support a finding of patent misuse. A 1988 amendment to § 271(d) 
provides that, inter alia, in the absence of market power, even a tying 
arrangement does not constitute patent misuse. 
  When a practice alleged to constitute patent misuse is neither per se 
patent misuse nor specifically excluded from a misuse analysis by 
§ 271(d), a court must determine if that practice is “reasonably within 
the patent grant, i.e., that it relates to subject matter within the scope of 
the patent claims.” If so, the practice does not have the effect of 
broadening the scope of the patent claims and thus cannot constitute 
patent misuse. If, on the other hand, the practice has the effect of 
extending the patentee’s statutory rights and does so with an anti-
competitive effect, that practice must then be analyzed in accordance 
with the “rule of reason.” Under the rule of reason, “the finder of fact 
must decide whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable 
restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of factors, 
including specific information about the relevant business, its condition 
before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, 
nature, and effect.”315 
Third, determine whether the contract restriction violates antitrust law. 
This analysis can overlap, but is not identical to, a patent misuse analysis316 
and, as discussed in Part III.A.3, relies on the case-by-case, rule of reason 
approach adopted by the Supreme Court in evaluating vertical restraints. 
 
 313. The fact that the Supreme Court’s patent exhaustion jurisprudence predates its patent misuse 
jurisprudence eliminates the argument that, as in the case of patent exhaustion, the Keeler quote 
discussed in Part II.A.1 can be relied on to support the conclusion that an effort to enforce a post-sale 
restriction on a patented product under state contract law can never constitute patent misuse. Recall that 
the Court in Keeler expressed no opinion as to whether a contract-based post-sale restriction on a 
patented product is enforceable under contract law, but viewed it as “obvious that such a question would 
arise as a question of contract, and not as one under the inherent meaning and effect of the patent laws.” 
Keeler v. Standard Folding-Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895). While patent misuse, like patent 
exhaustion, is a doctrine that emanates from “the inherent meaning and effect of the patent laws,” Keeler 
was decided in 1895, at least twenty-two years before the Supreme Court began its formulation of the 
patent misuse doctrine in Motion Picture Patents. The better argument is that the Keeler quotation set a 
limit on the reach of patent exhaustion but has no bearing on the scope of patent misuse. 
 314. 133 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 315. Id. at 869 (citations omitted). 
 316. The overlap of an antitrust analysis with a patent misuse analysis is discussed in Part II.B.2. 
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Finally, determine whether public policy considerations (e.g., regarding 
public health and safety) are relevant to an assessment of the 
enforceability of the contract-based post-sale restriction. Such 
considerations may shift the balance in favor of enforcing the restriction 
under state law, as was noted in Part II.A.1 with respect to the Lear 
approach to patent law preemption and in Part II.A.3 with respect to the 
enforcement of a personal property servitude, and as will be discussed 
below with respect to the rule of reason analysis required for 
determining whether a restriction violates patent misuse or antitrust law. 
2. Assessment of a Representative Contract Restriction 
A comprehensive assessment of the various product-related contract 
restrictions that can be placed by a patent holder on the buyer of its 
patented product as a condition of the sale is beyond the scope of this 
Article. However, a brief discussion of one such restriction is useful in 
demonstrating the application of the analytical approach to enforceability 
described in Part II.B.1. Considering the central role that the Mallinckrodt 
case has played in defining the scope of patent exhaustion and in 
determining the types of remedies available for a buyer’s breach of a 
contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product, it seems 
fitting to address the enforceability of the “single-use only” restriction on 
a patented medical device that was at issue in that case. Assuming that 
the first sale of the product is authorized and that the single-use only 
restriction placed by the patent holder on the buyer is part of a contract 
that meets the requirements for a binding agreement under applicable 
state contract law,317 the question is whether the restriction is enforceable 
through a breach of contract remedy. 
The Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt acknowledged the possibility of 
multiple remedies in the event of the failure of the buyer of the patented 
medical device to honor the single-use only restriction, that is, a patent 
infringement remedy and a breach of contract remedy. In Mallinckrodt, 
no breach of contract action was brought and, accordingly, the court 
focused its analysis on the patent infringement remedy.318 As discussed in 
 
 317. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt did not consider 
whether inscribing the “single use only” restriction on Mallinckrodt’s patented medical device or 
including the restriction in a package insert that accompanied each device was legally sufficient under 
state contract law to form a binding agreement between Mallinckrodt and the hospitals that purchased 
the device. As the Federal Circuit explained, “[t]he district court did not decide whether the form of 
the ‘single use only’ notice was legally sufficient to constitute a . . . condition of the sale from 
Mallinckrodt to the hospitals. The district court also specifically stated that it was not deciding whether 
Mallinckrodt could enforce this notice under contract law. These aspects are not presented on this 
appeal.” Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 701 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see supra note 312. 
 318. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 707 n.6 (“We agree that a patentee may choose among alternate 
remedies, but to deny a patentee access to statutory remedies is to withhold the protection of the law. 
Thus whether Mallinckrodt may also have a remedy outside of the patent law is not before us.”); see 
B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[V]iolation of valid 
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Part I.C, the weight of the evidence indicates that Mallinckrodt’s 
conditional sale doctrine is no longer good law, limiting the possibility of 
a patent infringement remedy as a result of patent exhaustion. Thus, the 
breach of contract remedy remains the only possible recourse for the 
patent holder. While the Federal Circuit did not rely on that remedy in 
Mallinckrodt for enforcement of the single-use only restriction, aspects of 
its opinion in the case are directly relevant to our enforceability analysis. 
As the Federal Circuit noted in Braun319 in summarizing its Mallinckrodt 
holding, “express conditions accompanying the sale . . . of a patented 
product are generally upheld. Such express conditions, however, are 
contractual in nature and are subject to antitrust, patent, contract, and any 
other applicable law, as well as equitable considerations such as patent 
misuse. Accordingly, conditions that violate some law or equitable 
consideration are unenforceable.”320 
The first issue to address in the enforceability analysis outlined in 
Part II.B.1 is whether enforcement of the single-use only restriction 
under state law is preempted as inconsistent with an objective of federal 
patent law. The argument in favor of preemption is that since an 
authorized first sale of the restricted product moves the product outside 
of the limits of the patent monopoly, an effort by the patent holder to 
control the downstream use of the product through a contract restriction 
contravenes the patent law objective of leaving ideas in the public 
domain available for unencumbered use. This is the same issue that was 
addressed in Part II.A.1 in our consideration of the enforceability—in 
the face of a patent law preemption challenge—of contract-based post-
sales restrictions in general. Our analysis yielded a conclusion that such a 
challenge would not be effective in voiding the restriction and a single-
use-only restriction presents no new issue that would alter that 
conclusion.321 If anything, the public policy considerations raised in the 
Mallinckrodt case (and discussed below in this Part) regarding the safety 
of the public and the preservation of the goodwill of a business would tip 
the balance in favor of enforcing a single-use only restriction under the 
Lear approach to patent law preemption. 
On its face, then, a single-use only restriction does not violate an 
objective of federal patent law requiring preemption of an effort to 
enforce such a restriction under state law. However, consideration of 
 
conditions entitles the patentee to a remedy for either patent infringement or breach of contract.” 
(citing Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 707 n.6)). 
 319. Braun, 124 F.3d at 1426.  
 320. Id. (citations omitted). 
 321. The Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt did not consider this preemption issue since in the absence 
of patent exhaustion—which was avoided through the court’s reliance on the conditional sale doctrine—
the product remained within the limits of the patent monopoly following its sale, and enforcement of the 
single-use only restriction under state contract law presented no apparent conflict with the objectives of 
federal patent law. Viewed from the Federal Circuit’s perspective, a breach of contract remedy 
complimented a patent infringement remedy, rather than serving as a potential substitute. 
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such a restriction raises a noteworthy preemption issue not addressed 
elsewhere in this Article. Recall that in justifying the Mallinckrodt court’s 
reliance on the conditional sale doctrine to avoid patent exhaustion, the 
Federal Circuit in Braun rejected the single reward interpretation of 
patent exhaustion—suggested by the Supreme Court in Bloomer v. 
Millinger322 and Hobbie v. Jennison323—that a patent holder that sells its 
patented product is entitled to only a single payment at the time of the 
sale, and upon receipt of that consideration its right to exert downstream 
control over the buyer’s use of the product through the threat of a patent 
infringement action is exhausted. According to the Federal Circuit in 
Braun, the better argument is that “it is more reasonable to infer that the 
parties negotiated a price that reflects only the value of the ‘use’ rights 
conferred by the patentee.”324  
Such an argument anticipates a reasonable addition to a single-use 
only restriction on a patented product, that is, that only a single use is 
permitted following the sale of the product unless the buyer agrees to pay 
to the patentee a royalty for each subsequent use. This addition to the single-
use only restriction is referred to as a “double royalty”325 obligation. It can 
be argued that a contractual obligation of this type, yielding multiple 
rewards for the patent holder, conflicts with the federal patent law’s 
carefully balanced objective of promoting “invention while at the same 
time preserving free competition.”326 The patent statute is intended to 
reward the inventor only to the extent necessary to promote invention 
for the public good. Over-rewarding the inventor through multiple 
payments (as some might argue would be the case in the event of the 
payment on the sale of a patented product followed by subsequent 
royalty payments on use) could be viewed as providing an unnecessary 
bonus to the inventor, while burdening (through a royalty obligation) a 
purchased product with respect to which the patent holder’s patent has 
been exhausted. To the extent that the doctrine of patent exhaustion was 
developed to deal with this concern,327 enforcement of a double royalty 
 
 322. 68 U.S. 340 (1863). See supra note 27. 
 323. 149 U.S. 355 (1893). 
 324. Braun, 124 F.3d at 1426. 
 325. See infra note 327. 
 326. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230–31 (1964). 
 327. See LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., No. C 01-00326, 2002 WL 31996860, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (“The patent exhaustion doctrine . . . is designed to prevent a patentee from receiving 
a double royalty on a single patented invention.”). It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court in its 
Quanta opinion did not comment on, and thereby passed on an opportunity to endorse, this statement 
by the district court in the case, which is based on the single reward interpretation of patent 
exhaustion. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 513 (“One historical concern that the courts raised in 
first sale cases was that permitting the patentee to place post-sale license restrictions on patented 
goods would entitle the patentee to collect multiple royalties.”); John W. Osborne, A Coherent View 
of Patent Exhaustion: A Standard Based on Patentable Distinctiveness, 20 Santa Clara Computer & 
High Tech. L.J. 643, 668 (2004) (“Precluding a double recovery for practice of a patent claim will . . . 
obviate the applicability of the patent exhaustion doctrine.”). 
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obligation through a breach of contract remedy could be viewed as an 
impermissible attempt to contract around patent exhaustion. 
While the debate regarding the enforceability of a contract obligation 
to pay a double royalty continues,328 the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Brulotte provides an effective counter to arguments against the 
enforcement of such an obligation under state contract law. As discussed 
in Part II.A.2, the Court in Brulotte held that the restriction placed by the 
buyer of the patented product at issue in the form of an ongoing royalty 
obligation based on use following an initial payment made by the buyer 
upon the authorized first sale was enforceable through a breach of 
contract remedy until the applicable patents expired.329 While this 
holding raises a general question as to the enforceability of contract-
based post-sale restrictions on patented products following expiration or 
invalidation of the applicable patents,330 it supports a conclusion that an 
ongoing royalty payment obligation in the context of an authorized first 
sale that exhausts a valid, unexpired patent is not preempted as an 
impermissible attempt to contract around an objective of federal patent 
law that underlies the patent exhaustion doctrine.331 
 
 328. Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 514–15 (“The concern [regarding a patent holder’s ability to collect 
multiple royalties] was most recently stated by the now vindicated district court decision in Quanta, which 
justified the first sale doctrine as prohibiting ‘double’ royalties. . . . In the 1950s, . . . [however, this 
concern] was largely discredited by Chicago School writers, who showed that . . . in any multi-stage 
distribution chain there is but a single monopoly profit to be earned.” (paragraphing omitted)). 
 329. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964).  
 330. The Supreme Court’s decision in Brulotte stands for the proposition that an obligation to pay 
royalties for the continued use of a product following the expiration of the patents embodied in the 
product is per se patent misuse and, accordingly, the payment obligation is unenforceable, whether or 
not the patent holder and the buyer of the patented product had agreed that extending the payment 
obligation was a convenient method of reflecting the business value of the transaction. The fact that 
the Court in Brulotte enforced a contract-based obligation to make ongoing royalty payments for the 
post-sale use of a patented product, but required that the payments cease following the expiration of 
the relevant patents, raises the interesting question of whether the Brulotte holding requires that other 
types of contract-based post-sale restrictions are not enforceable through a breach of contract remedy 
following the expiration (or invalidation) of the relevant patents. A comprehensive analysis of this 
issue is beyond the scope of this Article. It is noteworthy, however, that while the Brulotte rule of per 
se patent misuse is still good law, it has been widely criticized by both judges and commentators, and 
its application has not been extended beyond the limited facts in that case. See Zila, Inc. v. Tinnell, 502 
F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th Cir. 2007) (“No matter how unconvincing Brulotte’s foundation may be, . . . we 
are bound to apply its holding if it applies to the case before us. At the same time, our task is not to 
extend Brulotte’s holding beyond its terms. So, except as required by Brulotte and its progeny, we shall 
endeavor to give effect to the intent of the parties and the bargain that they struck.”); Scheiber v. 
Dolby Lab., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1017–19 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e have no authority to overrule . . . [the] 
Supreme Court[’s Brulotte] decision no matter how dubious its reasoning strikes us, or even how out 
of touch with the Supreme Court’s current thinking the decision seems.”). Accordingly, there is a good 
argument to be made that the Brulotte rule would not be extended to limit the enforcement of 
contract-based post-sale restrictions that are not royalty payment obligations. 
 331. The Supreme Court’s decision in Brulotte is an effective counter to a broader preemption 
argument, also based on the single reward interpretation of patent exhaustion, that can be made 
against the enforcement of any contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product under state 
law. According to this argument, the doctrine of patent exhaustion is intended to prevent a patent 
holder from receiving multiple rewards with respect to the authorized sale of its patented product, 
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Returning to the single-use only restriction, the next issue to address 
in assessing its enforceability under state contract law is whether the 
inclusion of the restriction in a contract constitutes patent misuse. Recall 
that in Part II.A.2 we concluded that the doctrine of patent misuse does 
not render every contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product 
unenforceable under state law. We reviewed the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Motion Picture Patents and concluded that the Court in that case applied 
the exhaustion doctrine to eliminate patent infringement remedies and 
relied on the misuse doctrine to void a contract-based post-sale restriction 
on a patented product, but only after an assessment of the nature and 
impact of the particular restriction under consideration. The post-sale 
restriction in Motion Picture Patents was a tying obligation, and the 
question before us is whether a single-use-only restriction raises problems 
that are comparable to those raised by a tying obligation from a patent 
misuse perspective. As discussed in Part II.B.1, the Federal Circuit has 
provided a means of addressing this question with its analytical framework 
for a finding of patent misuse. 
In fact, the approach to patent misuse summarized by the Federal 
Circuit in Virginia Panel was based largely on that court’s prior opinion 
in Mallinckrodt, where it considered the enforceability of the single-use 
only restriction.332 In adopting the conditional sale doctrine, and thereby 
dispensing with the patent exhaustion issue, the Federal Circuit in 
Mallinckrodt was able to reframe the question before it as one of patent 
misuse. As the Federal Circuit stated, the “appropriate criterion [in 
assessing the enforceability of the single-use-only restriction under 
consideration] is whether Mallinckrodt’s restriction is reasonably within 
the patent grant, or whether the patentee has ventured beyond the patent 
grant and into behavior having an anticompetitive effect not justifiable 
under the rule of reason.”333 In the end, the Mallinckrodt appellate court 
failed to answer the questions it had posed but instead remanded the case 
to the district court for reconsideration in accordance with its guidance.  
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Mallinckrodt provided 
the basis for an argument in support of the enforceability under state law 
 
whether or not such rewards come in the form of multiple royalty payments. Yet, a patent holder who 
is paid for the sale of its product and subsequently obtains breach of contract damages from a buyer 
that fails to honor a contract-based post-sale restriction is, in fact, receiving multiple rewards. Viewed 
from this perspective, an action to enforce a post-sale restriction under state contract law could be 
considered an impermissible attempt to contract around a patent law objective underlying patent 
exhaustion that should be preempted. As in the case of the argument against a double royalty 
obligation, however, this broader argument is incompatible with the Supreme Court’s Brulotte 
decision, which affirmed the enforcement by a state court of a contract obligation placed on the buyer 
of a patented product to provide multiple rewards to a patent holder (in the form of an initial payment 
on the sale of the patented product followed by multiple royalty payments based on the use of the 
product), despite the exhaustion of patent infringement remedies as a result of an authorized first sale. 
 332. See Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 333. Mallinckrodt v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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of the single-use only restriction, although the argument must 
accommodate our conclusion, not shared by the Federal Circuit in 
Mallinckrodt, that the applicable patents were exhausted by Mallinckrodt’s 
authorized first sale of its patented medical device. In Mallinckrodt, the 
Federal Circuit presented its patent misuse analysis in the context of a 
conditioned authorized first sale that, in its view, did not exhaust the 
relevant patents. Because we have rejected Mallinckrodt’s conditional 
sale doctrine, an argument that relies on language in the Mallinckrodt 
decision to conclude that a single-use only restriction does not constitute 
patent misuse must reach that conclusion, despite the exhaustion of the 
relevant patents. 
The Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt began its misuse analysis by 
noting that a single-use only restriction was not one of the examples of 
per se patent misuse recognized by the Supreme Court.334 The court did 
not find it necessary to make the obvious point that the single-use only 
restriction was not protected from a misuse challenge under § 271(d)(5), 
so it next addressed the question of whether the single-use only 
restriction “is reasonably within the patent grant.”335 In intimating that 
that was indeed the case, the court noted that restrictions “on use are 
judged in terms of their relation to the patentee’s right to exclude,”336 and 
that such “right to exclude may be waived in whole or in part.”337 Taken 
together, these statements suggest that the single-use only restriction 
placed by Mallinckrodt on its buyers was “reasonably within the patent 
grant”338 conferred upon Mallinckrodt that enabled it to exclude others 
from any unauthorized use of its patented medical device. The required 
modification to accommodate our rejection of the conditional sale doctrine 
is to add the qualifier that the restriction was reasonably within the patent 
grant at the time of the authorized first sale when the patent holder made the 
restriction a condition of the sale. The sale would exhaust patent remedies, 
but not breach of contract remedies that could be sought against a buyer 
that failed to honor the restriction. This interpretation is consistent with 
our conclusion in Part II.A.2 that the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Automatic Radio, Zenith, and Brulotte allow for the placement of a 
contract-based restriction on a product outside the limits of the patent 
monopoly that is enforceable through a breach of contract remedy, at 
least until the relevant patent expires or is invalidated.339 
 
 334. Id. at 701 (“The restriction here at issue does not per se violate the doctrine of patent 
misuse.”); id. at 708 (“[T]his is not a price-fixing or tying case, and the per se . . . misuse violations 
found in the Bauer trilogy and Motion Picture Patents are not here present.”). 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. at 706. 
 337. Id. at 703. 
 338. Id. at 708. 
 339. See supra note 330. 
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The Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt went on to note that even if the 
patent misuse analysis of a contract restriction should “lead to the 
conclusion that there are anticompetitive effects extending beyond the 
patentee’s statutory right to exclude, these effects do not automatically 
impeach the restriction [since] [a]nticompetitive effects that are not per 
se violations of law are reviewed in accordance with the rule of 
reason.”340 Here again we need to add the qualifier that the restriction 
would result in anticompetitive effects extending beyond the patentee’s 
statutory right to exclude at the time of the authorized first sale when the 
patent holder made the restriction a condition of the sale, but can 
otherwise rely on the language in the Mallinckrodt opinion. While the 
Federal Circuit left the rule of reason analysis to the district court on 
remand, it indicated that public policy considerations were relevant to 
such an analysis and could militate in favor of enforcing the restriction. 
In making this last point, the Federal Circuit cited a First Circuit case that 
held that a “single use only restriction based on safety concerns [was] not 
patent misuse.”341 The Federal Circuit was clearly mindful of the fact that 
in Mallinckrodt the reconditioned medical devices at issue were not tested 
for any biological or radioactive contamination prior to being returned to 
hospitals for reuse342 and the fact that Mallinckrodt had indicated that it 
had imposed the single-use only restriction “based on health, safety, 
efficacy, and liability considerations.”343 Such considerations could have 
caused Mallinckrodt to raise its prices in anticipation of multiple liability 
 
 340. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708. 
 341. Id. at 708–09 (citing Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 237 F.2d 428, 436–37 (1st Cir. 1956)). In Marks, 
the First Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling that actions by the patent holder in restricting the use 
of spectacle-like three dimensional viewers did not constitute patent misuse. 
  Polaroid justified these restrictions on the ground that reuse by the public generally 
might spread eye infection for which perhaps it might be held liable, and in the case of the 
temporary viewers, that after one use they were likely to become bent or dirty and hence 
lose some if not all of their effectiveness. The District Court found that there was ground for 
some ‘rational fear of infection and the spread of disease’ from the indiscriminate reuse of 
viewers of both types by the general public which Polaroid could well feel it ought to take 
measures to guard against. But it also recognized that the restrictions if observed 
guaranteed an expansion of Polaroid’s business. ‘However,’ the court said, ‘on the facts of 
this case, where there appears to be present countervailing public policy considerations, I 
cannot hold that the practices employed by the defendant in connection with the sale of 
viewers constitute such a misuse of patents as to compel this Court in good conscience to 
deny the defendant relief on its counterclaim.’ 
  The matter lies primarily in the discretion of the District Court. Under the circumstances 
outlined above we cannot find that in this instance the court abused its discretion. 
Id. at 436–37. 
 342. See Part I.C.1 for a review of the facts in Mallinckrodt. 
 343. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 703; see id. at 702 (“[T]he purpose of this [single-use-only] 
restriction is to protect the hospital and its patients from potential adverse consequences of 
reconditioning, such as infectious disease transmission, material instability, and/or decreased 
diagnostic performance.”). 
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claims or keep its patented device off the market to avoid such claims and 
to protect its goodwill—actions which, arguably, would harm competition. 
The next issue to address in our recommended analysis for 
determining the enforceability of a contract-based post-sale restriction 
under state law is whether the restriction violates federal antitrust law. 
Admittedly, this step in the analysis overlaps the assessment of whether 
the restriction under consideration constitutes patent misuse. As noted in 
Part II.A.2, the Federal Circuit’s patent misuse jurisprudence has been 
criticized for conflating the misuse doctrine, as articulated by the 
Supreme Court, and antitrust analysis,344 by requiring a showing of 
anticompetitive effect and a rule of reason analysis for a finding of patent 
misuse. The case law has failed to demonstrate a clear distinction 
between a rule of reason analysis that is required for a showing of patent 
misuse and one that is required for demonstrating an antitrust 
violation.345 As the Seventh Circuit noted in USM Corp. v. SPS 
Technologies, Inc.,346 in discussing the evidence required for the finding 
of an anticompetitive effect in a patent misuse analysis, “we have found 
no cases where standards different from those of antitrust law were 
actually applied to yield different results.”347 In fact, in providing its 
analytical framework for a finding of patent misuse, the Federal Circuit 
in Virginia Panel relied on State Oil Co. v. Khan,348 a vertical restraint 
antitrust case that was discussed in Part II.A.3, for a description of the 
appropriate rule of reason analysis.349 However, despite the considerable 
overlap in approach, a separate antitrust analysis is required to assess the 
enforceability of a contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented 
product.  
The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Princo350 highlights the 
importance of this conclusion with its ruling that an antitrust violation 
 
 344. See supra notes 265, 271. 
 345. See Daniel J. Matheson, Patent Misuse: The Questions That Linger Post-Princo, A.B.A. 
Section of Antitrust Law—Intellectual Property Committee, IP Committee Alert: Patent 
Misuse, Apr./May 2011, at 4 (“Since 1986 [when the Federal Circuit issued its ruling in Windsurfing], 
patent misuse doctrine has largely—and sometimes explicitly—incorporated antitrust analysis. 
Indeed, . . . the practical application of the rule of reason is similar in the misuse and antitrust 
contexts.”); see also infra note 347. 
 346. 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 347. Id. at 512. (“One still finds plenty of statements in judicial opinions that less evidence of 
anticompetitive effect is required in a misuse case than in an antitrust case. But apart from the 
conventional applications of the doctrine [to fact patterns that mirror those in the Supreme Court’s 
patent misuse decision involving tie-ins, post-expiration royalties, and coerced total sales royalties,] we 
have found no cases where standards different from those of antitrust law were actually applied to 
yield different results. . . . If misuse claims are not tested by conventional antitrust principles, by what 
principles shall they be tested? Our law is not rich in alternative concepts of monopolistic abuse; and it 
is rather late in the day to try to develop one without in the process subjecting the rights of patent 
holders to debilitating uncertainty.” (citation omitted) (paragraphing omitted)). 
 348. 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
 349. See Part II.B.1. 
 350. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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can be found in the context of a patent misuse challenge that does not 
result in a finding of patent misuse.351 Accordingly, the single-use only 
restriction that we have selected for our enforceability analysis must be 
reviewed under the Supreme Court’s case-by-case, rule of reason 
approach to evaluating vertical restraints that are potentially in violation 
of federal antitrust law, as discussed in Part II.A.3. Such a review may 
involve an added focus on market power, since the courts have held that 
the “first requirement in every suit based on the Rule of Reason is 
market power, without which the practice cannot cause those injuries . . . 
that matter under the federal antitrust laws.”352 It is unlikely, however, 
that the rule of reason analysis of the single-use only restriction on the 
patented medical device under consideration in the Mallinckrodt case 
would result in a different outcome than that reached in the patent 
misuse analysis. 
The final issue to address in our enforceability analysis is whether 
there are any public policy considerations that would militate in favor of 
enforcing the restriction under consideration. As is apparent from our 
evaluation of a single-use only restriction on a patented medical device, 
this issue is integrated into the other steps in our recommended analysis. 
As discussed above, additional policy considerations such as the ones 
raised in the Mallinckrodt case regarding a concern for public safety and 
for the protection of the goodwill of a business can tip the balance in 
favor of the enforcement of a contract restriction under the Lear 
approach to patent law preemption. Moreover, the Federal Circuit in 
Mallinckrodt considered the issues of public safety and business goodwill 
as relevant to a rule of reason analysis, which is an essential component 
of a patent misuse or antitrust challenge. In this regard, it is noteworthy 
that concerns for the safety of the public and for the preservation of the 
goodwill of a business have been relied on by courts in enforcing selected 
personal property servitudes, which restrict a buyer’s use or disposition 
of a product even in the absence of a contract with the seller and which 
are generally disfavored as restraints of trade and restraints on 
alienation—as discussed in Part II.A.3. 
3. The Relative Benefit of a Breach of Contract Remedy  
Post-eBay 
In Part I, we concluded that the authorized first sale of a patented 
product exhausts patent infringement remedies, and that such remedies 
cannot be preserved by placing a restriction on a buyer’s use or 
 
 351. See supra note 269. 
 352. Menasha Corp. v. News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., Inc., 354 F.3d 661, 663 (7th Cir. 2004); see 
Eastern Food Servs., Inc. v. Pontifical Catholic Univ. Servs. Ass’n., 357 F.3d. 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(“Virtually always, anti-competitive effects under the rule of reason require that the arrangement or 
action in question create or enhance market power—meaning the power to control prices or exclude 
competition.”). 
636 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:561 
disposition of the product as a condition of the sale. In this Part, we have 
argued that at least some contract-based post-sale restrictions on a 
patented product can be enforced through a breach of contract remedy. 
We are left, then, with a question as to the relative benefit to a patent 
holder of a breach of contract remedy as compared to a patent 
infringement remedy, and this question is all the more significant in light of 
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C.353 regarding the availability of injunctive relief upon a finding of 
patent infringement. 
Prior to eBay, patent holders preferred to enforce restrictions on their 
products through patent remedies because the Federal Circuit had created 
a general rule that “an injunction will issue when infringement has been 
adjudged, absent a sound reason for denying it.”354 Thus, by proving 
infringement, patent holders often received injunctions that allowed them 
to either leverage better licensing deals for their patents or achieve 
increased market share. 
In eBay, a jury found eBay guilty of willfully infringing patents 
assigned to MercExchange.355 After upholding the jury’s verdict, the 
Federal Circuit reiterated its rule that, once infringement was found, an 
injunction should issue unless the injunction would injure the public 
interest.356 Because the Federal Circuit found no “exceptional” and 
persuasive reason to deny a permanent injunction, it granted the 
injunction.357 But the Court criticized and overruled the Federal Circuit’s 
“general rule.”358 The Court noted that the Federal Circuit’s “general 
rule,” unique to patent disputes, was misapplied and that injunctions in 
patent cases, as in other cases, “may issue in accordance with the principles 
of equity.”359 The Court held that the proper test is the traditional four-
factor test, in which 
a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable 
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, 
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the 
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in 
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.360 
Demonstrating how this test would shift the granting of injunctions in 
patent cases, the district court, following remand, refused to grant an 
 
 353. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 354. Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citing W.L. Gore & 
Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 355. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 356. Id. at 1338 (“[T]he general rule is that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement 
and validity have been adjudged.”). 
 357. Id. at 1339. 
 358. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006). 
 359. Id. at 392 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006)). 
 360. Id. at 391. 
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injunction.361 The district court held that the Supreme Court’s eBay 
decision had overturned the presumption of irreparable harm, placing the 
burden to prove irreparable harm on the plaintiff.362 Then, applying the 
four-factor test, the district court found (1) there was no irreparable 
harm because MercExchange continued to license its patents and lacked 
significant commercial activity;363 (2) money damages were an adequate 
remedy because the court felt MercExchange would only use a 
permanent injunction for negotiating leverage, meaning that it was not 
deserving of an equitable remedy;364 (3) the balance of hardships favored 
neither party because of marketplace uncertainty;365 and (4) the public 
interest weighed slightly against the issuance of an injunction because the 
MercExchange patent was a business method patent, many of which are 
of a questionable nature, while eBay’s online marketplace substantially 
impacts the U.S. economy and eBay was successful prior to any alleged 
infringement.366 Thus, eBay effected a shift away from a presumption in 
favor of injunctions, making them more difficult for a plaintiff to obtain. 
In the years following eBay, courts have adopted the same test to 
determine injunctive relief in both patent and non-patent cases.367 Thus, 
the difference in achieving injunctive relief in patent and non-patent 
causes of action is smaller today than it has been historically, blunting the 
impact of using contractual-based remedies in lieu of patent remedies.368 
As an example, in O.D.F. Optronics Ltd. v. Remington Arms Co., a 
preliminary injunction against resale of one of ODF’s products was issued 
against Remington based on violation of contract, despite the fact that 
ODF’s sale to Remington exhausted any patent remedies with respect to 
the product in question.369 Therefore, the likelihood of receiving an 
injunction may not be significantly different as a contract-based remedy 
as opposed to a patent-based remedy. 
 
 361. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
 362. Id. at 568–69. 
 363. Id. at 570–71. 
 364. Id. at 582–83. 
 365. Id. at 583–84. 
 366. Id. at 586–87. 
 367. See Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent 
Injunctions, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 203, 205 (2012) (“Within a half decade, the four-factor test from eBay 
has, in many federal courts, become the test for whether a permanent injunction should issue, regardless 
of whether the dispute in question centers on patent law, another form of intellectual property, more 
conventional government regulation, constitutional law, or state tort or contract law.”); Hovenkamp, 
supra note 8, at 543 (“[U]nder the Supreme Court’s eBay decision, injunctions are to be issued for patent 
infringement only when the plaintiff meets the same criteria as apply to equitable actions generally.”). 
 368. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 543 (“It is not obvious today that the right to an injunction 
to enforce a post-sale restraint via patent law would be any broader than the right to enforce it by a 
contract suit.”). 
 369. O.D.F. Optronics Ltd. v. Remington Arms Co., 08 Civ. 4746, 2008 WL 4410130, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y Nov. 9, 2008).  
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Further, damages from contract-based remedies will not necessarily 
be so different from those from patent-based remedies. Generally, in 
contract cases, expectation damages are recoverable, although the 
remedy provided to a nonbreaching party may be in the form of reliance 
or restitution damages.370 Meanwhile, in patent cases, damages for past 
infringement are intended to compensate the claimant for the 
infringement and can reflect lost profits, but must be no less than a 
reasonable royalty.371 Moreover, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
eBay decision, the Federal Circuit has concluded that a payment 
obligation for ongoing patent infringement in lieu of an injunction may 
be appropriate under some circumstances.372 In the context of a breach of 
an enforceable contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented 
product, the breach of contract damages may be very similar to 
infringement-related damages, were they available, in that evidence of an 
agreed-to sale price in the absence of the restriction could serve as a 
reasonable basis for the calculation of either breach of contract damages 
or infringement-related damages. And while contract law does not have 
any provision similar to the patent law’s willfulness provision, monetary 
damages recovery from contract-based causes of action can still be 
significant. 
Conclusion 
The Quanta decision, the Supreme Court’s latest opinion regarding 
the doctrine of patent exhaustion, failed to resolve two issues of 
importance to a patent holder who intends to control the post-sale use or 
disposition of its patented product: (1) whether a patent holder can 
preserve its patent infringement remedies by placing a contract-based 
restriction on the buyer of its product as a condition of an authorized 
first sale, and (2) whether breach of contract remedies are still available 
to the patent holder even if an authorized first sale exhausts patent 
infringement remedies. Based on our review of the relevant case law, we 
have concluded that the authorized first sale of a patented product 
exhausts patent infringement remedies and that the conditional sale 
doctrine, which holds that patent infringement remedies can be 
preserved through conditioning the sale of a patented product, is no 
longer good law. And even if one accepts, for the sake of argument, that 
the status of the conditional sale doctrine has yet to be fully resolved, 
there is sufficient doubt as to its viability to justify our focus in this Article 
on the enforceability of contract-based post-sale restrictions on a patented 
 
 370. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 839–55 (Little, Brown & Co., 2d ed. 1990). 
 371. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); see Chisum, supra note 178, § 20.03 (Remedy of Monetary Relief). 
 372. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Under some 
circumstances, awarding an ongoing royalty for patent infringement in lieu of an injunction may be 
appropriate.”). 
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product through a breach of contract remedy. Our analysis indicates that 
at least some contract-based post-sale restrictions are enforceable through 
a breach of contract remedy, and we have presented a case-by-case 
approach to identifying those post-sale restrictions that would be 
enforceable. We end our analysis by noting that the distinction between a 
breach of contract remedy and a patent infringement remedy has 
diminished in the wake of the Supreme Court’s eBay decision, blunting the 
impact of using contract-based remedies in lieu of patent remedies. 
 
Table 1: Supreme Court Patent Exhaustion Cases373 
Case First Sale By 
Authorized 
Sale 
Patent 
Exhausted 
Restriction 
Enforceable 
Bloomer v. McQuewan, 
55 U.S. 539 (1852) 
Patent Holder Yes374 Yes No 
Chaffee v. The Bos. Belting Co., 
63 U.S. 217 (1859) 
No Evidence of a 
First Sale375 
No No Yes 
Bloomer v. Millinger, 
68 U.S. 340 (1863) 
Patent Holder Yes376 Yes No 
Mitchell v. Hawley,  
83 U.S. 544 (1872) 
Manufacturing 
Licensee 
No No Yes 
Adams v. Burke,  
84 U.S. 453 (1873) 
Patent Holder Yes Yes No 
Boesch v. Gräff,  
133 U.S. 697 (1890) 
Party Authorized 
to Sell in 
Germany377 
No No Yes 
Hobbie v. Jennison,  
149 U.S. 355 (1893)  
Patent Holder Yes Yes No 
Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed 
Co., 157 U.S. 659 (1895) 
Patent Holder Yes Yes No 
 
 373. See supra note 14. 
 374. The Court in this case concluded that there was an authorized first sale in the sense that the 
alleged infringer was granted the right under the applicable patent to make and use the patented 
machine, and in constructing and using said machine pursuant to that right the alleged infringer legally 
obtained title to the machine. See supra note 7. 
 375. The Court in this case determined that there was no evidence that the patent holder had sold, 
or granted any right or license to, the patented product to the alleged infringer providing the latter 
with legal title to the product. 63 U.S. at 219. 
 376. The facts of this case were similar to those in Bloomer v. McQuewan. See supra note 374. 
 377. The Court in this case addressed the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. patent exhaustion doctrine. 
The first sale under consideration was made by a party authorized to sell the product only in Germany, 
and the seller was not a licensee under the U.S. patentee’s German patents. The Court concluded that 
such a sale was not an authorized first sale with respect to the U.S. patents covering the product. 
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Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.,  
224 U.S. 1 (1912), overruled by  
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. 
Universal Film Mfg. Co.,  
243 U.S. 502 (1917) 
Patent Holder Yes No378 Yes 
Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell,  
229 U.S. 1 (1913) 
Patent Holder Yes Yes No 
Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. 
Co., 243 U.S. 490 (1917) 
Patent Holder Yes Yes No 
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. 
Universal Film Mfg. Co.,  
243 U.S. 502 (1917) 
Manufacturing 
Licensee 
Yes Yes No 
Bos. Store of Chi. v. Am. 
Graphophone Co.,  
246 U.S. 8 (1918) 
Patent Holder Yes Yes No 
Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. 
Western Elec. Co., 
304 U.S. 175 (1938), reh’g at  
305 U.S. 124 (1938)  
Manufacturing 
Licensee  
No No Yes 
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United 
States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940) 
Patent Holder Yes Yes No 
United States v. Univis Lens 
Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942) 
Manufacturing 
Licensee 
Yes Yes No 
United States v. Masonite 
Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942) 
Patent Holder Yes Yes No 
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible 
Top Replacement Co., Inc. 
 377 U.S. 476 (1964)379 
Third Party 
Infringer 
- - - - - - - - - - -  
Manufacturing 
Licensee 
 
No 
- - - - - - - - - 
Yes 
 
No 
- - - - - - - - - 
Yes 
 
Yes 
- - - - - - - - - 
No 
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG 
Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) 
Manufacturing 
Licensee  
Yes Yes No 
 
 
 378. The holding in Henry is the only instance in the Court’s patent exhaustion jurisprudence 
where an authorized, albeit conditional, first sale did not trigger patent exhaustion. 
 379. The Court in this case considered product sales by the same party both before and after it was 
granted a license to manufacture and sell the patented product by the patent holder. 
